


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Letter from the Editors

Seldom has an edition of *Human Security Perspectives* come at quite so timely a moment. Dedicated to the overarching topic of “Human Security 2010: The Way Forward”, the contributions to this number situate the debate on the future of human security. They are not alone. The concept of human security has managed to move from the fringes of security studies to the center of the international debate. Without referral to the concept of human security, no serious, substantial – and successful – discussion can be led on topics ranging from sustainable peacebuilding and intervention policies to conflict management, from post-conflict reconstruction and diversity management to peace and conflict studies.

The United Nations have accepted as much. While the World Summit Outcome Document of 2005 still refers to the necessity of describing and defining the concept of human security without a clear reference to its broad relevance for the international agenda, the 2009 debate in the General Assembly ended with the conclusion, by the presiding Srgjan Kerim, that “we need a new culture of international relations – with the precept of human security at its core.” But how can we revitalize international relations with human security as a guiding principle? Some important lessons are contained in the contributions to this special edition of *Human Security Perspectives*. They echo and expand the conclusions of the UN Secretary-General in his report on human security of 8 March 2010: “In today’s increasingly interlinked world”, he writes, “where threats can potentially spread rapidly within and across countries, human security is a practical approach to the growing interdependence of vulnerabilities facing peoples and communities.” Some of the elements of human security which the report identifies – including the people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and preventive character of its responses, its focus on root causes of conflicts and its promotion of multi-stakeholder responses – are put into practical context in this edition of the *Human Security Perspectives*.

The vigour with which the United Nations seems to push the concept of human security is not the only thing new. The current issue is a premier in its own right as it is being edited by international lawyers who have collaborated in the project “The Future of Security” at the Institute of International Law and International Relations of the University of Graz. The project, which was

funded by the *Jubiläumsfonds* of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, has identified mainstreaming of human security in peace operations and crisis management as the next big challenge and, to this end, has developed a roadmap published in the interdisciplinary volume *Mainstreaming Human Security in Peace Operations and Crisis Management. Policies, Problems, Potential*. London/ New York (Routledge) 2010.

Borislava Manojlovic shows how the very narratives that fuel conflicts can be transformed in light of human security. Recognizing the importance of disaggregated data for policy-development, *Marije Eldering* develops a methodology to measure human (in)security. For years, Europe's Human Security Doctrine has languished in a drawer in Brussels. *Ana Isabel Xavier* takes up the task of giving the concept a hard look and analyzing its practicality as a tool to shape and improve EU crisis management. The final two authors introduce important thematic and regional dimensions to this edition of the *Human Security Perspectives*. Written perceptively even before the current debate on the repatriation of Roma by France, *Ivana Tomovska* clearly shows why their treatment is a human security issue. This edition concludes with a study by *Adem Beha* and *Gezim Visoka* analyzing the interplay of human and ethnic security in Kosovo.

The UN Secretary-General concluded his 2010 study on human security with the recommendations to the General Assembly “[t]o take into account the added value of the human security concept [...] and to discuss how best to *mainstream* human security in United Nations activities”. In other words: The time for talk to talk about (and to define and describe) the concept of human security is over. Now, it is time to operationalize and mainstream it. The time to just talk about human security may be over – but the time to read about it has just begun. Turn the page and find out why.

*Wolfgang Benedek / Nathan Hauthaler / Lisa Heschl /
Matthias C. Kettmann / Markus Möstl / Maddalena Vivona*

Dealing with Complexities of Identity Conflict: Contentious Narratives and Possibilities of Their Transformation

*Borislava Manojlovic*¹

Current challenges to peace require a new language and practice of security. In this paper, human security will be seen through the lenses of conflict analysis and resolution as an ultimate goal that can only be accomplished through sustainable and just solutions despite the intricacy and complexity of today's conflicts. The need for complex research and practical approaches has received prominence in conflict analysis and resolution field as a consequence of increasing complexities of modern conflict situations that require new types of interventions and theoretical approaches. This article discusses ways of dealing with and embracing complexity as an aspect of human security and an integral part of theoretical and practical approaches to conflict resolution with a special emphasis on the exploration of contentious narratives and their transformation.

I. Introduction

Standard discourse in the field of conflict resolution has been founded on theories and interventions that seek commonalities among parties and consensus building. This trend started at the inception of the field and works of scholars and practitioners such as John Burton, who further developed Abraham Maslow's basic human needs

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theory² that was reinforced through practice of interactive conflict resolution.³ While these invaluable contributions marked the beginning of the field, conflict resolution has entered a stage of maturity marked by a constant need to revisit and re-examine theories and practices. Intractable and protracted identity conflicts resist most of the traditional approaches, which can be seen in the fact that the antagonisms as well as complex dynamics among parties persist long after agreements are signed and direct violence stopped. Agreements imply reduction of hostilities though simplification of conflict complexities on the ground, whereby so-called common and shared interests and goals tend to be extensions of discourses and policies of the powerful intervening parties that often lead to conflict intractability and impede sustainable solutions. It is not rare that such interventions clash with local conditions and understandings, which deem them inefficient and even harmful. To deal with current threats to human security such as intractable identity conflicts and to prevent their reemergence, we need both theoretical and practical approaches that go beyond agreements, shared paradigms and common interests and embrace complexity on the ground as a departure point for treating deep-rooted causes that persist through generations. I argue for the importance of exploring contentious narratives, through which threats, perceptions and meanings that reinforce or undermine human security circulate. In this paper, narrative inquiry is seen as a tool for understanding and dealing with the complexities that challenge human security and provide avenues for transformation and change in today's conflicts. My particular focus will be narratives generated within the context of identity conflict with emphasis on "negative peace" that tends to persist in the aftermath of such conflicts. "Negative peace", as defined by Galtung, refers to the "absence of direct violence"⁴ while other factors such as restoration of relationships and creation of social systems that serve the needs of people are lacking, which significantly affects human security.

II. Narratives as Loci for Understanding Human Security

While more narrow definitions of human security concentrate on impact of direct, armed violence on individuals and groups, broad definitions go further to encompass "freedom from fear and want", thus emphasizing not only basic human needs but also economic, ecological and political factors that contribute to human insecurity.⁵ In this paper, human security will be looked at through the prism of its broad

² Maslow, Abraham Harold, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, Psychological Review (Issue 50), 1943, pp. 370-396.

³ Fisher, J. Ronald, *Interactive Conflict Resolution in Peacemaking*, in: Zartman, I. William and Lewis J. Rasmussen (eds.), *International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 1997, pp. 239-272.

⁴ Galtung, Johan, *Peace: Research, Education, Action: Essays in Peace Research*, Journal of Peace Research (Volume 5), Christian Ejlertsen, Copenhagen, 1975, at p. 29.

⁵ Schnabel, Albrecht, *The Human Security Approach to Direct and Structural Violence*, in: SIPRI Yearbook 2008, Appendix 2C, Oxford University Press, New York 2008, at p. 90.

definition. I argue that stopping or preventing direct violence and war is a critical step towards peace and human security, but such actions do not necessarily guarantee more secure and humane societies in the long run. Therefore, the approach to human security in this paper will focus on threats that are the consequence of “negative peace and structural violence”⁶ such as lack of structural integration, willing interethnic cooperation and relationship restoration that are expressed through narratives, which will be the main loci for exploration of such threats to human security.

Social and structural conditions as well as power relations in a particular society are reflected in narratives that are tools for both perpetuation and change of status quo. Narratives are stories that create and give expression to personal and group identity as they “encode a body of shared knowledge to which persons are intellectually and emotionally committed”.⁷ They enable the formation and interpretation of human conditions and actions through constant renegotiation of meaning and making sense of these conditions. As Barthes has suggested, stories are “*omnipresent and transcultural*”⁸, they give us insight into the meaning systems of individuals and groups. The powerful forces that challenge human security whether they are played out in social, economic, political or environmental levels are underpinned by the struggle over meaning. Struggle over meaning in the form of contentious narratives clearly reflects the struggle for access to power, human rights, resources and legitimation of current and past action on the ground that takes place at all societal levels. Access to the process of meaning-making in conflicting societies can feed social inequalities and insecurity through legitimation of certain individual and groups’ stories while silencing the others. Hence, narratives can be seen as key loci for understanding how contentious meanings can be renegotiated, which would subsequently contribute to transformation and change.

III. Contentious Narratives and the Issue of Power

Following Foucault’s idea about power circulating through discourses, which legitimizes knowledge⁹ and determines what is considered “truth”, we can look at power as both a force that can foster social inequality¹⁰ or be an agent of progressive change. In Croatia, for example, the struggle for legitimacy and access to power has shifted from direct violence to the sphere of discourses. Croats and Serbs in Croatia still hold on to their different versions of history and present,

⁶ Galtung, Johan, *Violence, Peace, and Peace Research*, pp. 167-191, at p. 183.

⁷ Senehi, Jessica, *Constructive Storytelling: Building Community, Building Peace*. Peace and Conflict Studies Journal (Volume 9), 2002, pp. 41-63, at p. 48.

⁸ Herman, David, *Basic Elements of Narrative*, Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, at p. 23.

⁹ Foucault, Michel, *The History of Sexuality*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1981, pp. 92-102.

¹⁰ Luke, Allan, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, in: Keeves, John P. and Gabriele Lakomski (eds.), *Issues in Education Research*, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 161-173.

which has produced separate socio-cultural entities that exist as binary opposites to each other. The binary opposite meaning systems have become part of their identity, which is evident in their private and public narratives. Those systems have at its core the idea of positive, morally pure and superior «us» and evil, vicious and negative «them».¹¹ Thus the challenge to enduring human security in Croatia today is that both major ethnic groups, Croats and Serbs, seek legitimation of their own narratives and views of the past and present, through which they would position themselves on the higher moral grounds in relation to the 'Other'.

The narratives about human conditions, security and peace are significantly influenced by power relations, rank and status of groups and individuals. For example, Galtung argues that the very concept of peace in contemporary world is the Roman "pax"¹², which serves the interest of the powerful to maintain status quo. In case of Croatia, the two major groups have different narratives of peace and human conditions, reflecting significant differences in power relations and status. Serbian version suggests rank disequilibrium, economic and political inequalities and cultural ghettoization stressing the need for expanded view of human security and peace that would encompass cultural and structural emancipation of minorities. Croatian version focuses on a narrower view of human security and peace portraying current absence of interethnic violence and cessation of open hostilities as a success story that implies perpetuation of current power relations and status quo. In this context, one can argue that the narratives can be powerful tools of political activity and distribution of power, which can either open or close the window of opportunities for certain groups.

During the 1990s war in Croatia, we saw how the shifts in power, structurally enforced from the outside in the form of Germany and Vatican's early recognition of the new state of Croatia, had been subtly instrumentalized through the discourse of freedom and right to self-determination, while the narrative related to the old order of Federal country and sovereign nation state of Yugoslavia had been pushed aside. Shifting order of power legitimizes knowledge and action, and determines what is considered truth and what will be silenced. However, the shifting global order of power does not mean that the local ethnocentric narratives related to past atrocities and war will cease to exist and that their complexity will be subsumed under a common narrative of European integrations. Ethnocentric narratives about

¹¹ Rothbart, Daniel and Karina Korostelina, *The Enemy and the Innocent in Violent Conflicts*, in: Sandole, Dennis J.D., Sean Byrne, Ingrid Sandole-Staroste, and Jessica Senehi (eds.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*, Routledge, London and New York 2008.

¹² Galtung, Johan, *Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace*, in: *Journal of Peace Research* (Volume 18), 1981, pp. 183-199.

victimhood and past glory of all nations in Yugoslavia have persisted side by side of the state-promoted unifying narrative and that is why they were so easily mobilized by nationalist leaders in the wake of Yugoslavia's dissolution.

The issue of Armenian genocide is another example of how contentious narratives related to major historical events could be seen as detrimental to human security, as parties struggle for legitimacy, and as shifts in power relationships pose recurrent threats to security. The narratives about the Armenian genocide are a key element of ongoing tensions between Turks and Armenians that have escalated in the wake of Soviet Union disintegration in 1991 Nagorno-Karabakh war. This war can be characterized as a protracted ethnic conflict between Azerbaijan, an ethnically Turkic state, and ethnic majority Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, backed by Armenia, who sought secession from Azerbaijan. The conflict resulted in many atrocities and massive ethnic cleansing by both sides. The peace brokered by the OSCE Minsk Group only stopped the direct violence while arms race, intermittent border clashes and hostile discourses continue to feed negative peace that can very easily escalate in a new open violent conflict. In the meantime, narratives of victimhood in relation to genocide serve to both sides as justifications for perpetuation of hostilities¹³, while the struggle for power shifts and repositioning continues until a change in *status quo* takes place.

IV. Narrative Exclusivity, Simplifications and Binary Opposites

Contentious narratives maintain divisions, exclusiveness and justification of violent actions through the use of key rhetorical acts such as defining a group as 'an enemy' or 'a threat' to the community.¹⁴ Once opposing narratives of "us" versus "them" are developed into melodramas or simplified dramatic oppositions, conflict becomes polarized, personalized and overly simplified, which continually escalates the rhetoric of conflict and the actions of those involved as the conflict evolves.¹⁵ As the

¹³ While the atrocities committed against Armenians by the Turks were recognized as genocide by the International Center for Transitional Justice, the Association of Genocide Scholars and the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Turks have constantly disputed that the genocide had happened. See: <http://www.ictj.org/en/news/coverage/article/935.html> (All websites used in this article were last checked on 3 November 2010). Turks have even presented some documentation about the genocide committed by Armenians against Turks such as Binark Ismet, *Archive Documents about the Atrocities and Genocide Inflicted upon Turks by Armenians*, Ankara 2002.

¹⁴ Hogan, J. Michael and Glen L. Williams, *Defining the Enemy in Revolutionary America: From the Rhetoric of Protest to the Rhetoric of War*, in: *The Southern Communication Journal* (Volume 61), 1996, pp. 272-288.

¹⁵ Osborne, Michael and John Bakke. *The Melodramas of Memphis: Contending Narratives During the Sanitation Strike of 1968*, in: *The Southern Communication Journal* (Volume 63),

conflict and rhetoric escalate, the importance of locations, images and attachments contained within narratives increase¹⁶, which deepens polarization and insecurity. Jewish migration to Jerusalem, for example, increased the emotional significance of its holy sites for Muslims, which in response raised the significance of places in the old city for Jews.¹⁷ Thus the escalation on the ground resulted in escalation of more exclusive and simplified contentious narratives.

The Rwandan genocide of 1994 was not only a culmination of atrocities perpetrated throughout the history between Tutsis and Hutus, but it was also the result of perpetual repetition and political manipulation of mutually exclusive contentious narratives constructed by pre-colonial and colonial ideologies that promoted divisions based on class and race. Even fifteen years after the genocide, with a democratically elected government in power, truth and reconciliation commission, well decentralized government that allows inclusive participation in decision-making, similar narratives persist. They account for the continuing fleeing of Hutus from Rwanda into the Democratic Republic of Congo on claims of witch hunting from the Tutsi led government but are actually based on the underlying narrative of reestablished continuation of old unjust relationship between Hutus and Tutsis as inferior and superior. These narratives that have become an integral part of individual and group identities have been based on heightening the myth of the binary oppositions between these two groups such as the notion that Tutsis are “naturally” aristocratic as opposed to the “coarse” Hutus. As the narratives become more simplified, conflicts and violence are more likely to arise, which can be seen in reduction of complex ethno-cultural identities to simplified binary oppositions such as “noble Tutsis and servile Hutus”. These simplified contentious narratives lead to dehumanization, decrease in communication and interaction, and pave the way for further escalation of violence.

Narratives based on religious history are particularly mutually exclusive and divisive. Shia and Sunni centuries-long narratives about the right to leadership over the Muslim world, have informed and shaped political contexts, disputes and wars in the Middle East. Deeply divisive religious narrative of victimhood which ensued after the battle of Karbala and the massacre of Hussein, son of Ali, who was in Shia’s opinion the rightful heir of Mohammad, added a significant element of passion to the Shia psycho-cultural narrative, tradition and collective consciousness, analogous to the Christian worship of Christ’s passion and sacrifice on the cross. To the Shia, Hussein is a martyr of defiance in the face of oppression. As an often-persecuted minority throughout history, the Shia made the concept of victimhood

1998, pp. 220-234.

¹⁶ Ross, H. Marc, *Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, at p. 45.

¹⁷ Ross, H. Marc, *Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict*, at p. 47.

central to their tradition and the key vehicle of the exclusive narrative about Shia's primacy to the leadership of the Muslim world, which generates conflicts in the region.

V. Narrative Identity

The concept of narrative identity was developed by Paul Ricoeur, among other scholars, and is based on connectivity between narratives and temporality, history and personhood.¹⁸ This concept is supposed to enable the social scientists to empirically study the phenomenological conceptualization of identity since narrative identity can be described as the story we tell ourselves in the present moment about our past, present and future selves and others. "Stories create and give expression to personal and group identity by encoding a body of shared knowledge to which persons are intellectually and emotionally committed".¹⁹ The narrative theory of identity focuses on the underlying structure of personal histories or life-stories and considers the phenomenon of identity not as part of cognitive structures but as analyzable ingredient of personal histories that include narratives and overarching discourses about others and ourselves. People position themselves while telling stories to particular listeners in particular context and these stories vary due to these relationships.²⁰ A further implication is that narratives are products of our own view of history that is influenced by context, macrodiscourses and the listeners, so we can argue that they are constructs amenable to change and transformation. This is exactly echoed in Mamdani's article that shows the change in the content of identity given to Tutsi and Hutu categories that range from class to racial distinctions depending on the historical period.²¹ Narratives are a mixture of master structural discourses such as discourses of occupation, domination and unity on one hand, and personal stories on the other. This mixture influences not only the development of personhood and identity of individuals and groups but also establishes certain kind of relationship that position those groups and individuals in a particular way.

Mahmoud Mamdani's excellent analysis of Tutsi/Hutu identities shows how these identities changed following the historical change in state structures and institutions²² pointing to the fact that identities are socially constructed and influenced by context. Liisa Malkki points out that the stories about past atrocities

¹⁸ Ricoeur, Paul, *The Narrative Function*, in: Ricoeur, Paul, *Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.

¹⁹ Senehi, Jessica, *Constructive storytelling: Building Community, Building Peace*, at p. 48.

²⁰ Harré, Rom and Luk van Langenhove (eds.), *Positioning theory*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1999, at p. 216.

²¹ Mamdani, Mahmood, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002, at p. 364.

²² Mamdani, Mahmood, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*, at p. 364.

are particularly resilient and can become part of people's identity as "acutely meaningful themes ... which are incorporated into the overarching moral order expressed in the mythico-history".²³ Stories about historical atrocities contribute to the dehumanization and belittlement of the Other (the aggressor) and become part of the identity, moral order and everyday practices, which legitimize violence against the Other.

VI. Imagined Realities and Dehumanization through Discourses

Dehumanization through discourses leads to simplification and generalization of the Other. Jasbir Puar, for example, argues that discourses in which the terrorists were portrayed as sexually perverse beings were important for justification of their abject treatment in Abu Ghraib.²⁴ Similarly, the narratives of civilizing missions and rubber companies in the Putumayo region and Congo regularly presented natives as savages, cannibals – in one word "subhumans" – to justify the killing.²⁵ The circulating stories were stories of imagined reality, fabrications and constructions of natives' treachery, uprising and conspiracies and had a role to create a culture of terror and thereby become a "high powered tool for domination".²⁶ The "space of death" and terror is seen as "a space of transformation... loss of self and conformity to a new reality" of oppressors and oppressed.²⁷ Therefore, the context in which torture and genocide have become an acceptable and common practice is shaped through the circulation of macrodiscourses that inhibit complex personal identities such as professional affiliations or gender and promote uniform collective identity based on simplistic dichotomy of "us" vs. "them". When collective identity becomes more salient than individual, it creates particular detachment and dissolution of responsibility, which enables individuals to participate in acts of murder and torture. This once again points to the power of discourse that produces imagination and inspiration for terror, which subsequently leads to action. Selectivity of information and manipulation of discourses is one of the most prevalent tools for social domination in our time. Imagined and fabricated stories based on subjective interpretations of enemy's cultural models embedded in liberal discourse proved to

²³ Malkki, Lisa, *From Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania*, in: Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe I. Bourgois (eds.) *Violence in War and Peace*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 2004, pp. 129-135, at p. 135.

²⁴ Puar, K. Jasbir, *On Torture: Abu Ghraib*, *Radical History Review* (Volume 93), 2005, at pp. 13-38.

²⁵ Taussig, Michael, *Culture of Terror – Space of Death: Roger Casement's Putumayo Report and the Explanation of Torture*, in: Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe I. Bourgois (eds.) *Violence in War and Peace*, at p. 492.

²⁶ Taussig, Michael, *Culture of Terror – Space of Death: Roger Casement's Putumayo Report and the Explanation of Torture*, at p. 492.

²⁷ Taussig, Michael, *Culture of Terror – Space of Death: Roger Casement's Putumayo Report and the Explanation of Torture*, at p. 492.

be much more efficient in controlling the public opinion than showing the reality of war.

Discourses constitute reality even if they are distortions of that reality. Communities and their leaders interpret their past, present and future through narratives, myths and symbols that are adapted and remodeled to fit into the master discourse aimed at either polarization or integration of groups and individuals. Once these master narratives infiltrate individual narratives of the people, they become part of their reality and identity. This is where Mamdani's analysis becomes relevant as it shows how various elites throughout history used discourses to legitimize and delegitimize, give and take power to various groups on the ground in order to promote their own interests. Liisa H. Malkki pointed out how the physical differences between Hutu and Tutsi were kept categorically unambiguous and how their simplification and generalization led to public manipulation and war mongering. She argues that in the "*mythico-history... the markers of bodily difference were closely linked with and superimposed on moral and social difference. The body maps ... became symptoms and proofs for claims reaching far beyond the body*".²⁸ The notion about the difference in appearance between Tutsis and Hutus fueled the Hamitic myth despite the fact that throughout the centuries of coexistence the population mixed and majority of people could not fit into a single category based on their appearance.

VII. Transformation of Narratives

It is my intention to illuminate possible ways of contentious narratives' transformation based on the belief that the human agency can disrupt those dominant master narratives that overwhelm individuals through larger structures invested with power, by renegotiating, deconstructing and externalizing their main premises. Deciphering narratives as socio-historical constructs that incorporate the root causes of conflict can open up the possibilities for acceptance of more complex, and thereby more inclusive narratives, that can subsequently influence change of exclusive identities and pave the way for positive peace. It is transformation of contentious narratives by means of narrative analysis and practice that makes it a major contribution to human security and its goal of addressing the root causes of conflict by promoting equitable relationships as well as better economic and political opportunities for all.

²⁸ Malkki, Liisa, *From Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania*, at p. 130.

A. *Complex Narratives as a Way of Dealing with the Past*

When social scientists approach contentious accounts about past conflicts, they are faced with a variety of problems, one of which is the selection bias when dealing with historical facts. Ian Lustick notes that the researcher should compile diverse accounts from which background narratives must be constructed which can help prevent serious theoretical and evidentiary errors.²⁹ Narrative theory overcomes this problem with its assumption that the narratives are considered as subjective interpretations of history, which is an advantage for researchers for whom narratives represent an invaluable source of rich data about person, context, time and history. In narrative workshops, we are not concerned with the validity or truth of the stated historical accounts, but with the creation of complexities, as opposed to contentious binary simplifications, out of which we can build a new narrative, acceptable to all parties. Complexity and diversity of views and subjective realities implies change while simplicity leads to entrenchment of positions and conflict.³⁰

According to narrative theory, the past is seen as a continual and complex rather than linear process on both individual and collective levels where time collapse happens following particular turning points. The continuation of history and merging of the past and present is reflected in the stories and narratives that evoke past traumas of personal and collective plights that are relived in the present and have equal power over people's emotions and actions in the present as they did in the past. That is why I argue that narratives of the past cannot be disregarded in conflict analysis and resolution and narrative research may be the very tool for addressing that critical relationship between history and present, and how this relates to various aspects of human security. The aspects of human security that narrative research and practice deal with, such as relationships between adversaries, reframing of contentious issues to promote mutual understanding and better grasp of parties' needs and interests, are central in attaining more equitable distribution of power and resources. This is particularly relevant in the aftermath of armed conflicts and is key for improvements in overall social and political stability.³¹

B. *Creating Space for the Marginalized*

The capacity of narrative approach to create space for marginalized groups or marginalized accounts can be seen in its focus on people's private narratives, whose

²⁹ Lustick, S. Ian, *History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias*, in: *The American Political Science Review* (Volume 90, Number 3), 1996, at pp. 605-618.

³⁰ Cobb, Sara, *A Developmental Approach To Turning Points: "Irony" As An Ethics For Negotiation Pragmatics*, in: *Harvard Negotiation Law Review*, 11 (2006), at pp. 147-197.

³¹ Schnabel, Albrecht, *The Human Security Approach to Direct and Structural Violence*, at pp. 87-95.

value is not in their presentation of historical facts because they are neither objective nor neutral, but in their complexity, subjectivity and alternative perspectives that had not been heard before. The narratives of the weak provide alternative perspectives of the reality as well as insight into the development of identity of their speakers and their complex relationship with the external world. Through discourses of race, ethnicity, gender, class and education, as social constructs, people are positioned in disputes in ways that grant them different entitlements and conflict arises when they perceive that others are encroaching on their entitlements.³² Therefore, inquiry and intervention that focuses on narratives of the marginalized groups or individuals offers the possibility for position shifts, empowerment, deconstruction, disambiguation and change of social constructs that make up people's identities and at the same time promote unjust relationships and conflict.

When considering power relations between the dominant and marginalized within a society, positioning theory can help us explain power and powerlessness as relevant only through discourse where positions are taken, negotiated or challenged. Individuals either adopt discourses associated with their position, thus taking the passive receivers' positions, or they reject the dominant discourses and create their own reality, their own storylines as agents. Positions, marginalization and legitimacy shift through time and thus, according to narrative theory, power is seen as unstable, relational, constantly produced, reproduced and shifted in different contexts.³³ The emphasis in the narrative approach to power lies in its assumption that even the *marginalized* or *disadvantaged* can express resistance to existing power relations and make a difference by changing attitudes from passive to active.

The importance of turning the focus of research on the narratives of the marginalized, disenfranchised and silenced can be substantiated by Foucault's idea that the power should be explored in its extreme cases³⁴; in cases where the weakest clash with power of the state in its basic sense and where their bodies consequently become property of the state whether they are exiled, ethnically cleansed, imprisoned, raped or killed. It is not only the state power that fails in such cases but the whole value-belief system based on norms that clash with basic proposition of human security that puts emphasis on the importance of valuing human life as such even when stripped of all legalistic, national and gender attributes. When power relationships that constitute unjust practices that contradict humanity in its basic form become clear and disambiguated, this sets the stage for change to emerge.

³² Winslade, John and Gerald Monk, *Narrative Mediation: A New Approach to Conflict Resolution*, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco 2000, at p. 49.

³³ Winslade, John. and Gerald Monk, *Narrative Mediation: A New Approach to Conflict Resolution*, at p. 50.

³⁴ Foucault, Michel, *Two Lectures*, from *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings*, 1972-1977, Random House, New York, 1981, at pp. 78-108.

Exploring and finding polar cases that, by its very existence, introduce complexity and disrupt the dominant narratives and practices is one way of creating the conditions necessary for change. For example, Urvashi Butalia, who wrote about private narratives in the wake of Partition of India, presents the case of Abdul Shudul, a Muslim officer, who decided to stay in Hindu India because of economic reasons and job in the army.³⁵ Shudul's story represents an exception from the dominant *Hindu vs. Muslim* political discourses constructed to justify war and subsequent separation of India and Pakistan. His narrative puts emphasis on individual values, free will, personal and professional identity that defy the dominant collective narratives and structures shaped by war and population resettlement.

C. Discourses as Everyday Practices

I find Foucault's notion of exploring discourses not "*as groups of signs ...but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak,*" as relationships with "*... regulated ways (and describable as such) of practicing the possibilities of discourse, and as processes always of the "now," the ever-present, not the past*"³⁶ extremely relevant for narrative research related to conflict because it underlines the idea that past and present are often merged through repetition of certain practices within discourse. These practices can be a part of culture as exclusive customs or elements of mythology, symbolism and imagery that make the past relevant and meaningful in the present, which may be the very root of conflict. For example, it is Hindu/Sikh castes structure and the belief in their own superiority, purity as well as their exclusive dining practices that are particularly demeaning and disrespectful to the Muslims and might be one of the root causes of contention that resulted in the Partition.³⁷ Narrative inquiry deepens our context-specific understanding of local practices and provides valuable insights into the identity formation as well as the impact of complex historical processes, practices and socio-cultural contexts on individuals and groups. Possible narrative intervention should aim at identifying demeaning conflictual practices and processes incorporated within narratives and explore the ways of dealing with them, which has to go hand in hand with identifying and addressing other potential threats to human security such as institutionally promoted racial and ethnic discrimination.

³⁵ Butalia, Urvashi, *The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India*, Duke University Press, Durham, 2000, at p.76.

³⁶ Foucault, Michel, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Tavistock Publications, London 1972, at pp. 49 and 70.

³⁷ Butalia, Urvashi, *The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India*, pp. 76-88.

D. Change of Language and Verbal Expression Can Lead to Change of Practices

Language in postmodernist narrative theory plays a central role in constructing who we are and how we engage and or interact with others. Language is seen as a meaning-making activity and meaning cannot be chosen arbitrarily. The function of the language is the permitting and constraining options that might be available to us and by talking and verbally interacting with others, we are actually constructing experience.³⁸ The language has a performative function, which can be elaborated by Foucault's vision of language as action. Circulation of discourses is a process of social action, where relations are produced and reproduced and where change can take place. One can, therefore, argue that narratives can play a crucial role in conflict de-escalation and transformation of relationships towards peace when the change in verbal expressions and gestures towards the Other occur. Conflict mitigation can take place "when there are explicit connections made between inclusive cultural images and metaphors, and events on the ground".³⁹

For example, it was when some white South Africans who saw the inevitability of the majority rule acknowledged the black majority and changed discourse towards them, that the space for change and possibilities for peace were created. And it was Nelson Mandela's discourse that spoke of unity and reconciliation epitomized in his statement, "We must therefore act together as a united people, for national reconciliation, for nation building, for the birth of a new world"⁴⁰, that paved the way for non-violent process of relationship transformation.

However, some narratives are shaped to express ideas of peace and justice while they actually serve biased interests. It is necessary to distinguish between surface structures that underline prominent beliefs and syntactic organization or plots in narratives that can express the roles of social factors represented in biased models.⁴¹ A fundamental mechanism of language change to build negative or positive associations is the use of metaphor. Metaphors of disease, sickness and filth are used to activate gut-level feelings of revulsion toward the outgroup⁴² or its

³⁸ Winslade, John and Gerald Monk, *Narrative Mediation: A New approach to Conflict Resolution*, at p. 39.

³⁹ Ross, H. Marc, *Cultural Contestation in Ethic Conflict*, at p. 315.

⁴⁰ *Nelson Mandela Inaugural Speech*, Pretoria, 10 May 1994. Available online at: <http://www.famous-speeches-and-speech-topics.info/famous-speeches/nelson-mandela-speech-inaugural-address.htm>.

⁴¹ Van Dijk, A. Teun, *Discourse Analysis as Ideology Analysis*, in: Schaffner, Christina and Anita Wenden (eds.), *Language and Peace*, Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd, Aldershot, 1995, pp. 17-33.

⁴² Ruud, Kathryn, *Liberal Parasites And Other Creepers: Rush Limbaugh, Ken Hamblin, And The Discursive Construction Of Group Identities*, in: Nelson, Daniel and Dedaic,

ideology such as the use “vermin” in Hutu discourse to describe Tutsis or the use of “racial tuberculosis” to describe Marxism in Nazi discourse. Metaphors of peace and euphemisms are often used to justify military and political actions. Thus military intervention is called “humanitarian intervention”, and bombs are called “smart bombs”. The concept of “*waging war to make the world more democratic in order to have less war may strike more than a few as a grand paradox. Yet within such a looking glass, the discourse on peace and war is constructed and we are denied a way to talk about peace as peace and are left to contemplate what peace is not.*”⁴³

On the other hand, there have been attempts of using narratives and language to mitigate conflict and promote peaceful solutions as was evident in *Advertising for Peace* campaign, conceived by the Belfast agency of the American advertising multinational McCann-Erickson, that was aired on Ulster Television.⁴⁴ Different narratives and images were used to address the events on the ground and the goal was to raise awareness of shared heritage and social values. This was a new communicational approach to abate terrorist violence in the Northern Ireland province of Ulster, which contributed to an opening of public debate and communication and served as a stage in the gradual process of the change in relationships and positions. However, the issue of ethics in such campaigns, which are essentially based on the manipulation of the public, still provokes debate. We can conclude that in multi-ethnic states, the politicization of language means that linguistic nuances can become the front lines of peace and war,⁴⁵ which speaks to the relevance of narratives as loci where language is the main tool for shifts in meaning, positions, status and relationships.

VIII. Conclusion

Identity conflicts are perpetuated through narratives of individuals who committed, facilitated or resisted acts of violence and oppression via their written or oral record, and they exist alongside official discourses. As opposed to narratives that resulted from organizational or labor conflicts, contentious narratives related to historical events and identity conflicts are more difficult to tackle because of their much wider scope, content and emotional load. Based on the literature mentioned in this article, it is evident that there is an explicit need for more studies that would look at potential of narratives and language for peace. As Nelson says, peace for all requires a different “*language that focuses not on capacities but on threat*

Mirjana (eds.), *At War with Words*, Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co, Berlin, 1999, at p. 49.

⁴³ Nelson, Daniel N., *Conclusion: Word Peace*, in: Nelson Daniel and Mirjana Dedaic (eds.), *At War with Word*, Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co, Berlin, 1999, at pp. 453-454.

⁴⁴ Dickason, Renée, *Advertising For Peace As Political Communication*, in: Nelson Daniel and Mirjana Dedaic (eds.), *At War with Words*, Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co, Berlin, 2003, pp. 385-420.

⁴⁵ Nelson, N. Daniel, *Conclusion: Word Peace*, at pp. 453-454.

abatement, not on defense and deterrence but on identity affirmation"⁴⁶.

Contentious narratives as part of a socio-cultural context and understanding of personhood that were repeated through longer periods of time cannot easily be changed. It would be naïve to think that differences in culture, historical experiences and political disagreement could be bridged simply.⁴⁷ The "chosen traumas"⁴⁸, images of the self and the enemy, collective archetypes of identity embedded in narratives that persist through time perpetuate power relations of the people in a particular setting. The constructivist idea that informs narrative research which implies that truth or a perceived reality is relative is very difficult for the conflict parties to accept⁴⁹. Narrative approaches, as I see them, do not attempt to change identities and narratives, but acknowledge the differences and through complexity, open up opportunities for renegotiation of positions and power asymmetries. It is crucial to understand that every narrator has a sense of entitlement as an agent, wherefore deconstruction of narratives poses a threat to entitlement and legitimacy and is ultimately counterproductive. As an alternative, one can facilitate reconstruction of a shared narrative in such a way that it provides a renewed sense of entitlement for all parties taking into consideration nuances and complexities of interaction. This means the creation of superordinate goals as incentives for the parties to work together towards their attainment. Membership in regional associations, such as the EU, that imply loose unity but not uniformity, can be part of the solution only if those associations recognize the complexity of identities, cultures, opinions and practices of the people under their umbrellas.

Freire⁵⁰ and Fairclough⁵¹ are arguing for the need of conscientization and critical language awareness so that people can understand and fight the oppressive discursive practices and change society by taking control of their own processes in production of social relations. The need to explore narratives in order to address the threats to human security such as oppression, inequitable power and economic relationships and structures can be seen as an imperative for action. Exploration of narratives and *narrative turn* in social sciences can be interpreted as a need to get

⁴⁶ Nelson, N. Daniel, *Conclusion: Word Peace*, at p. 454.

⁴⁷ Ross, H. Marc, *Cultural Contestation in Ethic Conflict*, at p. 320.

⁴⁸ Volkan, Vamik, *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride To Ethnic Terrorism*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1997.

⁴⁹ Weinberg, Oren, *Transformative Approach To Mediation: Radical Insight or Pie in the Sky?*, 2003, at p. 2. Available online at: <http://cfcj-fcjc.org/clearinghouse/drapapers/2003-dra/weinberg.pdf>.

⁵⁰ Freire, Paulo, *Educacao como practica de liberdade, Paz e Terra*, Rio de Janeiro, 1969. Translation by Myra Bergman Ramos published as "Education and the Practice of Freedom" in: *Education for Critical Consciousness*, Seabury, 1973, pp. 1-59.

⁵¹ Fairclough, Norman, *Discourse and Social Change*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 12-240.

insight into the pain and suffering of the marginalized - victims and refugees, poor and discriminated - whose struggle to fit somewhere calls for re-examination of the concepts of identity and human security as well as new approaches to conflict resolution.

Despite the widespread influence of the uniform discourses such as that of globalization, recognition of complex reality embodied in local varieties, practices and identities that are deeply embedded in individual and collective narratives seems to be the only way to ensure security of each person with her/his own traits and particularities. Sociologists like Arthur Frank⁵² argue that peoples' narratives express the local and contingent solutions they have found to the basic questions of meaning. These are of course the very kinds of fundamental questions that researchers must address, and find ways of how to incorporate local and contextual experience into their approaches to peace and human security.

⁵² Frank, Arthur W., *The Rhetoric of Self-Change: Illness Experience as Narrative*, in: *The Sociological Quarterly* (Volume 34, Issue 1), 1993, pp. 39-52.

Measuring Human (In-)Security

*Marije Eldering*¹

Various attempts have been proposed by scholars to define and measure Human Security. This article starts with an introduction to defining the Human Security concept; it then delves into the criticism of Human Security and shows (after a theoretical introduction into measurement of concepts) the empirical differences in the way that Human Security is measured and defined nowadays. Moreover, this paper shows the consequences of these differences through applying the most important methods of measuring Human Security to a comparative case-study between Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar in order to see whether their methodology overlap or not. On the one hand, these outcomes can contribute in a broad sense to future debates about operationalizing Human Security. On the other hand, they might contribute to the development of a Human (In)Security Index.

I. Introduction

“Today, we know that “security” means far more than the absence of conflict... We know that lasting peace requires a broad vision encompassing areas such as education and health, democracy and human rights, protection against environmental degradation, and the proliferation of deadly weapons”²

There are various ways to define and conceptualize Human Security. For some (like Kofi Annan as quoted above) Human Security has a very broad meaning and it

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² Annan, Kofi, *Foreword*, in: Rob McRae and Don Hubert (eds.), *Human security and the new diplomacy: protecting people, promoting peace*, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001, at p. 19.

includes far more than just ‘the absence of violent conflict’. However, analysts and policy makers do not seem to agree on what Human Security might include or not, since a widely accepted definition does not exist.³ This ‘fuzziness’ poses a challenge to the implementation of the concept of Human Security, because scholars in the field of security and international relations use the lack of conceptual clarity as an argument against its analytical usefulness.⁴ The fact that a widely accepted Human (In)Security Index has not been developed yet, might be due to the absence of consensus concerning its definition. However, in order to make Human Security more useful as an analytical tool, it needs to be operationalized so that improvements in the security of individuals can be measured in an adequate way.⁵

II. Human Security

A. *Defining Human Security*

Internationally, the concept of Human Security emerged from the 1994 United Nations Human Development Report (UNDP) that stated that the concept of security was focused too narrowly on the nation-state while security concerns of ordinary people in their daily lives seemed forgotten.⁶ The UN pointed out that basic material needs should be met in addition with a reasonable expectation of protection, so that survival is not threatened (“*freedom from want*”). Moreover, a condition of human dignity with freedom of violence (“*freedom from fear*”) represents the second key element of Human Security.⁷ Since its introduction, many academic disciplines have

³ Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security: Overcoming the Paradox*, Human Security Bulletin (Volume 2, Issue 3), 2003, pp. 1-11; Winslow, D.J., *Human Security*, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 2003; King, Gary and Christopher Murray, *Rethinking Human Security*, Harvard University Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, 2000.

⁴ Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security: Overcoming the Paradox*, pp. 1-11; Paris, Roland, *Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?*, in: *International Security* (Volume 26, Issue 2), 2001, pp. 87–102; Bajpai, Kanti, *Human Security: Concept and Measurement*, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper 19, 2000.

⁵ Prezelj, Iztok, *Challenges in Conceptualizing and Providing Human Security*, in: *HUMSEC Journal* (Issue 2), 2008, pp. 23-45; Winslow, D.J., *Human Security*, pp. 1-37; Brecke, Peter, *Notes on Developing a Human Security/Insecurity Index*, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs Georgia Institute of Technology. Available online at: <http://www.inta.gatech.edu/peter/hsi.html> (All websites used in this article were last checked on 3 November 2010).

⁶ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report - New Dimensions of Human Security*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, at p. 22.

⁷ Alkire, Sabina, *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Working Paper No. 2, Oxford, 2003, at p. 13; Thomas, Caroline and Peter Wilkin, *Globalization, Human Security and the African experience*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, 1999, at p. 109; Winslow, D.J., *Human Security*, at p. 5.

contributed useful definitions of Human Security.⁸ Without discussing these definitions in detail, many of them incorporate aspects of both *want* and *fear*.

However, broadly speaking two conceptual schools of thoughts arise that group most definitions in the 'narrow' or 'broad' conception of Human Security.⁹ The narrow conception of Human Security seeks to prioritize insecurities related to military and physical threats that endanger survival. The broader understanding of Human Security (that encompasses most definitions on Human Security) aims to include a far wider range of threats that also affect non-physical aspects like social, psychological, political and economic aspects of vulnerability.¹⁰

B. Criticisms of Human Security

While proponents of the Human Security concept underline its successes and accomplishments, some academic criticism has emerged.

Firstly, some authors argue that Human Security as concept is too vague,¹¹ which makes it useless for analytical or policy related purposes.¹² Analytically, the more harms are marked as 'security threats' the harder it becomes to study their causal relation. However, as Büger states this might rather be an argument against a positivistic research design than against the Human Security concept in principle. Especially since insecurities cannot easily be separated into fragments but have to be

⁸ Winslow, D.J., *Human Security*, at p. 2.

⁹ Owen, Taylor, *Challenges and opportunities for defining and measuring human security*, Disarmament Forum, Human Rights, Human Security and Disarmament, 2004, at p. 17.

¹⁰ Büger, Christian, *Human Security – What's the use of it? On boundary objects and the constitution of new global spaces*, 2008, at p. 11. Available online at: [http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Researchers/bueger/Documents/B%C3%BCger,%20Christian%20\(2008\)%20Human%20Security%20\(Final%20Version\).pdf](http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Researchers/bueger/Documents/B%C3%BCger,%20Christian%20(2008)%20Human%20Security%20(Final%20Version).pdf); Taylor, Owen, *Human security – Conflict, critique and consensus: Colloquium remarks and a proposal for a threshold-based definition*, Security Dialogue (Volume 35, Number 3), Sage Publications, 2004, pp. 373–387.

¹¹ For instance by Buzan, Barry, *A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion That Adds Little Analytical Value*, in: Security Dialogue (Volume 35, Number 3), 2004, 369-70; Mack, Andrew, *A Signifier of Shared Values*, in: Security Dialogue (Volume 35, Number 3), 2004, at pp. 366-67; MacFarlane, Neil S. and Yuen Foong Khong, *Human Security and the UN: a critical History*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2006; Paris, Roland, *Still an Inscrutable Concept*, in: Security Dialogue (Volume 35, Number 3), 2004, at pp. 370-72; Krause, Keith, *The Key to a Powerful Agenda, If Properly Delimited*, in: Security Dialogue (Volume 35, Number 3), 2004, at pp. 367-68.

¹² For instance by Paris, Roland, *Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?* pp. 87–102; Büger Christian, *Human Security – What's the use of it? On boundary objects and the constitution of new global spaces*, at p. 11; Owen, Taylor, *Human Security – Conflicts, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition*, pp. 373-387.

conceived in their complexities¹³. In the policy field, some authors state (for the same reason as mentioned above) that prioritizing threats is difficult, making Human Security ‘politically useless’.¹⁴

Secondly, with regard to attempts to narrow the concept of Human Security, Paris notes that analysts make choices between values; identifying one as more important than another, while often neglecting to justify these (subjective) choices¹⁵. This might be influenced by the following point of criticism.

Thirdly, in spite of the universal dimension that the Human Security concept seems to offer, some authors argue that Human Security is a ‘Western construction’.¹⁶ For example, Acharya states that Human Security is perceived by some Asian governments and authors as another Western attempt to impose its values on non-Western societies.¹⁷ As Buzan points out, moral, ideological and normative elements prevent people from agreeing on how to define security.¹⁸ For this reason, we should not forget that security is a socially constructed concept based on the subjective experience of the people involved.¹⁹

C. *Measuring Human Security*

Besides conceptual critique, the question if Human Security should be measured is contested. According to Owen²⁰, opponents have argued that measurement asks for a clear definition of what Human Security includes (and what not). This might be

¹³ Büger, Christian, *Human Security – What’s the use of it? On boundary objects and the constitution of new global spaces*, at p. 11; Owen, Taylor, *Human Security – Conflicts, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition*, pp. 373-387.

¹⁴ Owen, Taylor, *Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition*, p. 378.

¹⁵ Paris, Roland, *Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?*, pp. 87-102.

¹⁶ Mushakoji, Kinhide, *Human Security as an Integrative Concept for the UN*, Prime 2, 1994, pp. 40-52; Freitas Raquel, *Human Security and Refugee Protection after September 11: A Reassessment*, in: *Refuge* (Volume 20, Number 4), 2002, pp. 34-43.

¹⁷ Acharya, Amitav, *Debating Human Security: East Versus the West*, Paper presented at the conference “Security with a Human Face: Expert Workshop on the Feasibility of a Human Security Report.” John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2001.

¹⁸ Buzan, Barry, *People, States and Fear. The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, Brighton, Sussex, 1983, at pp. 6-9

¹⁹ Lammers, Ellen, *Refugees, Gender and Human Security. A theoretical Introduction and Annotated Bibliography*, International Books, Utrecht, 1999; Lipschutz, Ronnie D., *Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millenium’s End*, in: Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (ed.), *On Security*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995.

²⁰ Taylor Owen has frequently published contributions on measuring Human Security and is therefore cited frequently.

problematic for those who do not want to limit Human Security in one definition. Furthermore, “objective” and “subjective” measurement might reveal different outcomes that contradict each other. On the one hand, subjective surveys might show that individuals fear physical violence more than diseases. On the other hand, objective mortality rates show that diseases are a greater danger. It is not clear yet how to deal with this ‘measuring contradiction’.²¹

Nevertheless, besides these concerns, it is important that Human Security is measured for the following five reasons:

Firstly, measurement helps *defining* the Human Security concept. Apart from an empirical component (numbering objects and events according to certain rules)²² measurements also have theoretical components. This theoretical component of measuring may force analysts to clarify basic concepts and theories.²³

Secondly, measurement can be used for *mapping and pattern recognition* that would otherwise not be observed. It helps to recognize and locate insecurities and can reveal broad patterns of insecurities within and across different countries.

Thirdly, measurement of Human Security can serve as an *advocacy tool* by presenting improvements or negative developments of different countries or in a specific policy-field like health-care.

Fourthly, for those aiming at determining causal and correlative relationships through a positivistic research design, measurement is of vital importance.²⁴

Finally, the most important reason, in order to respond properly towards Human Security threats, it is important to have a clear idea what these threats are and where they occur.²⁵

²¹ Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security, Methodological Challenges and the Importance of Geographically Referenced Determinants, Environmental Change and Human Security*, in: Liotta, Peter H. (ed.), *Environmental Change and Human Security: Recognizing and Acting on Hazard Impacts*, Springer NATO Science Series, 2008, pp. 35-64.

²² Stevens, Stanley Smith (ed.), *Handbook of Experimental Psychology*, Oxford, England, 1951, pp. 1-49.

²³ Blalock, Hubert M., *Introduction to Social Research*, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, 1970.

²⁴ Landman, Todd, *Measuring Human Rights in Studying Human Rights*, Routledge, New York, 2006.

²⁵ Owen, Taylor, *Challenges and Opportunities for defining and measuring Human Security*, in: Disarmament Forum (Number 3), 2004, pp. 15-24.

III. Measurement of Concepts

A. *From Concept to Indicator*

Section II.A showed that Human Security includes different categories (for example, military and physical threats for the narrow definition and economical and political threats for the broad definition). Additionally, Human Security can be conceptualized in positive or negative terms. Based on choices that are made (narrow vs. broad, negative vs. positive description, ranking values/categories or not, upholding state sovereignty or not) different definitions of Human Security appear that need to be operationalized. Operationalizing is necessary for developing ‘events-based’, ‘survey-based’ or other measures of Human Security. In the following chapter (IV) we will have a closer look at six different methods of measurement. At first, we look at the conceptual steps that allow us to move from a Human Security definition to a valid, reliable and meaningful measurement of Human Security.²⁶

According to Blalock, measurement is the process of linking abstract concepts to empirical indicators.²⁷ This process is described by Adcock and Collier who indicate four main steps to convert defined concepts into meaningful quantitative measures or qualitative categories. Level one considers the *background concept* that includes the broad pattern in conceptual meaning and understanding.²⁸ It is the analyst’s task to distill this broad background concept and this will involve several choices (e.g. normative, delimitative). This first step can differ between analysts since concepts are not closed or fixed quantities but rather fundamentally open in their meaning.²⁹ However, to some extent, scholars, analysts and practitioners often share a general consensus on the content of a background concept. For example in case of Human Security, a background concept should at least include the ‘people-centered’ aspect that Human Security has.³⁰

The second level continues with the *systematized concept* that further designates the concept that should be measured (for example a specific threat like AIDS or a group of related threats like all threats to health). Adcock and Collier tell us that in case of “contested concepts” (such as ‘Human Security’) there are many

²⁶ Landman, Todd, *Measuring Human Rights in Studying Human Rights*, pp. 75-92.

²⁷ Blalock, Hubert M., *Introduction to Social Research*; Zeller, Richard A., and Edward G. Carmines, *Measurement in the Social Sciences, the Link between Theory and Data*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980.

²⁸ Adcock, Robert and David Collier, *Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research*, in: *The American Political Science Review* (Volume 95, Number 3), 2001, pp. 529-546.

²⁹ Kaplan, Abraham, *The Conduct of Inquiry*, Chandler Publishing, New York, 1964.

³⁰ Alkire, Sabina, *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*.

feasible options that vary greatly. Careful examination of the options helps clarifying, but choices must be made. There are three common traps that analysts must avoid in establishing the systematized concept: firstly, analysts must not interpret flexibility in their choices as a possibility to have everything up for grabs. This is seldom the case, since in any field of inquiry scholars and analysts do agree to some extent on potential meanings associated with the background concept. This limits the number of plausible options and analysts that deviate too much might risk to be misunderstood in their field. Secondly, instead of claiming too much in defending their choices, analysts should rather present specific arguments related to the goals and context of their research to justify their choices. Thirdly, analyst should not forget to provide a fleshed-out specification of their systematized concepts that depicts the relation it has with other concepts.³¹ This is necessary in order to understand the systematized concept in its broader context.

Level three operationalizes the systematized concept into meaningful *indicators* that are valid and reliable. In contrast to the background concept at level one, indicators are designed to be as specific and exact as possible since they are intended to approximate and locate concepts empirically.³²

The final level of measurement provides *scores on indicators* that can provide quantitative and/or qualitative data about the unit of analysis that is being used by the analyst (e.g. individuals, communities, countries, regions etc.).³³ A fundamental concern related to the validity of measurement is contextual specificity. Contextual specificity indicates the possibility to interpret one indicator dissimilar due to contextual differences.³⁴ This concern can arise when analysts do comparative research across different world regions or distinct period of time. It can also appear when a specific unit of analysis contains a variety in sub-units (like a country with different regions or subgroups that may constitute different political, social or cultural contexts). Therefore, it is important that analysts are sensitive to context

³¹ Adcock, Robert and David Collier, *Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research*, pp. 529-546; Shepard, Lorrie A., *Evaluating Test Validity*, in: *Review of Research in Education*, 1993, pp. 405-450.


³² Zeller, Richard A., and Edward G. Carmines, *Measurement in the Social Sciences, the Link between Theory and Data*, 1980.

³³ Adcock Robert and David Collier, *Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research*; Zeller, Richard A. and Edward G. Carmines, *Measurement in the Social Sciences, the Link between Theory and Data*; Landman, Todd, *Measuring Human Rights in Studying Human Rights*, pp. 75-92.

³⁴ Moss, Pamela A., *Shifting Conceptions of Validity in Educational Measurement: Implications for Performance Assessment*, in: *Review of Educational Research* (Volume 62), 1992, pp. 229-258.

and bear this in mind while developing their indicators³⁵. Figure 1 provides an overview of the four levels of measurement.

Figure 1. Levels of Measurement³⁶



B. Data Collection and Methodology

Once the researcher established her indicators, there are several ways to collect the necessary data. Data can be collected through a series of questions the respondents answer; for example concerning their social situation (e.g. poverty) or related to their safety (e.g. regarding a specific threat) or to report a certain attitude. Moreover, data collection can take place through observation of individuals' behavior to see how they act or respond in a certain situation. In addition, data can be collected

³⁵ Adcock Robert, and David Collier, *Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research*.

³⁶ Adcock Robert, and David Collier, *Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research*; Zeller, Richard A., and Edward G. Carmines, *Measurement in the Social Sciences, the Link between Theory and Data*; Landman, Todd, *Measuring Human Rights in Studying Human Rights*, pp. 75-92.

through the examination of content analysis (e.g. mass media, policy documents, governmental reports etc.). For example, in order to see if there are changes in salience of an issue, such as AIDS, a content analysis of mass media would be sufficient. Finally, a method often used to collect data is through secondary analysis of data-sets that already exist (like official statistics collected by countries, NGOs, research institutions etc.).³⁷ Data collection mostly involves a great investment in terms of time and money. It is expensive to do a survey among, e.g., 2000 inhabitants of a certain country and since often research budgets are limited, comparative research involving a large number of large-scale units (like communities or societies) is mostly done through secondary analysis.

Blalock states that whenever analysts are forced to use secondary sources for their data, they often settle for other measures than those they would favor due to the fact that data is not available (*data availability*). Furthermore, *data integrity* is always very important and therefore the quality of data and the way of data collection needs to be investigated in order to determine the adequacy of data and collection-method. Data integrity also incorporates investigation to see if the data is accurate in describing the variables that were identified. If researchers expect that the used data has potential hazards, it is necessary to clarify what biases are likely to affect the research findings. In addition, a last difficulty is the *aggregation of data* that is almost always necessary in order to draw conclusions. Aggregation is done by using functions with a single variable (e.g. counting, summarizing) or multiple variables for example for finding out average income for different groups (e.g. counting and summarizing and dividing). A simple example of *aggregated data* is to measure a group by counting its members.³⁸ However, besides other simple ways of aggregation that involve percentages of the members that belong to various categories (like percent labor force that is unemployed, median income in country X, percent of certain ethnicity in city Y) there are also more complex ways to aggregate (e.g. if different weights are assigned to individuals of a measured group). It is a condition for aggregation that data shares at least one equal characteristic. If shared characteristics are not present they must be created (for example by using 'time' or 'space' as mutual characteristic since often it is known *when* or *where* data is collected).³⁹

³⁷ Bryman, Alan, *Social Research Methods*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.

³⁸ The opposite of aggregation is *disaggregation*. That 'fills' (related to this example) the missing data of members with data of the group.

³⁹ Blalock, Hubert M., *Introduction to Social Research*.

IV. Review of Proposed Ways to Measure Human Security

There are six broad frameworks that propose different ways to measure Human Security.⁴⁰ These frameworks can be distinguished by three characteristics: how they define the concept of Human Security, their suggestion of indicators that need to be measured and the methodology used to aggregate and analyze the obtained data. Sections A till F elaborate the existing frameworks while section G compares them and reveals their methodological challenges.

A. *The Human Development Report (UNDP)*

While not directly using the concept Human Security, the Human Development Report (HDR) by the UNDP contains a section on “Ensuring Human Security” and is often used for Human Security measurement. The UNDP uses the broad conception given in section II.A. to define Human Security. In line with the broad definition the HDR Office describes that “...*the causes of insecurity are subsequently broadened to include threats to socio-economic and political conditions, food, health, and environmental, community and personal safety*”.⁴¹ The indicators are divided into subareas that result in a wide range of information that is useful, but according to many authors, not adequate for measuring Human Security.⁴² Brecke states that a Human Security Index would use some of the HDR indicators, but this would not be enough to have credibility as a method to measure Human Security.⁴³ And indeed, the HDR is a report on Human Development, which is different from Human Security. Where Human Development aims at the fulfillment of individuals and the expansion of their life choices in a long perspective, Human Security has as its main goal to allow individuals to be able to pursue choice in a safe environment which includes relatively short-term actions (e.g. peace operations).⁴⁴ However, the UN believes that “*Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only possible if poor countries are*

⁴⁰ These six were selected because they refer clearly to “measuring Human Security” and because they are also used by other authors like Taylor Owen. The HDR method was selected based on the fact that it is often used as alternative (see Winslow, D.J., *Human Security*, p. 7). Other existing measure methodologies with similar variables are not used because they could more be considered as the measurement of specific type of threat that Human security encompasses.

⁴¹ National Human Development Report Series, *The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports*, Occasional Papers, 2006, at p. 5. Available online at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/Human_Security_GN.pdf.

⁴² Winslow, D.J. *Human Security*, pp. 1-37.

⁴³ Brecke, Peter, *Notes on Developing a Human Security/Insecurity Index*.

⁴⁴ Alkire, Sabina, *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*; Winslow, D.J. *Human Security*, pp. 1-37.

given the chance to develop.”⁴⁵ Seen from this perspective, the link between the HDR and Human Security is not attenuated.

The methodology can be applied in several ways (as shown by the Human Security Framework and National Development Reports)⁴⁶, but is largely in line with the Human Development methodology that is also visible in country reports from, for example, Latvia and Afghanistan.⁴⁷ The Human Security ‘handbook’⁴⁸ shows three phases that must be considered. Phase one involves analysis, mapping and planning, phase two is about the implementation of a Human Security Program and phase three makes an impact assessment of the followed program. In line with the topic of this article, only phase one is considered relevant.

During phase one, data on Human Insecurity is collected and analyzed. In order to make an overview of actual needs and vulnerabilities researchers need to identify them by consulting the affected community/ies⁴⁹. Furthermore, data about the root causes of insecurities and their inter-linkages across sectors need to be collected, and a comprehensive response to generate positive externalities for the affected community/ies needs to be established. Once this data is gathered, the ‘Human Security Needs, Vulnerabilities and Capacity Matrix’ (Table 1) can be used to identify and link widespread threats and consider the capacity of the affected community/ies.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ National Human Development Report Series, *The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports*, at p. 9; The UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004, at p. VIII.

⁴⁶ National Human Development Report Series, *The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports*.

⁴⁷ Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2004: *Security with a Human Face; Challenges and Responsibilities*, Army Press, Islamabad; Latvia Human Development Report 2002/2003, Human Security, Riga.

⁴⁸ Human Security Unit Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UN, *Human Security in Theory and Practice, Application of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security*, Handbook 2009, Available online at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HS_Handbook_2009.pdf.

⁴⁹ There is one case-study performed by the NHDR that is based on this method (Myanmar). Since consulting communities is not possible for the other countries (Thailand, Cambodia) this data is missing in the case-study of this article.

⁵⁰ United Nations Development Program, Human Security Unit, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, at p. 14.

Table 1. Human Security Needs, Vulnerabilities and Capacity Matrix⁵¹

Needs/Vulnerabilities										
Threats	National			District			Local			Capacities
	<i>NB: Distinguish between different groups as relevant, according e.g. to age, gender and socio-economic status</i>									
Economic										
Food										
Health										
Environmental										
Personal										
Community										
Political										

B. Generalized Poverty Index

The definition that is used by King and Murray to define Human Security is stated in their article ‘Rethinking Human Security’: “...we propose a simple, rigorous, and measurable definition of Human security: the number of years of future life spent outside a state of “generalized poverty.”⁵² Consequently, Human Insecurity is defined here as a state of generalized poverty which exists if any individual or a group lives below a certain threshold of any essential domain of human well-being. All domains of well-being that are according to King and Murray important enough “for human beings to fight over or to put their lives or property at great risk”⁵³ are equal in their weight in order to avoid difficulties in creating a composite index. This leaves the establishments of the threshold values as the singular subjective part of the process. King and Murray do make some suggestions of how thresholds can be created; these are included in table 2.⁵⁴

According to King and Murray there are several domains of well-being as income, health, democracy, education and political freedom that were inspired by the definition of the UNDP. On this selection of domains, Owen commented that,

⁵¹ United Nations Development Program, Human Security Unit, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, at pp. 15 and 32.

⁵² King, Gary and Murray, Christopher J.L., *Rethinking Human Security*, at p. 585.

⁵³ King, Gary and Murray, Christopher J.L., *Rethinking Human Security*, at p. 593.

⁵⁴ King, Gary and Murray, Christopher J.L., *Rethinking Human Security*, p. 585-610.

interesting enough, these indicators do not include the measurement of violence (although all domains are regarded as ‘worth fighting for’).⁵⁵ For the first domain (income) King and Murray propose as good measure GNP per capita converted into dollars using purchasing power parities. However, due to aggregation related problems this measure is difficult to use and therefore they propose to use the definition that the World Bank gives to absolute (economic) poverty (less than \$1 per capita per day in 2009)⁵⁶ which is widely adopted in the international community. Regarding the second domain (health) they propose several survey instruments (SF-36, Euroqol and WHODAS⁵⁷) to measure different health aspects. The ‘individual state of health’ should be valued from scale 0 (death) to 1 (full health) and cases less than 0.25 are considered as a “state of generalized poverty”⁵⁸. For the third and fifth domain (democracy and political freedom) they propose a reasonable threshold of “*the right of an individual to vote in at least one free and fair election (not necessarily national) that affects some important aspects of that person’s life*”⁵⁹. Concerning the fourth domain (education) they propose to include literacy and the average years of schooling. Because literacy is difficult to measure across countries (due to differences in self-reported literacy by countries) they state that average years of schooling with a threshold of five to six years (primary education) would be sufficient.⁶⁰

Table 2. Generalized Poverty⁶¹

Domain	Indicator
Income	GNP per capita converted to purchasing power parity/absolute (economic) poverty (World Bank)
Health	Quality of health scale
Democracy	Fraction of adults able to participate in elections
Education	Literacy rate and average years of schooling
Political freedom	Freedom house measure of societal freedom

⁵⁵ Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security, Methodological Challenges and the Importance of Geographically Referenced Determinants*, pp. 35-64.

⁵⁶ A Dollar a Day, Finding solutions to poverty. Available online at: http://library.thinkquest.org/05aug/00282/over_what.htm.

⁵⁷ These are questionnaires that must be perceived as field-work, since it is not possible to include that into this article. To compensate some relevant indicators related to ‘quality of health’ are added to cope with this.

⁵⁸ This is a subjective process and it left out of the scope of this research.

⁵⁹ King, Gary and Murray, Christopher J.L., *Rethinking Human Security*, at p. 600.

⁶⁰ King, Gary and Murray, Christopher J.L., *Rethinking Human Security*, at p. 600.

⁶¹ As used by Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security*, at p. 39.

The methodology that King and Murray propose includes three measures. The first measure is the ‘Years of Individual Human Security’ (YIHS) that symbolizes the years that an individual is expected to live outside a “state of generalized poverty”. The second measure is “Individual Human Security” (IHS) that describes the proportion of lifespan a person could expect to live outside the state of generalized poverty. The simplest way to aggregate YIHS is the average of YIHS for everyone in the relevant population, but it can also be done by looking into groups on the basis of population years of human security at birth. The Population Years of Human Security (PYHS) or third measure is the result of aggregated YIHS for a particular population (for example a nation-state or a city).⁶²

C. Human Security Audit

Bajpai defines Human Security as the protection of individuals against direct and indirect threats that affects their personal safety or well-being. This *definition* is derived from a comparison of the Canadian and the UNDP approaches to the concept of Human Security.⁶³

The different threats as given in table three are measured in different stages. The first stage is to measure *potential* threats by collecting qualitative data about these threats. Although Bajpai states that enough data exists to fulfill this stage, Owen argues that this might not always be the case in developing countries. Furthermore, he comments that the broad indicators might give problems regarding data continuity and accuracy. Moreover, judgments about potential threats are speculative and subjective and therefore unlikely to lead towards consensus⁶⁴.

At a second stage, Bajpai seeks to measure the capacities of individuals to combat those *potential* threats. This is done by an assessment of a people’s or government’s capacity by qualitative measures. For example: it is not enough for a Human Security Audit to count the number of women that fall victim to human trafficking. It must also look at governmental policies that are in place to end this practice.⁶⁵ The practical limitations of this methodology are described by Owen: firstly, the aggregation method of indicators is not always clear, although it is important that this is transparent. Secondly, weights of threats and capacities of people or governments are entirely subjective and finally, it is not sure that capacities to counter potential threats are directly relevant to the posed threats.⁶⁶

⁶² King, Gary and Murray, Christopher J.L., *Rethinking Human Security*; Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security*.

⁶³ Bajpai, Kanti, 2000, *Human Security: Concept and Measurement*.

⁶⁴ Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security*.

⁶⁵ Bajpai, Kanti, 2000, *Human Security: Concept and Measurement*.

⁶⁶ Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security*.

Besides an annual Human Security Audit, Bajpai proposes a Human Security Index (HSI) to measure quantitative data also on an annual basis. He describes the uses and limits of a HSI and states that a great deal of data is available to compare national and intra-national. However, concrete indicators that should be included in a HSI are absent and only abstract areas are identified. For this reason the proposed HSI is left out of the scope of the case study as presented in this article.⁶⁷

Table 3. Human Security Audit⁶⁸

Direct threats	
Local	Violent crime, abuse of women/children
Regional	Terrorism, genocide, government repression
National	Societal violence, international war, banditry, ethnic violence
International	Interstate war, weapons of mass destruction, landmines
Indirect threats	
Societal	Lack of basic needs, disease, employment levels, population growth or decline, natural disasters
Global level	Population movement, environmental degradation, unequal consumption

D. Index of Human Insecurity (GECHS)

The definition of Human Security of the Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project (GECHS) is based on the premise that environment and society are inter-linked. They state that “*environmental stress, often the result of global environmental change, coupled with increasingly vulnerable societies, may contribute to insecurity and even conflict.*”⁶⁹ In this context, security is only achieved if individuals are able to end or adapt to their environmental, social or human rights related threats. GECHS believes that a cumulative causality between environment and security exist. In addition, they point out indirect threats that come from environmental conditions or from the responses to that condition.

In order to measure insecurities, the Index of Human Insecurity (IHI) is developed to help in identification and classification of vulnerable or insecure

⁶⁷ Bajpai, Kanti, *Human Security: Concept and Measurement*.

⁶⁸ As used by Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security*, at p. 40.

⁶⁹ Lonergan, Steve, Gustavson, Kent and Carter, Brian, *The Index of Human Insecurity*. AVISO (Issue 6), 2000, at p. 1. Available online at: www.gechs.org/aviso.

regions. Social, environmental, economical and institutional are selected as categories that include each four indicators (table 4). Indicator selection was based on the following criteria: data-indicator consistency; relevance to selected framework; existing theoretical or empirical relationship, data availability, adequacy of spatial coverage.⁷⁰

Table 4. The Index of Human Insecurity⁷¹

Environment	net energy imports (% of commercial energy use)
	soil degradation (tone/year)
	safe water (% population with access)
	arable land (hectares per person)
Economy	real GDP per capita (US\$)
	GNP per capita growth (annual %)
	adult illiteracy rate (% of population 15+)
	value of import and export of goods and services (% of GDP)
Society	Urban population growth (annual %)
	young male population (% aged 0-14 of total population)
	maternal mortality ratio (per 100.000 live births)
	Life expectancy (years)
Institutions	public expenditures on defense vs. education, primary and secondary (% of GDP)
	gross domestic fixed investment (% of GDP)
	Degree of democratization (on scale 1 - 7)
	Human freedom index (on scale 0 - 40)


The methodology that GECHS uses, involves three stages. At first, a complete time series (1970-1995) for all indicators at national level was established.

⁷⁰ Lonergan, Steve, Gustavson, Kent and Carter, Brian, *The Index of Human Insecurity*, pp. 1-11; Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security*.

⁷¹ Lonergan, Steve, Gustavson, Kent and Carter, Brian, *The Index of Human Insecurity*, at p. 3.

Missing data was filled through linear regression or data interpolation. The second stage involved data standardization so that data would be available on a common scale. Owen comments on this process of data standardizing that it is not clear in detail how this was done, however this stage seems crucial to the validity of the final measurement. In the third stage, data is classified and the index is calculated by using cluster analysis, assigning a number between one and ten for each indicator of each country.⁷² GECHS states that the IHI model can provide medium and long-term indications of changes in insecurity. Furthermore, GECHS shows that there is a strong linear relationship between IHI and the Human Development Index (HDI) by the UNDP. In reaction to this, Owen raises the question, “[if this is the case] *then what is the difference between development and security as defined by GECHS?*”⁷³ Exactly this question reveals one of the key-debates for Human Security; because if too many threats are listed as danger to Human Security, it will include also those more related to Human Development.⁷⁴

Figure 2. Relationship of IHI and HDI by country for 1994 as given by GECHS⁷⁵



⁷² Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security*, at p. 42.

⁷³ Lonergan, Steve, Gustavson, Kent and Carter, Brian, *The Index of Human Insecurity*, at p. 42.

⁷⁴ Lonergan, Steve, Gustavson, Kent and Carter, Brian, *The Index of Human Insecurity*; Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security*, at p. 42.

⁷⁵ The strong linear relationship is visible in the graphic by the density of dots that is larger along a line; Lonergan, Steve, Gustavson, Kent and Carter, Brian, *The Index of Human Insecurity*, at p. 8.

E. Human Security Report Index

The Human Security Report, an initiative originally implemented by the University of British Columbia in Canada, but now continued by Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, defines Human Security due to pragmatic and methodological reasons in relation to its narrow concept: deaths caused by armed conflict and criminal violence.⁷⁶ This is the most limited spectrum as compared to other proposed ways for measuring Human Security as used in this article.

The Human Security Centre uses for their Human Security Report a variety of data from different research institutions and through major public opinion polls. Additionally, they use a dataset that was commissioned in 2005 from Uppsala University's Conflict Program that provides key trend data for the report. The measured indicators fall under the following three categories: state-based armed conflict (e.g. interstate wars and civil wars that include the state as warring party), non-state armed conflict (e.g. conflicts that does not involve the government as a warring party) and one-sided violence (e.g. genocides, politicides).⁷⁷ To measure Human Insecurity, data-collection is done by counting "*the number of cases of political violence (armed conflict plus cases of one sided violence, the number of countries experiencing political violence, the number of reported deaths from political violence and the number of reported death per 100.000 population)*".⁷⁸ Regarding the methodology the aggregation of measures is unproblematic, since a common scale of indicators is present, namely number of deaths.⁷⁹

F. Human Security Mapping

Owen defines Human Security largely in line with the definition given by the Commission on Human Security: "*Human Security is the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive economic, environmental, health, food, political and personal threats.*"⁸⁰ According to him this definition keeps a broad focus on Human Security while at the same time it separates itself from concepts such as human development or human wellbeing. The reason for a broad definition can be found in the fact that death from flood or death from a gunshot is, in the end, not different and should both considered as threats to Human Security. An important aspect of this definition is that it is dynamic and able to filter a list of

⁷⁶ The Human Security Project, *Human Security Report 2005*, part VIII.

⁷⁷ The Human Security Project, *Human Security Report 2005*, at p. 2; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP Database. Available online at: www.ucdp.uu.se/database. Uppsala University. Available online at: <http://www.pcr.uu.se>.

⁷⁸ Human Security Report Project, *Human Security Report 2005*, at p. 67; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP Database.

⁷⁹ Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security*.

⁸⁰ Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security: Overcoming the Paradox*, at p. 3.

‘security threats’ by setting a certain threshold. Indicators that should be measured regard those threats that surpass the threshold of Human Security. They are divided under the categories environment, economic, political, personal, health, and food.⁸¹

The Human Security Mapping methodology has three stages: threat assessment, data collection and organization, and data visualization and analysis. Stage one (threat assessment) seeks to determine specific threats that affect a particular country or region based on grounded empirical and qualitative research. Through interviews with regional specialists for each category, it becomes clear what Human Security threats are present in their region. By shifting to a local focus (instead of a national focus) the list of Human Security threats is limited to a manageable size. In the second stage (data collection and organization) Owen proposes quantitative and qualitative data collection in relation to the security threats that were determined. For indicator selection local researchers, NGOs, governmental ministries and International Organizations are used and two important aspects in this stage are data availability (addressed by only including regional relevant threats) and the spatial dimension (necessary since this is the common characteristic between the indicators). The final stage is to map and analyze the Human Security data that are organized in a Geographical Information System (GIS) by their special reference. This results in a map that displays the varying severity in threats by showing ‘hot spots’ (regions of aggregated Human Insecurities). Below an overview of all stages of Human Security Mapping encompasses.⁸²

Table 5. The Human Security Mapping

Stage 1. Threat Assessment																	
Environ.			Economic			Poltical			Personal			Health			Food		
A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C

Stage 2. Data Set						
Province	Economic			Political		
	Threat A	Threat B	Threat C	Threat A	Threat B	Threat C
1						
2						
3						

⁸¹ Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security: Overcoming the Paradox*; Owen, Taylor, *Human Security Mapping: A New Method for Measuring Vulnerability*.

⁸² Owen, Taylor and Olav Slaymaker, *Towards Modeling Regionally Specific Human Security Using GIS: Case Study Cambodia*, *Ambio* (Volume 34, Number 6), 2005, pp. 439-443.

Stage 3. Hotspot Count							
Province	Economic			Political			Hotspot Count
	Threat A	Threat B	Threat C	Threat A	Threat B	Threat C	
1.	1	2	2	1	2	0	3
2.	1	1	2	1	0	1	1
3.	0	0	2	2	0	1	2

G *Methodological Challenges*

This overview of proposed ways to measure Human Security reveals different conceptions of what Human Security is. Where GECHS underlines environment as important variable, King and Murray point out that development is very important, while neither of them addresses violence. The approach of King and Murray is therefore more focused on issues associated with ‘freedom of want’ since they perceive poverty as a root cause of conflict.⁸³ On the contrary, the ‘Human Security Report Index’ would not include development or environmental factors in its measurement of Human Security. They are mainly focused on describing human insecurities resulting from global violence or issues associated with ‘freedom of fear’⁸⁴. Many of the elaborated ways of measuring Human Security include some aspects of the broad conception as given by the UNDP that in this way can be perceived as ‘background concept’. Moreover, all frameworks (except HDR) claim to measure Human Security, but they are clearly different in their focus. Regarding the feasibility of the methodology it becomes clear that when the index is broadened by including another indicator, issues of data availability, integrity and aggregation become more problematic.⁸⁵ In other words, the closer the methodology tries to be (with regard to the broad background concept), the less practical and analytically feasible it becomes. Owen created the framework of ‘Human Security Mapping’ that tries to overcome this by including space as common variable and by measuring at local level⁸⁶.

While the ‘Human Security Index’ has a narrow conception (personal security), the other frameworks are conceptually broader and incorporate other dimensions of security. These broader frameworks share the characteristic that the ranges of indicators they use are derived from Human Security literature.

⁸³ Alkire, Sabina, *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*.

⁸⁴ Winslow, D.J., *Human Security*, pp. 1-37.

⁸⁵ Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security*, Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler, *Data Issues in the Study of Conflict*, Paper prepared for the Conference on “Data Collection and Armed Conflict”, Uppsala 8-9 June 2001; Brauer Jurgens, *War and Nature: The Problem of Data and Data Collection*. Paper prepared for the Conference on “Data Collection and Armed Conflict”, Uppsala 8-9 June 2001.

⁸⁶ Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security*.

Furthermore, most of them (except ‘Human Security Mapping’) measure at the national level by applying their ranges of indicators to each nation assuming them to be of equal importance. The national data for each indicator is available through databases from, for instance, the World Bank and the UN. On this point, Owen states his critique that *data availability* is a too important consideration in many of the approaches to measure Human Security. “*An assumption with this approach is that if a harm is serious enough, someone will most likely measure it*”.⁸⁷ However, this might not be the case due to a lack of capacity (only a few organizations are able to collect sufficient data on a global scale) or because it is a relatively small scale threat (which is still a threat to Human Security but most likely not measured on a global scale). Although most approaches measure at national-level, the ‘Human Security Mapping’ approach includes measures at the regional level for the reason that “*...most Human Security threats are regionally dispersed within, not simply between countries*”.⁸⁸ According to Owen, this is ignored by other national Human Security comparisons.⁸⁹

V. Case Study: Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand

A. Introduction

The case study applies the methods of measuring to analyze the security situation of three neighbouring countries in South-East Asia, namely Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar.⁹⁰ All are different in their history (between very conflicted with multiple other issues and less conflicted). Data collection took place over the period 2002-2007 by using several databases (WHO, World Bank, HDI, Freedom House, Uppsala database, UNDP) or by using reports (HDR, World health statistics, CIA factbook) or analysis done by the analysts or institutes that proposed the measuring method. Tables 6 till 11 shows the outcome of the different methods.

B. Application of the Human Development Report

The Human Security Trust Fund of the UN performed a case study of their human security approach for Myanmar. The ‘multiple entry points’ that they described in their case study, are used to fill in the ‘Post-Conflict Needs, Vulnerabilities and Capacity Matrix’ that they propose in the Human Security ‘Handbook’. Since this

⁸⁷ Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security*, at p. 48.

⁸⁸ Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security*, at p. 47.

⁸⁹ Owen, Taylor, *Measuring Human Security*.

⁹⁰ For further background information related to measurement of Human Security see for example: Owen, Taylor, *Human Security Mapping, A New Method for Measuring Vulnerability (Cambodia)*; Based on outcome of Case Study United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, Myanmar; United Nations Development Program, Human Security Unit, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*.

application does not describe any challenges or threats in ‘Environmental’, ‘Personal’, ‘Community’ and ‘Political’ areas, these boxes remain empty. Unfortunately, this measuring method could not be applied for Thailand and Cambodia since there was no case study performed for these countries.

Table 6. Application of the Human Development Report

Needs/Vulnerabilities Myanmar: Support Ex-Poppy Farmers and Poor Vulnerable Families ⁹¹				
Threats ⁹²	National	District	Local	Capacities
Economic	Increased poverty and unemployment; lack of education	... ⁹³	Loss of income (ex-poppy farming households/poor families); lack of access to gainful employment	Improve socio-econ. conditions (UN agencies and local and international NGOs)
Food	Inability of the state to ensure food production and equitable distribution	... ⁹⁴	Lack of physical/econ. access to basic food (ex-poppy farming households/poor families)	Improve food security conditions (UN agencies and local and int. NGOs)
Health	Multiple health challenges			
Environmental ⁹⁵				
Personal ⁹⁶				
Community ⁹⁷				
Political ⁹⁸				

⁹¹ Based on outcome of Case Study United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, Myanmar, United Nations Development Program, Human Security Unit, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, at pp. 70-71.

⁹² Distinguish between different groups as relevant, according to, for instance, age, gender and socio-economic status.

⁹³ No data available in Case Study.

⁹⁴ No data available in the case study.

⁹⁵ This area was not referred to in the case study.

⁹⁶ This area was not referred to in the case study.

⁹⁷ This area was not referred to in the case study.

⁹⁸ This area was not referred to in the case study.

C. Application of the Generalized Poverty Index

In order to apply the Generalized Poverty Index, multiple databases are used to obtain the necessary data to fill in the proposed indicators for Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar. Sometimes, boxes remain empty due to a lack of data. For this measuring method this only occurred once for Myanmar.

Table 7. Application of the Generalized Poverty Index

Income	Cambodia	Thailand	Myanmar
GDP per capita (PPP US\$, 2007) ⁹⁹	1,802	8,135	904
Population living under \$1.25 a day (% , 2000-2007) ¹⁰⁰	40,2	<2	32,7 ¹⁰¹
Population living under \$1.00 a day (% , 2000-2007) ¹⁰²	40,2 ¹⁰³	2 ¹⁰⁴	.. ¹⁰⁵
Health	Cambodia	Thailand	Myanmar
Healthy life expectancy (HALE) at birth (years, 2007) ¹⁰⁶	53	62	50
Unhealthy life expectancy (% , 2007) ¹⁰⁷	9	5	15
Education	Cambodia	Thailand	Myanmar
Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above) ¹⁰⁸	76.3	94.1	89.9
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group, 2007) ¹⁰⁹	85	101	.. ¹¹⁰

⁹⁹ Human Development Index (author's own query). Available online at: www.hdi.org.

¹⁰⁰ Human Development Index (author's own query).

¹⁰¹ Nation Master, Economic Statistics. Available online at: http://www.nationmaster.com/time.php?stat=eco_pop_bel_pov_lin-economy-population-below-poverty-line&country=bm-burma#definition.

¹⁰² Millennium Development Goals Indicators. Available online at: <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=580>.

¹⁰³ Estimated from Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey, 2004; National coverage.

¹⁰⁴ Estimated from Thailand Socio-Economic Survey; 2004; National coverage.

¹⁰⁵ No data available.

¹⁰⁶ Indicators derived from mortality rates provide a good picture of overall population health, at p. 35. World Health Organization, *World Health Statistics 2009*, pp. 35-45.

¹⁰⁷ Refers to the difference between life expectancy and healthy life expectancy, expressed in percentage terms. Human Development Index (author's own query).

¹⁰⁸ World Bank (author's own query). Available online at: <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135>.

Political freedom and democracy	Cambodia	Thailand	Myanmar
Map of Freedom (2007) ¹¹¹	not free	not free	not free
Political Right score (1 most free - 7 least free) ¹¹²	6	7	7
Civil Liberty score (1 most free - 7 least free) ¹¹³	5	4	7

D. Application of the Human Security Audit

Several databases and reports were used to obtain the necessary data on direct and indirect threats in Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar. In the databases, qualitative data is collected about the indicators that Bajpai proposes. This resulted in the table below. Some boxes are left empty; this means that there are no threats in that area found (at least not in line with Bajpai's indicators) for that particular country within the timeframe 2002 to 2007.

Table 8. Application of the Human Security Audit

Direct threats (2002-2007)	Cambodia	Thailand	Myanmar
Local ¹¹⁴	human trafficking		
Regional ¹¹⁵		govern. repression (2002-2004)	government repression (2002-2007)
National ¹¹⁶	narcotics-related corruption	societal violence (2002-2007)	societal violence (2002-2007)
International	landmines		

¹⁰⁹ World Bank (author's own query).

¹¹⁰ No data available.

¹¹¹ Freedom House. Available online at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/MOF2007.pdf>.

¹¹² Freedom House.

¹¹³ Freedom House.

¹¹⁴ CIA factbook 2006. Available online at: <http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/27509/pg27509.html> and CIA factbook 2009 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>.

¹¹⁵ Uppsala database; UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset v 1.3 1989-2007, September 2009. Available online at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.html.

¹¹⁶ CIA factbook 2006, CIA factbook 2009, Uppsala database, and UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset.

Indirect threats (2002-2007)	Cambodia	Thailand	Myanmar
Societal ¹¹⁷	very high risk major infectious diseases (303.2 estimated deaths per 100,000 population by cause 'infectious and parasitic diseases' ¹¹⁸)	Natural disasters (tsunami 2004; 5,395 dead, 2,993 missing and presumed dead) ¹¹⁹	Natural disasters (tsunami 2004; 59 dead ¹²⁰)
		high risk major infectious diseases (177.6 estimated deaths per 100,000 population by cause 'infectious and parasitic diseases') ¹²¹	Natural disasters (destructive earthquakes and cyclones; flooding and landslides)
			very high risk major infectious diseases (236.4 estimated deaths per 100,000 population by cause 'infectious and parasitic diseases') ¹²²
	lack of basic needs (in 2004 40% below poverty line)	lack of basic needs (in 2004 10% below poverty line)	lack of basic needs (in 2007 32.7% below poverty line)
Global level			

¹¹⁷ CIA factbook 2006 and CIA factbook 2009.

¹¹⁸ WHO, *Burden of Disease*, 2004. Available online at: http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/gbddeathdalycountryestimates2004.xls.

¹¹⁹ CNN Tsunami death toll, 2005. Available online at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/12/28/tsunami.deaths>.

¹²⁰ CNN Tsunami death toll, 2005.

¹²¹ WHO, *Burden of Disease*.

¹²² WHO, *Burden of Disease*.

D. Index of Human Insecurity (GECHS)

The data for the indicators as proposed by GECHS to measure insecurities are collected through different databases and reports. For one indicator (Value of import/export of goods and services in % of GDP) data is not available for Myanmar. The required data on 'soil degradation' (per ton/year) were not found, as alternative data on the 'severity of Human Induced Soil Degradation' is used. For all indicators the latest available data is used, therefore the data collection year may differ per country (like in case of public expenditures on defense and education).

Table 9. Application of the Index of Human Insecurity (GECHS)

Environment	Cambodia	Myanmar	Thailand
Net energy imports (% of energy use, 2003/2004) ¹²³	26.7% ¹²⁴	-34.23 %	48.39%
Soil degradation ¹²⁵	22,4% (very severe) 26,4% (severe)	1% (very severe) 34,9% (severe)	49,5% (very severe) 28,2 % severe)
Safe water (% pop. with access, 2006) ¹²⁶	65	80	98
Arable land (% of land area, 2005) ¹²⁷	30 / 20,44	17 / 14,92	36 / 27,54
Society¹²⁸	Cambodia	Myanmar	Thailand
Urban population growth (annual %, 2006)	1,7	0,7	0,9
Young male population (% aged 0-14 of total pop.) ¹²⁹	17,9	13,3	11,2
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100.000 live births, 2005)	540	380	110
Life expectancy (years, 2005)	62	60	72

¹²³ Available online at: http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/ene_imp_net_of_ene_use-energy-imports-net-of-use.

¹²⁴ No data available for 2003-2004 therefore data for 2005 was used. The World Bank (author's own query).

¹²⁵ No data found to measure this indicator in ton per year; as alternative data used about the 'Severity of Human Induced Soil Degradation' FAO/AGL, available online at: www.fao.org.

¹²⁶ World Bank (author's own query).

¹²⁷ World Bank (author's own query) and CIA factbook 2006.

¹²⁸ WHO (author's own query).

¹²⁹ CIA factbook 2006.

Economy ¹³⁰	Cambodia	Myanmar	Thailand
Real GDP per capita ¹³¹ (US\$, 2006)	449	1100 ¹³²	2488
GNP per capita growth (annual %, 2006)	11	13	5
Adult illiteracy rate (% of population 15+) ¹³³	23,7	10.1	5,9
Value of import/export of goods and services (% of GDP, 2006)	76 / 69	.. / .. ¹³⁴	73 / 76
Institutions	Cambodia	Myanmar	Thailand
Public expenditures on defense vs. education, primary and secondary (% of GDP) ¹³⁵	3 (2005) vs. 1.7 (2004)	2,1 (2005) vs. 1,2% (2000)	1,8 (2005) vs. 4,2 (2005)
Gross domestic fixed investment (% of GDP, 2005) ¹³⁶	23,3	11,5	29
Political Right score (1 most free - 7 least free) ¹³⁷	6	7	7
Civil Liberty score (1 most free - 7 least free) ¹³⁸	5	7	4
Human Development Index (rank, 2006) ¹³⁹	137	138	87

*D. Application of the Human Security Report Index*¹⁴⁰

Data collection for the indicators as suggested for this Index is done by using the proposed dataset from the Uppsala University. If available, the number of deaths

¹³⁰ World Bank (author's own query).

¹³¹ World Bank (author's own query).

¹³² CIA factbooks 2006 and 2009.

¹³³ Data refer to national illiteracy estimates from censuses or surveys conducted between 1999 and 2007 obtained at Human Development Index (author's own query).

¹³⁴ No data available.

¹³⁵ CIA factbook 2009.

¹³⁶ CIA factbook 2006.

¹³⁷ Freedom House.

¹³⁸ Freedom House.

¹³⁹ Ranks between 84 and 154 are medium developing countries. See <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data>.

¹⁴⁰ All data obtained from <http://www.pcr.uu.se>.

caused by the conflict is given, since this number is counted to measure Human Insecurity as explained before. In Cambodia no conflict occurred in the period 2002 – 2007, therefore the boxes for Cambodia are left empty.

Table 10. Application of the Human Security Report Index

	Cambodia	Thailand	Myanmar
2002		Intrastate conflict (Patani) and one-side conflict (Government - civilians)	Intrastate conflict Karen (102 death), Karenni, Shan (180) and non-state conflict SSA-S – UWSA (63 death) and one-side conflict Government – civilians (64 death)
2003		Intrastate conflict Patani (27 death ¹⁴¹) and one-side conflict Government – civilians (76 death)	Intrastate conflict Karen (40 death), Karenni, Shan and non-state conflict (SSA-S - UWSA) and one-side conflict Government – civilians (72 death)
2004		Intrastate conflict Patani (164 death) and one-side conflict Government – civilians (116 death) and Patani insurgents – civilians (146 death)	Intrastate conflict Karen, Karenni, Shan and non-state conflict (SSA-S - UWSA) and one-side conflict (Government - civilians)
2005		Intrastate conflict Patani (205 death) and one-side conflict Patani insurgents – civilians (287 death)	Intrastate conflict Karen (42 death), Karenni (35 death), Shan (28 death) and non-state conflict SSA-S – UWSA (119 death) and one-side conflict Government–civilians (132 death)
2006		Intrastate conflict Patani (214 death) and one side conflict Patani insurgents – civilians (326 death)	Intrastate conflict Karen (104 death), Shan (54 death) and one-side conflict Government of Myanmar – civilians (211 death)

¹⁴¹ Based on ‘best estimate’ data that consist of the aggregated most reliable numbers for all incidents of one-sided violence during a year. If the number of death is missing means that data was not available. UCDP, *One-sided Violence Codebook*, version 1.3, 2008. Available online at: <http://www.pcr.uu.se>.

2007		Intrastate conflict Patani (197 death) and one side conflict Patani insurgents – civilians (320 death)	Intrastate conflict Karen (104 death) Shan (25 death), non-state conflict DKBA – KNU (33 death) and one-side conflict Government of Myanmar – civilians (205 death)
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E. Application of the Human Security Mapping¹⁴²

Between 2002 and 2004 a case study was conducted for Cambodia by Owen who proposes Human Security Mapping as method to measure threats to Human Security. In short on several Human Security treats spatially referenced local data was collected. The outcome of this case study resulted revealed ‘hotspots’ of insecurity which can be found in Owen’s articles. The given table “constitute the critical and pervasive threats to the vital core of Cambodians”¹⁴³. Since a case study was not conducted for Thailand and Myanmar, Human Security Mapping can not be applied for these countries.

Table 11. Application of the Human Security Mapping

Environ.	Economic	Political	Personal	Food	Health
Floods (District) ¹⁴⁴	Poverty (Comm.)	Corruption (Province)	Landmines (District)	Starvation (Commune)	HIV/AIDS (Province)
Droughts (District)		Human rights abuses (Province)	UXO's (District)	Malnutrition (Commune)	Malaria (Province)
			Violence (Commune)		TB (District)
			Robbery/ theft (Commune)		Dengue fever (Province)
			Small arms (Commune)		

¹⁴² Based on Owen, Taylor, *Human Security Mapping: A New Method for Measuring Vulnerability*, pp. 1-24.

¹⁴³ Based on Owen, Taylor, *Human Security Mapping: A New Method for Measuring Vulnerability*, at p. 13

¹⁴⁴ The most local level is Commune level, followed by District level which is followed by Province level.

F. Comparison Matrix

Every method has a certain way of measuring Human (in)security by using different indicators, which might result in different outcomes. In order to compare the outcomes of the applied methods in the case study, table 12 is compiled by interpreting the collected data for each measuring-method per country. Firstly, table 12 shows for every method, the areas of security that are measured. These areas (economic-, food-, health-, environment-, personal-, political-, community- and institutional security)¹⁴⁵ are taken as proposed by the HDR of UNDP in 1994. If a certain security area is not relevant according to a method, 'X' is used as a value. Secondly, the data outcomes (e.g. percentages, absolute numbers, and descriptions) of the measuring-methods are converted into relative scores by ranking them from the lowest level security (1) to the highest level security (3). For some indicators the ranking is straightforward. A good example is ranking the economic indicator of HSA ('lack of basic needs'). For this indicator, Cambodia scores the lowest level of security (score 1 with 40% below poverty line in 2004) and Thailand scores the highest level of security (score 3 with 10% below poverty line in 2004). However, sometimes, within a security area, a certain method proposes qualitative indicators and these outcomes might be equal for two countries (for example HSA table 8 both Thailand and Myanmar have both 'Natural disaster (Tsunami 2004)'). In order to deal with this and to have a more accurate ranking between methods these qualitative data are converted into quantitative data. This is done by using the method proposed by Roberts, namely to focus on Human Insecurity and to revolve this around the number of death¹⁴⁶. Thus, if possible, the number of deaths caused by the proposed qualitative indicator is used to make a more funded comparison between measuring methods. For example, the HSA method has for Thailand and Myanmar as indicator 'Natural disaster (Tsunami 2004)', which falls in table 12 under Environmental Security. In first instance, both countries will score the same. However, if we use number of deaths caused by this 'indirect threat', Thailand scores less good ("5,395 dead, 2,993 missing. Many of the missing are presumed dead") than Myanmar ("59 dead, according to the International Federation for the Red Cross, which is coordinating with the Myanmar government")¹⁴⁷. This is done only if necessary to distinguish between similar outcomes.

To make the ranking method more transparent, the following short overview of methodological choices needs to be presented.

¹⁴⁵ UNDP, *Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, at pp. 22-46.

¹⁴⁶ Roberts, David, *Empowering the human security debate: making it coherent and meaningful*, in: *International Journal on World Peace* (Volume 22, Issue 3), 2005, pp. 3-16.

¹⁴⁷ CNN Tsunami death toll (2005).

Human Development Report (HDR): ranking within the same method because due to the single case study method of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, it was not possible to compare these outcomes between countries. Ranking was done based on the assumption that for areas that are least secure (score 1), help will be provided (based on Human Security concept).

General Poverty Index (GPI): ranking was done between the different security areas of the selected countries. 'Income' and 'Education' both fall under Economic Security. If the outcomes of the indicators were similar also the relative score in table 12 is similar.

Human Security Audit (HSA): ranking was done between the different security areas of the selected countries. If a threat does not occur within the chosen timeframe for a certain country, this country is ranked with 3 (relatively the highest level of security in that area). For infectious diseases, in case of Cambodia and Myanmar (both very high risk) is seen how these diseases contribute to the number of deaths per country (see table 9).

Index of Human Insecurity (IHI): The area of political security is based on 'political right score' and the 'civil liberty score' and area of institutional security is based on all indicators under 'institutions' (see table 10).

Human Security Report Index (HSRI): ranking took place in the area of personal security (severe physical violence by actors outside of the government) and political security (government was involved in violence).

Human Security Mapping (HSM): Due to single case study method that was done for Cambodia, it was not possible to compare these outcomes between countries.

The aim is to show how the proposed methods lead to different relative scores of Human Security between three similar countries, therefore neither the interpretation of the values nor the determination of the indicators is subject of discussion in this paper.

Table 12. Comparison Matrix

	Cambodia						Myanmar						Thailand					
	HDR	GPI	HSA	IHI	HSRI	HSM	HDR	GPI	HSA	IHI	HSRI	HSM	HDR	GPI	HSA	IHI	HSRI	HSM
Economic security	...	1	1	1	X	1-3 ¹⁴⁸	1 ¹⁴⁹	2	2	2	X	3	3	3	X	...
Food security	...	X	X	X	X	1-3	2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	...
Health security	...	2	1	X	X	1-3	3	1	2	X	X	3	3	X	X	...
Environ. security	...	X	3	2	X	1-3	...	X	2	2	X	X	1	3	X	...
Personal security	...	X	1	X	3	1-3	...	X	3	X	2	X	3	X	1	...
Political security	...	2	3	2	3	1-3	...	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	...
Comm. security	...	X	3	X	X	X	...	X	1	X	X	X	2	X	X	...
Instit. security	...	X	X	2	X	X	...	X	X	1	X	X	X	3	X	...

¹⁴⁸ Taylor Owen shows through spatial mapping difference in security at Commune, District and Province level. High scores in different area's combined lead to 'hotspots' ("regions that experience the aggregate impact of multiple security threats"). Owen, Taylor, *Human Security Mapping*, at p. 18. Due to Owen's single case study method it was not possible to compare these outcomes between countries.

¹⁴⁹ Due to the single case study method of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security it was not possible to compare these outcomes between countries. Ranking was done based on the assumption that in areas that are least secure (score 1) help will be provided (based on Human Security concept).

VI. Conclusion

It is clear that the results of measuring Human Security vary from one applied method to the other because of a different focus due to various conceptual definitions. If Human Security as a concept wants to remain academically useful and relevant for its related policy fields, it must have a clear and consensual analytical tool that can be used for Human (In)Security assessments. Currently, it seems that this is not the case. There is a serious lacuna in the field of Human Security measurement that needs to be addressed that includes both *content of unmeasured threats* (by threat-area *in-or* exclusion) and an *over-reliance on certain forms of measurement* (mostly on ordinal scale at the national level while looking at other levels/scales might reveal different outcomes). All reviewed methods suffer from these lacunae to some extent, except Human Security Mapping. It might be that by using spatial aggregation (as proposed by Owen), the broad conception of Human Security can be applied; while at the same time, a focus on analysis and policy can be created (by using 'hotspots'). Moreover, since security is a socially constructed concept, the local security definition and the local context needs to be taken into account – Owen's method can provide this flexibility.¹⁵⁰ Then again, the disadvantage of this method is that it always requires regional fieldwork (which can be expensive or simply impossible) combined with basic knowledge of GIS (which might not be present). However, at this moment Human Security is a 'contested concept' and it will remain until its methodological issues are solved. Possible solutions could be found through a broader multidisciplinary approach which would involve methods that might force analysts and researchers to 'look outside of their box'. This may require some efforts, but they are worth it. After all, the concept of Human Security sets out to safeguard the security of human beings.

¹⁵⁰ Winslow, D.J., *Human Security*, pp. 1-37.

The European Union Crisis Management and the Making of a Common Strategic Culture: What Lies Beyond Human Security?

*Ana Isabel Xavier*¹

This article aims to question whether the European Union (EU) is capable of carrying out a strategic culture based on the concept of Human Security (HS). In other words, is the EU likely to become a strategic player based on a new type of strategic culture? Hence, the purpose of this article is to contribute to a broader discussion with some critical insights on how the EU, as a global peace actor, may or may not develop a strategic culture based on civil and military capabilities according to the main values and principles of the concept of Human Security. Initially, we will attempt to establish the concept of HS – a concept which has in recent years induced the academic literature to focus more on the individual and community and less on the State. We will also reflect on the concept of Human Security as a potential paradigm and guideline for a future EU strategic culture in the field of crisis management missions. Finally, we will assert that the EU still faces a structural dilemma and gap between its expectations and needs and the instruments available. It is true that there has been an effort made towards operational integration, as well as setting up civil and military capabilities, but the EU's capacities in action denounce a search for a strategy. Consequently, how do Human Security principles connect with the broader goal of projecting the EU as a global player with the demanding political will and consensus from the member states? Regarding this question, we will conclude that the EU has not yet (and probably will never) accomplished a common strategic culture, due to the different strategic cultures of the 27 Member States.

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I. Introduction

Human Security is a core concept in critical security studies. In recent years, two trends have placed in disagreement a "comprehensive approach", focusing on "freedom from necessity" ("freedom from want") and a "limited approach", focusing on "freedom from fear". These two freedoms were first defined as Human Security components in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report, distinguishing between the "(...) *protection from sudden disruptions in the patterns of evil everyday whether in homes, jobs or in communities' (from fear) and (...) the security threats of hunger, disease and repression.*" (from want).

Given this multidisciplinary and comprehensive understanding of security, most of the literature on Human Security does not hesitate to recognize the 1994 UNDP Report as the founding document of the Human Security doctrine. In this Report, the individual suffers a brand of insecurities, produced by the states, by the international community or as a result of its own process of (under)development. The "recipe" to step out from this insecurity cycle is good governance (at the level of national and international politics), diplomacy, preventive development and the reform of global institutions namely the United Nations. States like Canada² or Japan³ tailored the Human Security principles to their own foreign policies and, within the EU, there is a widespread acceptance of many of the principles of Human Security. We can, indeed, argue that the EU has shaped several initiatives consistent with the principles of Human Security, such as the Commission's strategy for Conflict Prevention or the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO's).

But perhaps the most significant sign of the incorporation of the Human Security concept in the European integration context is the European Security Strategy⁴ (ESS) and the understanding that security is a pre-requisite for development. Proclaimed and adopted by the 83rd conclusion of the 2003 Brussels European Council (12 and 13th December) the Strategy presented by Javier Solana, the EU's former High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, still does not explicitly use the term Human Security. However, it projects the EU as a producer and promoter of norms and values, either for their surroundings and for the rest of the world, due to the legal framework in terms of humanitarian law and international criminal law, whether at the decision-making level or at the operational level. In addition, it is assumed that poverty, disease and ignorance often cause insecurity and

² See Axworthy, Lloyd, *Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First*, in: *Global Governance* (Volume 7, Number 1), 2001, pp. 19-23.

³ See Japanese Commission on Human Security (CHS). Available online at: <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org> (All websites used in this article were last checked on 3 November 2010).

⁴ See Council of the European Union, *European Security Strategy*. Available online at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

lead to terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. Moreover, the ESS argues that the political will is more valuable than the use of force and that “*we need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise*”. That was one of Solana’s calls. While Giscard d’Estaing was trying to refound a politically disoriented Europe by drafting a Constitution for Europe, Solana meant to reshape the EU as a global player, recognizing that the EU must take a more pronounced position on the international stage.

Notwithstanding the emphasis on preventive intervention and the importance of multilateralism, the ESS does not explain how the European institutions can implement the ESS in order to explore all possibilities of a European Human Security policy.

Bearing this in mind, in 2004, thirteen researchers, representatives of the *crème de la crème* of the European expertise on security and defence issues, presented the Barcelona Report⁵. In less than a year, since the ESS approval, thirteen renowned researchers, led by Mary Kaldor, presented the Human Security Doctrine, influenced especially by preventive action rather than a pre-emptive engagement. The thirteen researchers assumed that the new threats that Europe faces today, i.e. terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, regional conflicts, failing or rogue states, organized crime, environment depletion, are global in the sense that they constitute sources of global insecurity.

By adopting a broad concept of Human Security, oriented towards the freedom of individuals in relation to the basic insecurities arising from human rights violations, this report proposes that a Human Security Doctrine may be developed at three interdependent levels.

The first level is echoed in a set of seven guiding principles, outlining the human capacities, cultural, technological, legal and organizational requirements for the pursuit of these principles: respect for human rights; the establishment of a legitimate political authority in a Human Security mission command and control; effective multilateralism; a perspective from below; a regional focus; the legal instruments primacy; and an appropriate and legitimate use of force. In addition, according to the authors, to implement a Human Security policy based on these seven principles, the EU needs to acquire a second and third level of action,

⁵ Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*, Available online at: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityDoctrine.pdf>. The Barcelona Report was not explicitly requested by the EU but by Javier Solana.

concerning a "Human Security Response Force"⁶ and a legal framework to govern the intervention's decisions and coordinate the operations in the field.

In 2007, the same group of investigators published *A European Way of Security - The Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group comprising a Proposal and Background Report*⁷, trying to draw a parallel between the principles and levels of action and the EU missions in progress. The importance of the Madrid report lies in an attempt to operationalize the concept of Human Security analysing the main missions that the EU has developed since 2003 in the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP): DRC (EUFOR; EUPOL Kinshasa; EUSEC); Palestine (EU BAM; EUCOPS); Lebanon; Kosovo and Aceh (AMM)⁸.

In fact, the seven principles first outlined in the Barcelona Report are now considered lessons learned and challenges for the future. And "how should CFSP/CSDP develop in the next four years, in a changing international context which is likely to increase further 'the demand for Europe?'"⁹. The answer, for the authors, is coherence, effectiveness and visibility, the three interlinked challenges that the EU's new capabilities face nowadays. Moreover, another innovation of the Madrid Report, regarding the update of the threats, is the introduction of pandemics as a new threat, by suggestion of the Portuguese Presidency, warning of public health issues such as flu A.

However, the academic disagreement on how broad or narrow the concept of Human Security is, its analytical and operational utility, the responsibility for providing and maintaining Human Security, the role of the state and the impact of securitization, makes it difficult to explain what Human Security means in the context of European crisis management. More importantly, it remains unclear how

⁶ This force would consist of 15 000 members, one third of them civilians, bringing together experts from both sexes in the area of police, humanitarian and technical development, theoretical and practical Human Rights, academics and volunteers.

⁷ Human Security Study Group, *A European Way of Security. The Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group comprising a Proposal and Background Report Madrid*. Available online at: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/PDFs/Madrid%20Report%20Final%20for%20distribution.pdf>.

⁸ This analysis also inspired the Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 11 and 12 December 2008 and drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative Javier Solana. Available online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf.

⁹ Human Security Study Group, *A European Way of Security*, at p. 22.

the concept of Human Security can be operationalized, i.e. how can it be put into operational practice.¹⁰

II. Human Security: An Operationalized Concept or a Wishful Thinking Doctrine?

The concept of Human Security tends to divide researchers all around the world and is faced immediately with the lack of consensus on a commonly accepted definition. Many theorists refuse to acknowledge Human Security as something more than a term or concept, even more than a theory. However, one element that all authors seem to agree on is that Human Security is dealing with the concern of material and physical security of individuals and communities, rather than states. In fact, Human Security advocates a shift in attention from a state-centred to a people-centred security approach, concerned with the security of those who live within a state's borders¹¹.

Theoretically, Human Security principles are needed at all stages of a crisis or a conflict, from prevention to post-conflict reconstruction. Therefore, Human Security is suitable for crisis management situations and for conflict prevention, when the tools required are used for emergency reconstruction and not for structural pacification *à la longue*. No wonder that Human Security principles are perceived as both goals and methods and cannot be divorced from each other.

By linking security to development and focusing on collective responses to new threats, we can identify some Human Security complementary principles in the following.¹²

¹⁰ Some contributions aim to clarify this question. See, e.g., Benedek, Wolfgang, Kettemann, Matthias C., and Möstl, Markus (eds.), *Mainstreaming Human Security in Peace Operations and Crisis Management. Policies, Problems, Potential*, Routledge, London/New York, 2010.

¹¹ See Tajbakhsh, Shahrbanu and Anuradha M. Chenoy, *Human Security: Concepts and Implication*, Routledge, New York, 2006. Les Etudes du CERI n° 117-118, 2005. Available online at: http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/publica/etude/etude117_118.pdf. See also Benedek, Wolfgang, *Human Security and Human Rights Interaction*, in: *International Social Science Journal* (Volume 59, Supplement 1), Willey-Blackwell on behalf of UNESCO, 2008, pp. 7-17.

¹² The objective of this exercise is to find a sort of personal agenda and "checklist". It is important to note that the hierarchy or prioritisation of these five factors would be pointless, especially if we take in consideration that Human Security postulates that all threats are interdependent and have a spill over/domino effect and the complete eradication of one of them isolated is impossible without a comprehensive addressing of the issue. They are largely inspired on the principles developed by the Human Security Study Group and the Madrid Report.

A. *Cross-cutting Approach – Bottom-up and Top-down Perspective*

Local people must be active agents of their own process of development and not passive recipients of security and any mandate should take into account the basic needs of those most directly affected by violence and insecurity through an ongoing process of communication, consultation, dialogue and partnership. Still, policy making cannot be seen as a vertical process, exclusively top down. Of course the importance of top political actors, governmental platforms, offices and local hierarchies that ease the progress of dialogue for long term development cannot be ignored. Therefore, both governmental and non governmental platforms must be taken in consideration to build a horizontal network of joint commitments and a sectoral agenda of peacebuilding. Moreover, governments must reinforce national strategies towards development and must be the first actors to intervene.

However, we cannot foresee that Human Security is mainly a question of commitment and to build a close relationship with the concerns of local people about their empowerment, autonomy and developing self-centred, tailored to their own realities and special conditions.

B. *Struggle Against the Roots of Structural Violence*

Contemporary crisis management operations should be focused on the structural aspects of the conflict or crisis. A situation diagnosis on the ground should always take in consideration the roots of the conflict, its causes, dynamics and impacts, distinguishing the need to prevent, intervene and/or to develop. In sum, the key must lie on addressing conflicts from prevention to rebuilding and reconstruction.

C. *Multilateralism and Local/Regional Coordination*

Nowadays, conflicts are often characterized by its spilling over borders, meaning that the difference between what is inside and outside of the conflict is disappearing. Since each “global actor” must share the burden of international security, the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN) and regional organisations must build efforts together to assure the correct answer for the sake of our global security.

In fact, multilateralism is only an added value if it is effective. Therefore, the regional and international partnerships must be reinforced, because the more multilateral the action is, the more effective the global effect on the region and in the western and local civil society will be.

D. State Building

A Human Security perspective encourages states to protect people and communities. Therefore, one of the main tasks of a mission guided by a Human Security perspective must envisage a strong and legitimate political authority that guarantees human rights, good governance and respect for the rule of law.

E. Joint Civil-military Nature of Operations

The action's "tools" should be both civilian and military, as the goal is always to protect civilians without collateral damages and not to win the war as an end in itself. This strategic mix allows a conceptual coherence and effectiveness that has in mind different stages and needs.

In sum, these five elements may comprise the core of a Human Security agenda allegedly subscribed by the EU. We can question if a crisis management missions guided by these Human Security principles may be helpful to the EU missions' visibility and recognition, as well as to the growing mobilisation of the international public opinion. Besides the broader inclusion of those principles, CSDP missions could also be redefined and evaluated.

One suggestion may follow in the mandates, which should explicitly embody the basic needs of population and communities, regarding the primacy of their human rights. For instance, an adviser for human rights and gender issues could be included in all mandates to assure the success of the mission on the ground. In fact, Javier Solana once drew the attention to the necessity of an effective approach towards local community through women's involvement. This "bottom up" approach is frequently forgotten in the mandates, but it is quite relevant in terms of trust building and "intelligence gathering" with local communities.

III. The EU as a "Global Player"

Nowadays, the EU has the ability to be a strategic actor on the global stage and act as a community of norms and values, of stability and cooperation all over the world. Some authors envisage the EU as a normative power and almost as a "force for good". In fact, since the Cologne, Helsinki and Feira European Councils, the EU is developing several instruments for civil and military crisis management. Furthermore, the EU has developed peace-oriented policies for several areas of the world, including peace building, conflict resolution, development aid, neighbourhood policy and in the context of accession processes.

Nevertheless, the EU still faces a structural dilemma and a gap between its security needs and the instruments available. Although the EU member states make

efforts for operational integration and for the further development of civil and military capabilities (the Lisbon Treaty encompasses that efforts), the EU's capacities in action still lack an overall strategy.

Assuming that the EU is a global actor concerned with the issues of security and peace and that it is still searching for a common strategic culture, what is the added value of the concept of Human Security for the EU? Bearing in mind its "global actorness", can the concept of Human Security be understood as a paradigm and guideline of a future EU strategic culture for crisis management missions? Can the Human Security elements identified in the current missions be seen as guidelines for future crisis management missions – not as a "one model fits all", but as a flexible model and "checklist" for different backgrounds and crisis management scenarios? How do Human Security principles relate to the broader goal of projecting the EU as a global player, given the fact that there is minimum political consensus on crisis management issues among the member states?

Over the last years, the enlarged EU was challenged in several ways. In fact, at the turn to the 21st century, the member states of the EU face the same global threats and only together they can try to fight them. Today, the EU is, undoubtedly, a global player¹³. The enlarged Union combines more than 450 million people; it has one of the most competitive currencies in the international financial markets; it is the world's biggest economic unit and has the most substantial trade volume with Africa, Latin America and with the emerging markets in India and China. Together, the EU Member States are the biggest donor of humanitarian aid.

As a result, the EU has the ability to be a strategic actor on the global stage and act as a community of norms and values of stability and cooperation in many parts of the world. This is clear as part of the creation of several soft power mechanisms, instruments and initiatives, in the development of peace-oriented policies and in the inclusion of the peace building element in the development aid strategies or assistance programmes. In these particular cases, "it is here assumed that the type of power and exercised by the EU is of the 'soft' rather than the 'hard' type and based on economic instruments, dialogue and diplomacy"¹⁴.

One of the main evidence of this *softness*¹⁵ is, certainly, the crisis management missions where the EU is acting as a collective unit or under the leadership of a specific member state. With its crisis management missions, the EU

¹³ A reminder for the fact that the term "global actor" was first assumed in 1999 by Bretherton, Charlotte and Vogler, John, *Europe as a global actor*, Routledge, London, 1999.

¹⁴ Hettne, Björn and Soderbaum, Fredrik, *Civilian Power or soft imperialism?*, in: *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Volume 10), 2005, p. 535-552.

¹⁵ On soft power, see Nye, Joseph S., *Soft power. The means to success in world politics*, in: Public Affairs, New York, 2004.

has been showing that the interconnection of different regions of the world in a *safe* common frontier in itself is a strategy for security and defence.

However, we are faced with the reality that “*the EU needs to both exercise influence through soft power and be able to deploy hard power in a targeted and strategic way*”.¹⁶ In fact, the EU’s capacities in action reveal the “search of a strategy”, even if the ESS and the European Defence Agency may be considered as embryonic stages of a European common strategic culture.

If the EU really aims to be a strategic actor on the global stage, great effort must be done in order to avoid double standards and dissident voices that question the political cohesion of the EU, internally and externally.¹⁷

This represents a true challenge to the EU because the world’s insecurity is Europe’s insecurity. Consequently, the EU should be more interventionist in the exploration of conflict roots to address the best policies to fight against insecurity and develop military forces configured in renewed and adapted ways for the new global security scenarios. Regional conflicts, failed states, weapons of massive destruction, human rights violations in general – all these threats exemplify how individuals still haven’t found “*freedom from want*” and/or “*freedom from fear*”.

IV. The Strategic Culture “Umbrella”

Every state has its own strategic culture. Therefore, the EU, as a “security community”, also has a strategic culture, since it shares values, beliefs and ideals related to the collective will of crisis management, for instance. However, it is still in an embryonic stage of formation, since it is not a pre-defined strategic culture as unique or common to all 27 Member States. This is even more obvious in the field of foreign policy where the EU’s role as a global player is still evolving.

In fact, it has been recognized that the EU is one of the best examples of what Karl Deutsch dubbed, in 1957, a “safe community” around a common process of economic integration, developing mutual expectations, shared values and similar views on how security can be achieved. The Communities of security can thus be defined as transnational security communities, sharing a common identity and

¹⁶ Grevi, Giovanni, *Reflections after the NO votes: what makes the EU an international actor?* November 2005. Available online at: <http://www.gees.org/documentos /Document-01692.pdf>.

¹⁷ At the European Council of the 15th and 16th of June 2006 the proposal of a European Commission’s communication entitled *Europe in the World: Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility* was discussed and widely accepted. This communication pretended to propose some measures to strengthen the EU’s external action, defining the requisite of a strong sense of collective purpose, balancing the required political will with the necessary policy instruments.

respect for both concern and national perceptions of the process of institutional cooperation between member states in CFSP/CSDP.

This concept of Security Community is being developed by the European member states, interacting with other international organizations and strategic partners to jointly tackle threats to peace and stability. To this end, the EU claimed responsibility and pledged to develop more resources and capacities, several instruments of international crisis management, prevention and stabilization of conflicts, as a real player in providing security.

Increasingly, the EU moved from a "community of not War" (Weaver, 1998:76) for a community of peace, where the power of attraction for "belonging to the club" is huge. Weaver called "*desecuritization*" to this evolutionary process, arguing that the EU integration policies were removing the military security of the historical context of transferring it to Europe from NATO.

The Union would thus be an anchor that separates an island of peace in a world of chaos, disorder and insecurity meaning that security is understood, not as the absence of war among the member states, but as an alliance of democracies, through a process of institutionalization and socialization.

Any concept of strategic culture thus aims to analyse the major issues of continuity and change in the security policies in an attempt to create a framework to understand shared patterns of policy options pursued by members of a national strategic community states.

In the EU, we witness that there are 27 member states with a clear national identity dimension distinctly influenced by different historical backgrounds, levels of economic development, geopolitical and geographical settings, a military history, international relations, political cultures and ideologies etc. Therefore, we can reflect upon the fact that an EU strategic culture may inspire references, guidelines, tendencies, but, until now, it does not oblige neither to a common action, nor to a unique voice. So, a European strategic culture can inspire a reference, a guide to action, but, until now, it did not provide a common voice.

For example, if we take into account the legitimated use of force, and the impact on national public opinions, in countries like France or the United Kingdom¹⁸, force can be understood as defending their own interests, but in the Nordic countries, traditionally neutral, such as Finland, Sweden or Denmark, the

¹⁸ In 1998, in Saint Malo, both countries agreed on the progressive autonomy of European Capabilities and Sarkozy has recently defended the improvement of military capabilities.

force should be restricted as much as possible and always with strategic partnerships and the UN mandate or an invitation by the host state.

Cornish and Edwards¹⁹ give us a very interesting definition of the EU strategic culture as “the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments, together with general recognition of the EU’s legitimacy as an international actor with military capabilities”. The focus seems to be clearly on the military dimension.

In sum, we may conclude that an EU strategic culture will always be of a very special nature, a hybrid version of a Deutschian Security Community. The diversity of a particular society’s geographical, political, cultural and strategic experience will produce multiple strategic cultures and its member states may share a common, but to a great extent, fragmented strategic culture. Therefore, EU member states are far from being able to achieve a common strategic culture. In the case of the EU, a dominant transnational culture seems doomed to the philosophy of ideas and overcome by sub-strategic cultures that hardly may outweigh a dominant one.

V. Summary and Conclusions

We have started to say that the EU has the ability to perform as strategic actor on the global stage and act as a community of norms and values of stability and cooperation all over the world. We also concluded that a EU strategic culture will always be a very special nature, an amalgam hybrid version of the Deutsch's Safety Community, where the diversity of geographical experience, political, cultural and strategic individual of a given society produces multiple strategic crops and its member states can share common strategic culture but largely fragmented and therefore far from a unique strategic culture. Thus, if the EU wants to act as a strategic player at the global level, a long way has to be made in order to avoid double standards and dissenting voices that question the EU’s cohesion, both internally and externally.

And if we reflect on the concept of Human Security, it is probably even more difficult to rely on Human Security principles to make a strategic culture. First of all, because there is not even an agreement whether it is a concept, a paradigm or an approach, it is considered primarily an "umbrella" that covers everything we want and nothing concrete. Therefore, a strategic culture depending on the consensus on

¹⁹ Cornish, Paul and Geoffrey Edwards, *The strategic culture of the European Union: a progress report*, in: *International Affairs* (Volume 81, Number 4), Wiley-Blackwell, July 2005, pp. 801-820.

Human Security will fail. Thus, it is unlikely that the European Union adopts a Human Security cap as an instrument of foreign policy.

Moreover, Human Security in form of a philosophy or a moral conduct code has not yet been mainstreamed and some sceptics see it as a concept that nourishes the philosophy of language debates based in moral conduct codes. How to implement it as an international praxis? Is it expected and desirable that the EU adopts the Human Security “umbrella” as a foreign policy? Will the people to people approach be even helpful to measure the international dimension related with the so-called “global actor”?

The immediate answer is no. If the actorness depends on the Human Security consensus on an “umbrella” that deals with everything we wish for and nothing at all in concrete it will fail. In fact, it is not to be expected that the EU endorses such a vague concept as a foreign policy tool, because there are different strategic cultures in Europe. However, there is a value added of the concept of Human Security for peace operations and crisis management. The Madrid Report already outlines that. But we must admit that probably it is not obliging enough to measure the international dimension related with the so-called “global actor”. It doesn’t change the *status quo* at all.

Why? One of the reasons is that the EU may suggest human rights aspect in all mandates, but it cannot impose changes in constitutions or people’s minds. The goal of a crisis management mission is (only) to stabilize and maintain security. Therefore, it is hardly difficult to launch a Human Security mission, if the mandate gives the EU only the mission to observe, advice, monitor. A Human Security mission also has to accomplish an executive mandate. Moreover, even for that purpose, the EU has to be invited by the host government to that.

We then have to conclude that there is no such thing as a Human Security CSDP mission. There are elements of Human Security in every CSDP missions, but that does not make it a Human Security mission as a whole and the CSDP does not embrace a human narrative. It also must cover all stages of the conflict cycle (crisis prevention, intervention and post crisis rehabilitation) and it must be followed up by a civilian mission that regards the broad spectrum of functions and tasks required. How can we measure that in the last CSDP missions? Of course, in a certain way, the EU is already doing Human Security and, for some countries, enlargement is the instrument by excellence, because it really interferes with the essence of institutions and people empowerment. But it is not enough to label it as a Human Security assignment.

At the moment, it is clear that the EU is building a real confidence as an external actor, distinctively European, neither NATO nor UN “typical action”. The

new emerging self-confidence must be pushed up for future missions, but there is still a lack of visibility on the ground and within European member states. The EU is gaining confidence through the different CSDP missions and is recognising the advantages of it. However, what it has already achieved is rather fragile (also too “fresh”) and the main question is, if these great efforts are going to be sustainable, if they are going to reinforce the visibility of the “global player” and if they will make a real difference in the political process of the places where the EU intervenes.

Poverty, Discrimination and the Roma: a Human Security Issue

*Ivana Tomovska*¹

The article examines the living conditions of Roma communities throughout Europe through the prism of a human security approach. Protracted deprivation of human needs along with growing intolerance and discrimination Roma people face represents a human security concern that needs to be addressed accordingly. The prolonged and systematic violations of human rights along with the lack of opportunities and advancement of quality of life deepen the human insecurities of Roma. Five sets of security concerns shall be examined: economic, health, personal, community and political security threats, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive, multi-sector approach towards tackling the issue. The human security model can serve as a basis for further policy and reforms in this area. Furthermore, this framework can provide a universal structure along which different agents, governments and international organizations can cooperate and coordinate their efforts.

I. Introduction

The following analysis examines various forms of insecurities and discrimination against Roma people and treats them as a human security issue in Europe. Understanding the protracted deprivation of human needs as a human security

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concern is necessary in order to generate a viable long-term resolution of the issue. The human security discourse and concepts underpinning human security can play a normative role at international, national and local levels. Human security of Roma in this regard can be examined as a normative-political issue that has the potential to influence states' conduct towards individuals and to eventually influence public policy. In order to investigate the way in which a human security approach could help tackle the problems Roma people face, five different security threats shall be examined: economic, health, personal, community and political security threats.

Roma communities throughout Western, Eastern and Southeast European countries are experiencing poverty, socio-economic marginalization with additional increasing intolerance and violence from the majority population. This marginalization involves exclusion from labour markets, exclusion and segregation within the education system, difficult access to services including healthcare services, extreme forms of spatial segregation; in a word, exclusion from the right to exercise active citizenship. In addition, Roma people are experiencing very concrete security issues such as: police brutality, racism, intolerance, violent outbursts against them and discrimination. One blatant example of such discrimination is a public statement identifying the Roma as “‘*socially unadaptable population*’ with a high birth rate of ‘*children who are poorly adaptable mentally, poorly adaptable socially, children with serious health disorders, children, simply, who are a great burden on this society*’.”²

All of these elements together establish the different cases of insecurities and discrimination Roma people face, as a human security issue, which consequently needs to be answered as such. One way of addressing this issue is through the principle of “*emancipation as security*” that will be argued in section four in the text. This concept has emerged in the post Cold-war period and it is closely connected with the concepts of liberty and equity; recently, emancipation has been connected to the processes of protection and empowerment by human security doctrines.³

² Statement given by Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar in 1993, as quoted in Barany, Zoltan, *Orphans of Transition: Gypsies in Eastern Europe*, in: *Journal of Democracy* (Volume 9, Number 3), July 1998, pp. 142-156, at p. 153.

³ On the thoughts of emancipation, liberty and equity see Booth, Ken, *Security and Emancipation*, in: *Review of International Studies* (Volume 17, Number 4), October 1991, pp. 313-326; On protection and empowerment, see Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, New York, 2003.

As Neufeld defines it, the strategy of emancipation “*is one which focuses on the more ‘empirical’ question of how security issues are framed in political discourse*”.⁴

Illustrative examples are presented from documented cases in a number of countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania. The theoretical framework is employed from two branches of political science literature: literature on “*securitization*”, as a discourse used in order to identify something as a (security) threat and attach a label of urgency upon that issue, and literature on human security and human development.

II. The Concept of Human Security in Theory and Practice

The concept of human security represents a radical degree of expansion for the existing concept of security.⁵ Human security treats the following parameters: individual and humanity as a whole represents referent object; values at risk include a number of different categories starting from survival of the individual, to quality of life and other human rights; possible source of threat can be states but also globalization’s impact.⁶ The difference between previous notions of security, including “*societal security*” and the concept of human security, is the fact that human security takes a step further, treating the need for development as a need for security, as well, “[*job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime, these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world*”.⁷

Human security addresses the link between human rights and sustainable human development. The goal of human development is “*growth with equity*”; the human security approach adds an additional dimension called “*downturn with*

⁴ Neufeld, Mark, *Pitfalls of Emancipation and Discourses of Security: Reflections on Canada’s ‘Security with a Human Face*, in: *International Relations* (Volume 18, Number 1), 109-123, 2004, at p. 109.

⁵ Møller, Bjorn, *National, Societal and Human Security: General Discussion with a Case Study from the Balkans*, in: UNESCO (eds.), *What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?*, Proceedings of the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions, Paris, 27-28 November 2000, pp. 41-62, at p. 43.

⁶ The theory of ‘securitization’ is a theory of search for referent object, or according to Buzan’s argument, “*Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization*”. Cf. Buzan, Barry et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner, London, 1998, at p. 23. Securitization is particularly concerned with three questions: security of whom (or referent object); security of what (what are the values at risk) and security from whom or what.

⁷ Møller, Bjorn, *National, Societal and Human Security: General Discussion with a Case Study from the Balkans*, at p. 41.

security” meaning that prolonged and systematic violations of human rights of a certain group greatly undermine development and can cause a massive setback in people’s standards of living, drastically limit their choices and opportunities and cause insecurities.⁸ Human security treats different types of human rights, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, creating a synergy between them and offering a multidimensional and all-encompassing solution: “*It introduces a practical framework for identifying the specific rights that are at stake in a particular situation of insecurity and for considering the institutional and governance arrangements that are needed to exercise and sustain them*”.⁹ In the case of the Roma, this framework likewise can be used, not only to identify rights at stake, but also for adequate institutional and policy actions that governments in cooperation with national and international non-governmental organizations can undertake.

The following analysis shall be looking at Roma communities throughout European countries, their protracted deprivation of human needs, which had been further exacerbated with extremism and anti-Gypsyism¹⁰, through the prism of human security. As mentioned earlier, even though the human security approach is often used in situations of post-conflict or natural disasters-struck areas and communities, the attempt shall be to illustrate ways in which the Roma issues can be treated as human security issues, and consequently addressed as such.

The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security report identifies several types of human security threats:¹¹

- Economic security: persistent poverty, unemployment;
- Food security: hunger, famine;
- Health security: deadly infectious diseases, unsafe food, malnutrition, lack of access to basic health care;
- Environmental security: environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters, pollution;
- Personal security: physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, child labour;

⁸ United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, 2009, at p. 9. Available online at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HS_Handbook_2009.pdf (All websites used in this article were last checked on 3 November 2010).

⁹ United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, at p. 9.

¹⁰ There is no recognized or widely accepted definition of anti-Gypsyism available; however it can be considered as a distinct type of racist ideology. See Nicolae, Valeriu, *Towards a Definition of Anti-Gypsyism*, European Grassroot Roma Organization (ERGO), 2006. Available online at: <http://www.ergonet.org/antigyptism.htm>.

¹¹ United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, at p. 7.

- Community security: inter-ethnic, religious and other identity based tensions; and
- Political security: political repression, human rights abuses

These identified threats shall be taken as parameters for our further analysis;¹² assessing the level of insecurity for the Roma communities in each of these areas can represent a starting point for an academic debate within this area and a baseline for further policy considerations. This human security approach towards issues Roma people face may be the beginning of a broader research project. It is important to note that all areas are intertwined and very often insecurity arising from one area affects the security within other areas.

III. Roma People in Europe Today: Challenges, Discrimination and Poverty¹³

There are about ten million Roma in Europe, spread throughout every country on the continent. Roma communities vary in culture, traditions, languages, religions they practice and other characteristics. Due to occurrences of anti-Gypsyism and increased outbursts of violence against them, many Roma have been experiencing various insecurities on a daily basis, starting with personal and community security threats to socio-economic hardship. Breaking the stereotypes and enabling Roma people to fully exercise their rights is one of the priorities that European countries need to address. The following analysis treats five different camps of security threats, starting from the most urgent deprivation of human needs.

A. Economic Security: Persistent Poverty

Taking into consideration Liebel's argument that unequal power relations contribute to economic insecurities, the shift in political systems that took place in the 1990s in Central and Southeast European (CEE and SEE) countries and the transition period (which in some countries is still ongoing) shifted power relations as well: "*Exploitation takes place in all societies in which there are unequal power relations, and the powerful section of society is able to tap the productive potential of those excluded from power*".¹⁴ In the light of new power relations, new forms of poverty

¹² For further analysis some of the identified areas shall be omitted or annexed with another group of identified threat; food security as such shall be treated as part of economic security and health security (nutrition, etc), while environmental security shall be also considered under health security (consequences of pollution and living conditions).

¹³ The author would like to thank Dr. Nidhi Trehan for her thoughts and comments on the initial abstract and for her overall support.

¹⁴ Liebel, Manfred, *A Will of Their Own: Cross-cultural Perspectives on Working Children*, Zed Books, London, 2004, at p. 202.

and structural changes destabilized communities all over CEE and SEE countries, especially destabilizing hitherto already vulnerable groups (such as women, minorities, Roma communities). As Barany argues: “[t]hrough entire sections of society (unskilled laborers, pensioners, and so on) have been hurt by the marketization processes that began nearly a decade ago, none has been more adversely affected than the Roma”.¹⁵ In addition, Barany also identifies one positive change in the post-communist period in the CEE countries, this being the decrease of Roma political exclusion and the opportunities to politically organize themselves in the new multi-party political system; however without much success to do so.¹⁶

Looking at more recent developments, one can argue that this situation is a “downturn with security”,¹⁷ i.e. the economic crisis as such exacerbated the already fragile situation of the Roma communities. The economic crisis has evident human development implications that reach beyond the direct consequences, “decreasing employment and income opportunities with negative mid- and long-term implications for education, health status, housing security, and other human development indicators.”¹⁸ Roma are one of the groups that are most affected by the economic crisis in the European Union countries. They live in poverty and social exclusion and are facing substandard living conditions and unequal treatment as citizens compared to non-Roma and majority communities.

Poverty and unemployment are two of the most salient and urgent issues that fall into the category of economic insecurities. The percentage of Roma people experiencing poverty (and the percentage of Roma living in conditions of extreme poverty) is considerable and it is always much higher than of the general population. In addition, Roma are generally employed in sectors that demand low-skilled labour and sectors that are less paid. The following examples illustrate the situation in number of countries within the European Union as well as SEE countries.

There are 108,193 Roma living in Serbia, according to the 2002 census (on a population of 7,3 million people); the Roma community is recognized as a national minority in Serbia and formally enjoys human rights as well as minority rights.¹⁹

¹⁵ Barany, Zoltan, *Orphans of Transition: Gypsies in Eastern Europe*, at p.142.

¹⁶ Barany, Zoltan, *Orphans of Transition: Gypsies in Eastern Europe*, at p. 147. The issue of political representation shall be discussed further on, in section III.E. of this article.

¹⁷ United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, at p. 9.

¹⁸ Ivanov, Andrey, *The Economic Crisis as a Human Development Opportunity*, Development and Transition, Published by the United Nations Development Programme and the London School of Economics and Political Science, July 2009, at p. 23.

¹⁹ Rakovic, Slavisa, *Affirmative Action as a Policy Answer to Roma Inclusion in Public Education in Serbia*, in: Lozanoska, Jana and Dimitrovski, Slavco (eds.), *Integrating*

However, the majority of Roma people in Serbia live in poverty or extreme poverty: 60.5% of Roma in Serbia are regarded extremely poor; Roma unemployment rate is 2.5 times higher than that of non-Roma; out of 593 Roma settlements registered in 2005 in Serbia, 43.5% were slums.²⁰ In neighbouring Macedonia the average Roma poor are 32% lower below the poverty line, while the average ethnic Macedonian poor are 9% lower below the poverty line.²¹ When analysing socio-economic factors determining overall vulnerability, 25% of the Roma population has been defined as highly vulnerable.²²

In Romania, the Roma population comprises up to 10% of the total population (or 2,2 million people). It has been noted that 75% of Roma are living in poverty, as opposed to 24% of Romanians in general and 20% of ethnic Hungarians, the largest minority in Romania.²³ Among Kosovo's diverse ethnic communities, Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptian (RAE) are the most vulnerable and socially excluded groups; their number is estimated between 35.000 and 40.000 with further estimates of 70.000 to 100.000 people living abroad as refugees.²⁴ Their socio-economic situation is devastating with around 40% of them living in extreme poverty with less than one USD per day.²⁵

Economic insecurity leads to exclusion in other spheres of life; Roma experience low levels of educational enrolment, employment, and access to services. This exclusion intensifies poverty, contributing to poor health, which again makes socio-economic inclusion even more difficult to achieve. Another very important aspect of the Roma communities is their health situation and discrimination they experience in receiving various healthcare related services.

Differences Human Rights, Social Inclusion and Social Cohesion in the Balkans on its Road to the EU, Euro-Balkan Institute, Skopje, 2009, p. 181-199, at p. 182.

²⁰ Rakovc, Slavisa, *Affirmative Action as a Policy Answer to Roma Inclusion in Public Education in Serbia*, at p. 182.

²¹ Bartlett, William, *People Centred Analyses, Regional Development, Local Governance and the Quality of Life*, United Nations Development Programme, South East European University, Tetovo, March 2009, at p. 41.

²² Bartlett, William, *People Centred Analyses, Regional Development, Local Governance and the Quality of Life*, at p. 41.

²³ Amnesty International, *Housing is a Human Right, Treated Like Waste Roma Homes Destroyed and Health at Risk in Romania*, January 2010, at p. 2.

²⁴ Tmava, Milena and Beha, Adem., *Helplessness Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptian Forced Returnees in Kosovo*, RAD Centre, Prishtina, 2009, at p.18.

²⁵ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report Kosovo 2004*, Pristina, 2004. Available online at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/europethesis/kosovo/kosovo_2004_en.pdf.

B. Health Security: Accessing The Healthcare System

According to the Communication of the European Commission “*Solidarity in Health: Reducing Health Inequalities in the EU*”,²⁶ Roma are amongst the most vulnerable groups experiencing health inequalities. Some of the key facts include estimations that life expectancy among Roma is 10 years less than that of the majority population.²⁷ There is a higher occurrence of communicable diseases that could otherwise be prevented by regular vaccination. As stated further, segregated Roma communities and settlements often lack the necessary infrastructure, including healthcare infrastructure, preventing access to healthcare services. Additionally, Roma people often face discrimination and ill-treatment by medical personnel and public administration for services connected to healthcare.

Lack of data regarding the health situation of the Roma population and furthermore lack of specific information and knowledge among healthcare professionals regarding special needs and practices Roma people have, additionally burdens the situation: “*As in most of the countries in the region, for Macedonia also it represents a major challenge to provide official data on demographic, socio-economic, vital and health indicators and parameters for the Roma population, mainly due to the fact that the vast majority of the data is not recorded by ethnicity*”.²⁸ It is very important to note that if the overall health of the Roma population is threatened by number of influences, the health of Roma women is especially fragile due to their unfavourable social status to begin with. Thus, Roma women have a lower level of education, lower or no income and are taking care of the household, children and other family members. Regarding the situation of sexual and reproductive health of women, grave violations of human rights have been discovered of coerced sterilization of Roma women in Slovakia in the past decades; similar cases have been discovered and documented in the Czech Republic and Hungary.²⁹

²⁶ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions, *Solidarity in Health: Reducing Health Inequalities in the EU*, COM 2009, at p. 3. Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/socio_economics/documents/com2009_en.pdf.

²⁷ European Commission, *Solidarity in Health: Reducing Health Inequalities in the EU*, COM 2009, at p. 3.

²⁸ Milevska-Kostova, Neda and Enisa Eminovska, *Situation of the Roma Population in Macedonia: Housing and Health*, Advocacy report, HCAR Mesecina and USAID, January 2008, at p. 26.

²⁹ Center for Reproductive Rights, *Report on Coerced Sterilization in Slovakia Leads to Exposure of Issue throughout the Region*. Also see Center for Reproductive Rights, *Body and Soul: Forced Sterilization and Other Assaults on Roma Reproductive Freedom*. Available online at: <http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/report-on-coerced-sterilization-in-slovakia-leads-to-exposure-of-issue-throughout-the-reg>.

The situation of Roma health in Romania is similar, with the Roma population experiencing comparable health issues caused by lack of access to healthcare. Roma persons suffer more often from chronic illnesses than the general population and not all children are included and covered through vaccination campaigns: “25% of children already declare they have a chronic illness, 38.7% blame dental problems in the last week, 42.8% blame some sight problems, and 35.5% some hearing problems while at school”.³⁰ In Kosovo, the Roma and Ashkalia Documentation Centre (RAD Centre) has recorded growing numbers of people infected with Tuberculosis in the Ashkali community in Dubrave, a village of the Ferizaj/Urosevac municipality. According to medical specialists, the TBC is caused by bad hygienic circumstances in the settlement, lack of sewerage systems, lack of clean water, and bad food; furthermore, the people of the settlement do not have any medicine or healthcare available.³¹

The root of institutional inequalities and obstacles leading to these documented conditions can be traced to lack of health insurance of the Roma population, which is a result of unregulated citizenship documentation, a lack of birth certificates, a lack of identification card and permanent living addresses.³² This situation is mostly present in the former Yugoslav countries, where the issue of citizenships has been an issue also for the general population.³³ However, the situation as such is also present in European Union countries due to migration of the population.

The deteriorated health conditions of the general Roma population causes considerably impaired working ability. Since a significant part of the Roma population works in the informal sector and lacks healthcare insurance, any inability to work decreases the family income. The socio-economic situation and health are thus strongly interrelated, causing “an existence of the vicious circle poverty – impaired health condition – poverty in the Roma [population]”.³⁴ The social exclusion of the Roma population does not end within the institutional sphere; the

³⁰ Iovu, Mihai-Bogdan, Paul Haragush and Maria Roth, *Education and minority children. Findings from a Romanian survey*, in: Loanoska, Jana and Dimitrovski, Slavco (eds.), *Integrating Differences Human Rights, Social Inclusion and Social Cohesion in the Balkans on its Road to the EU*. Euro-Balkan Institute: Skopje, 2009, p. 263-275, at p. 271.

³¹ Tmava, Milena and Adem Beha, *Helplessness Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptian Forced Returnees in Kosovo*, at p. 18.

³² Milevska-Kostova Neda and Enisa Eminovska, *Situation of the Roma population in Macedonia: Housing and Health*, at p. 26.

³³ The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the ethnic conflicts that took place throughout the 1990s caused movement of population as refugees and internally displaced persons.

³⁴ Pavlovski, Borjan, *Health, Healthcare and Impacts of the Health of the Roma in the Republic of Macedonia*, Association of Emancipation, Solidarity and Equality of Women of Republic of Macedonia – ESE, 2008, at p. 12.

attitude of the general population towards their Roma co-citizens represents a graver problem.

C. Personal Security: Discrimination and Extremism

Another growing problem that Roma people face is increasing discrimination and open aggression towards them, which not rarely ends in physical violence and assaults against them. Within the Roma communities there are groups of more vulnerable members, such as women, children and sexual minorities, which are even more difficult to protect and empower. The paradoxical situation is that even though there are numerous anti-discrimination and anti-violence campaigns, the cases of violence against Roma persons can no longer be considered as a series of isolated cases. Hate speech³⁵ is often present and sometimes even used by mainstream media, contributing to the continuation of certain stereotypes regarding Roma people.

Discriminatory media discourse against the Roma population has been documented in Slovenia; large majority of media texts reporting on Roma have been motivated by some problem or have criminal connotations.³⁶ Furthermore, it is important to note that Roma only rarely appear in Slovenian media as individuals and are mostly placed in predetermined categories: *“using generalization and stereotyping, Roma people are presented as culturally different (they are lazy and rely on social aid), deviant (stealing is presumably their inherent trait), and as being a threat to our cultural pattern and in turn to the majority population”*.³⁷

There has been a growing number of hate-motivated assaults and killings of Roma in Hungary in the past year. Those assaults include attacks with deadly weapons, such as petrol bombs, hand grenades and other small weapons. A Romani couple was killed in November 2009 in the town of Pecs, Hungary by a grenade thrown at their house.³⁸ The latest victim of such assault is a 54-year old man who

³⁵ The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation 97(20) on hate speech defines it as follows: *“the term “hate speech” shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.”* Webber, Anne, *Manual on Hate Speech*, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2009, at p. 3.

³⁶ Kuhar, Roman, *Media Representation of Minorities*, Mediawatch Edition, Mirovni Institut, Slovenia, 2006. Available online at: <http://mediawatch.mirovni-institut.si/eng/mw18.htm>.

³⁷ Kuhar, Roman, *Media Representation of Minorities*, at p. 148.

³⁸ Amnesty International, Report 2009 Hungary. Available online at: <http://thereport.amnesty.org/en/regions/europe-central-asia/hungary>.

was shot at his chest at his doorstep in the town of Tiszalök in April 2010.³⁹ In such situations and without any legal or state protection mechanisms, it is inevitable for the community to turn to itself for protection.⁴⁰ The RAD Centre on Kosovo, has identified cases in which some Ashkalia people feel discriminated against or threatened if they leave their village; such fears may cause the community to further isolate itself.⁴¹ During the month of September 2009, Amnesty International reported about different attacks on Roma that occurred in August and September 2009 on Kosovo⁴². As in Hungary, the security situation of Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptians on Kosovo is further aggravated due to the lack of response from authorities and punishment for the perpetrators.

Even when discrimination is not expressed through open aggression, this phenomenon exists and is expressed through avoidance and creation of social distance. For example: the most unwanted social groups in a role of neighbours in Slovenian society are: drug addicts (79.5%), alcoholics (78%), political extremists (68.5%), homosexuals (60.3%) and the Roma (53.5%).⁴³ In Macedonian society, there is the following situation: 21% of citizens believe that Roma are permanently discriminated against, 31% believe they are frequently discriminated against, 24% stated that Roma are rarely discriminated against, and 21% that they are not discriminated against at all; 19% of citizens feel uncomfortable around Roma persons; Roma are acceptable as neighbours for 53% of the population while 27% provided negative answers.⁴⁴ The focus group identified a number of situations where Roma persons are being discriminated on daily basis: “[...] *unequal treatment by the police; different treatment in regard to communal services’ payment collection (electricity); unequal treatment of Roma children in the education, in the*

³⁹ Nadler, John, *Murder Mystery: Who's Killing Hungary's Gypsies?*, in: Time Magazine Friday, May 01, 2009, Available at: <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1895255,00.html>. Tensions in Hungary are growing bigger after the formation of a national paramilitary civilian group, which calls itself the *Magyar Garda* (Hungarian Guard) and purports to protect Hungarians against Roma crime.

⁴⁰ The Observer Guardian, *Hungarian Roma Take to Streets in Self-defense*, May 2009. Available online at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/03/roma-hungary-race-discrimination>.

⁴¹ Tmava, Milena and Adem, Beha, *Helplessness Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptian Forced Returnees in Kosovo*, at p. 11.

⁴² Tmava, Milena and Adem, Beha, *Helplessness Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptian Forced Returnees in Kosovo*, at p. 11.

⁴³ Erjavec, Karmen, Basic-Hrvatini, Sandra and Kelbl, Barbara, *We about the Roma*, Mediawatch Edition, Mirovni Institut, Slovenia, 2006, at p. 148. Available at: <http://mediawatch.mirovni-institut.si/eng/mw18.htm>.

⁴⁴ Simoska, Emilija et al, *How Inclusive is Macedonian Society*, Foundation Institute Open Society Macedonia, 2008, at p. 93. Available online at: <http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00005343/01/FIOOM-Istrazuvanje-Inkluzivnosta-na-MK-opstestvo-ANG.pdf>.

enrolment and grading procedures; mistrust, refusal to be served in shops; closed doors for employment, even in cases of people holding higher education degrees; refusal of social allowance; no assistance in solving residential or health problems; humiliating attitude from other ethnic groups, especially from Macedonians and Albanians".⁴⁵ The following section deals with some of the most severe forms of community insecurities Roma populations face.

D. Community Security and Spatial Segregation: Education and Housing

Apart from the personal insecurities of Roma people, community security issues are even more greatly manifested, notably through extreme forms of spatial segregation. The two most common forms of spatial segregation are reflected in education and housing policies. Personal insecurities at larger level are manifested through community isolating itself further.

Segregation of Roma children in the school system is an issue present across Europe. Within the Czech Republic, Roma children have repeatedly been placed in special schools for children with intellectual disabilities, without the actual need for these children to be placed in such schools.⁴⁶ In Bulgaria the material conditions in many segregated Roma schools are at low level. Furthermore, in a public opinion poll, 86% of non-Roma citizens responded that they would not want their children attending school where pupils are predominantly Roma.⁴⁷ The material conditions of majority-Roma schools are similar in Hungary, Slovakia and Romania and involve lacks of equipment and teaching aid, worn out furniture, schools located in buildings that do not comply with official standards and inadequate conditions for children to spend their time.⁴⁸

Anti-discrimination mechanisms and provisions are rarely used, sometimes due to a lack of such mechanisms, thus discrimination of Roma pupils and students continues. Research conducted by the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) reveals discriminatory practices, such as placing Roma pupils in back row seats in the classrooms for, supposedly, other pupils do not wish to sit next to Roma children; furthermore, teachers take no notice of racist behaviour towards Roma and often themselves practice such behaviour.⁴⁹ All of those practices eventually lead to

⁴⁵ Simoska, Emilija et al, *How Inclusive is Macedonian Society*, at p. 93.

⁴⁶ Open Society Institute EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program (EUMAP) OSI, *Equal Access to Quality Education for Roma*, OSI, Budapest, 2008, at p. 11.

⁴⁷ EUMAP, *Equal Access to Quality Education for Roma*, at p. 62.

⁴⁸ EUMAP, *Equal Access to Quality Education for Roma*, at p. 57.

⁴⁹ European Centre for Minority Issues, *Toward Regional Guidelines for the Integration of Roms*, Narrative Report Submitted to the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, February 2004, at p. 35. Available online at: <http://www.ecmirom.org>.

a substantial disparity between the level of education of the majority and the Roma population: almost a quarter of adult Roma have no education; there are high estimates as to the number of Roma children who do not attend school; dropout rates from primary school among Roma estimated are as high as 49%.⁵⁰

Spatial segregation in terms of housing policies, segregated settlements, and occurrences of forced evictions⁵¹ are frequent throughout urban areas in Western European, CEE and SEE countries. In Romania forced evictions or threats of evictions for Roma families have been present and followed by a decrease of quality of life for the families: “*On the occasions when alternative housing is offered by the authorities, it is often built in very precarious conditions and lacks basic facilities such as water, heating or electricity. In recent years, Romani communities have been evicted and relocated next to garbage dumps, sewage treatment plants or industrial areas on the outskirts of cities*”.⁵² In addition to the newly created situation and often worsened living conditions, Roma families also experience intolerance and hostility by their new neighbours.⁵³ Hazardous living conditions for the Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptians are also present on Kosovo, where the situation is exacerbated by recent conflict and environmental degradation; the communities located in camps in Mitrovica are lead-polluted areas where the lead contamination is particularly high.⁵⁴

A study conducted on poverty housing in Macedonia states that the poorest housing conditions are found among the Roma communities living in urban peripheries.⁵⁵ Traditionally, Roma settlements are observed to be located within the city centre, while more recent settlements tend to be located on the outskirts of the cities, in places that are difficult to access with little or no infrastructure. Roma

⁵⁰ Open Society Institute EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program (EUMAP), *Equal Access to Quality Education for Roma* (Volume 2), 2007, at p. 168.

⁵¹ Author's note: the latest case of forced eviction took place on March 19, 2010 in the Municipality Airport located within the City of Skopje, Macedonia. Mr. Aljush Eminov, his four under-age children, his wife and old father were left homeless after the municipality tore down their house due to lack of proper documents. The family has been living on that property since 1963 and regularly paid taxes. Information obtained in conversation with Mr. Aljush Eminov.

⁵² Amnesty International, *Treated Like Waste Roma Homes Destroyed and Health at Risk in Romania*, EUR 39/001/2010, 26 January 2010, at p. 2. Available online at: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR39/001/2010/en>.

⁵³ Amnesty International, *Treated Like Waste Roma Homes Destroyed and Health at Risk in Romania*, at p. 2.

⁵⁴ Tmava, Milena and Adem, Beha, *Helplessness Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptian Forced Returnees in Kosovo*, at p.10.

⁵⁵ Centre for Regional Policy Research and Cooperation ‘Studiorum’, *Report on Poverty Housing Situation in Macedonia*, Skopje, June 2004, at p. 15. Available online at: <http://studiorum.org.mk/en/?p=242>.

communities live in settlements that are spatially and socially segregated, often located near industrial zones and often in temporary settlements that hold that status for many years or even decades:

“As a result, almost all cities and towns of any size in Romania, Bulgaria, former Yugoslavia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (which are also countries of the Decade) now have at least one peripheral shantytown predominantly settled with Roma population; their advantage of coming closer to the opportunities of the urban settlements is little compared to the disadvantages of this type of isolation and ghettoization [sic]- inappropriate living conditions devoid of water supply and sanitation, lack of access to education and healthcare and other social services, which together with the resulting lack of access to employment in the city, again close the vicious circle of poverty, exclusion and marginalization.”⁵⁶

Various forms of spatial segregation also represent part of the vicious circle: segregation of children within the education system may lead to dropout and certainly leads to lower quality of education; consequently, it leads to lack of skills and accordingly decreases employment opportunities. Segregation of communities in terms of living conditions in the cases depicted above leads to deteriorated health of the communities living there. Discrimination and insecurities cause mistrust of the people regarding other communities and the states where they live.

E. Political Security: Political Representation and Active Citizenship

Finally, after having presented various forms of insecurities that Roma communities experience throughout European countries, the issue of political security is to be addressed. Political representation, giving voice to those communities to enter the decision-making process in one country, to enter the political battle is a mean to consequently improve the situation of their communities. Representation and political recognition can be considered as a first step to exercising active citizenship.

Political engagement of Roma needs to be traced to the creation of intellectual Roma elites as community leaders. In the past ten to fifteen years, the revival of the civil society sector in the post-communist countries brought the creation of non-governmental organizations that are dealing with various socio-economic issues of the Roma. The civil society sector has acted as a starting ground

⁵⁶ Milevska-Kostova, Neda and Eminovska, Enisa, *Situation of the Roma Population in Macedonia: Housing and Health*, at p. 8.

for Roma activists to engage in or form a political party. In other cases, informal community leaders have decided to pursue a political career and represent their community through political party creation. What is important to consider is the degree of political liberty, which respective countries have given to various ethnic minorities, including the Roma population.

The situation in the former Yugoslav countries for example, varies from one country to another and the degree to which multiculturalism as such is respected in the country.⁵⁷ At the moment, the political representation of Roma in Macedonia is the following: there is one Member of Parliament from the Roma Alliance of Macedonia party; one Mayor in the Municipality Shuto Orizari and the Minister without Portfolio in the Macedonian Government. The Minister without Portfolio and his office act as the coordinator of the Decade of Roma Inclusion in Macedonia, the international initiative by number of organizations and government to improve the situation of Roma throughout Europe.

In Bulgaria, likewise, Roma elites have demonstrated an increased concern in their community's culture and organisation in the post-communist system of political party pluralism.⁵⁸ Moreover, it can be noticed that the Roma elites have been encouraged by external intellectuals, to take upon this role and represent their communities.⁵⁹ A study conducted in Bulgaria describes that some Roma people are politically active either in non-Roma parties, such as the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) or in Roma political formations, *EvroRoma*, a Roma party of leftwing orientation and *Tsar Kiro*, and *Kupate*, right-wing Roma formation.⁶⁰

The political party diversity of Romania is also rich with Roma political parties: in 2001 up to thirteen Roma political parties has been registered in Romania.⁶¹ As in Bulgaria, Romani votes are scattered among Roma political parties and other non-Roma political parties. The oldest and best established Roma political party in Romania *Roma Party* is supported by 29% of the total Romani votes, while

⁵⁷ Friedman, Eben, *Political Integration of the Romani Minority in Post-communist Macedonia*, in: Southeast European Politics (Volume 3, Number 2-3), pp. 107-126, November 2002, at p. 113.

⁵⁸ Giordano, Christian and Boscoboinik, Andrea, *Roma's Identities in Southeast Europe: Bulgaria*, The Ethnobarometer Working Paper Series, 2003, at p. 20.

⁵⁹ Giordano, Christian and Boscoboinik, Andrea, *Roma's Identities in Southeast Europe: Bulgaria*, at p. 20.

⁶⁰ Benovska-Sabkova, Milena, *I am a Pure Gypsy. The Roma Individuality in the Distorted Mirror of Group Stereotypes*, Roma's Identities in Southeast Europe: Bulgaria, The Ethnobarometer Working Paper Series, 2003, at p. 78.

⁶¹ Tarnovschi, Daniela, *Roma from Romania*, Roma's Identities in Southeast Europe: Romania, The Ethnobarometer Working Paper Series, 2008, at p. 31.

others such as *Roma Civil Alliance*, the *Alliance for Roma Unity* and *Roma Christian Centre* are less known and supported.⁶²

The mobilization of Roma people and their organization in political parties and civil society organizations needs to be acknowledged as an important element and step forward improving the overall situation of Roma and enabling them to fully exercise their civil rights. According to the human security paradigm, it is emancipation and protection that ultimately leads to sustainable human development and security.

IV. Application of the Human Security Approach: Emancipation as Security

The notion of “*emancipation as security*” has been described by Neufeld as a critical and emancipatory strategy focusing on the empirical question of how security issues are structured in political discourse.⁶³ One can argue that it was Ken Booth that introduced this concept in the early 1990s setting a basis for further discourse:

*“Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security.”*⁶⁴

One can consider emancipation as the enlightenment thought of the 20th century that continues up to date. As Booth argues, the struggle for freedom and emancipation has been going on in different parts of the world and for different individuals and groups – in post-colonial societies, post-communists societies, among the feminist movement, among the sexual minorities, ethnic minorities, immigrants, consumers and different stakeholders – and this struggle has been more successful for some groups than others.⁶⁵ One can argue that in today’s Europe the efforts that Roma activists are pursuing are ones of emancipation.

⁶² Tarnovschi, Daniela, *Roma from Romania*, at p. 31.

⁶³ Neufeld, Mark, *Pitfalls of Emancipation and Discourses of Security: Reflections on Canada’s ‘Security with Human Face’*, in: *International Relations* (Volume 18, Number 1), March 2004, pp. 109-123.

⁶⁴ Booth, Ken, *Security and Emancipation*, in: *Review of International Studies* (Volume 17, Number 4), October 1991, pp. 313-326, at p. 319.

⁶⁵ Booth, Ken, *Security and Emancipation*, at p. 320

In order for one individual or a group of people to pursue emancipation, those people firstly need to feel protected and to feel empowered to do so. In the past decade, emancipation has been connected to those two concepts. According to the Commission on Human Security, emancipation can be also understood as protection and empowerment of people: “*Protection shields people from dangers. It requires concerted effort to develop norms, processes and institutions that systematically address insecurities. Empowerment enables people to develop their potential and become full participants in decision-making. Protection and empowerment are mutually reinforcing, and both are required in most situations*”⁶⁶ Those two components are can be regarded as parts of the emancipatory process. As parts of human rights and emancipation, Henry Shue distinguishes two sets of basic rights: “‘*subsistence*’ which includes social and economic rights, and ‘*security from violence*’ which includes civil and political rights”.⁶⁷ One cannot argue which set of basic rights precedes the other; for example drinking water and food, which falls into category of economic and social rights, are far more urgent needs than empowerment and civil and political rights issues; however, the political and civil rights are equally important and necessary as the daily bread, since without them the individuals cannot fully exercise their freedom.⁶⁸

Emancipation can only be achieved when the two sets of rights are fulfilled, i.e. when people are protected from fear and want and empowered to take action and choose among opportunities. Furthermore, as Booth argues freedom or liberty is the core value of emancipation, while “*emancipation implies an egalitarian concept of liberty*.”⁶⁹ In that sense, emancipation requires full social inclusion within the society for the group that is the subject of emancipation.

Granting specific group rights as part of the emancipation package leads to the “*societal security dilemma*” which is seen as a situation where “*one group’s security spells insecurity for the others*.”⁷⁰ The question which arises is: can emancipation represent a zero-sum game where each player can only gain at the expense of others? In cases of prior conflict between minority and majority groups (or between two groups in general) and in case of contested identities the emancipation of one group can spill danger for the other group: “*The constitution of identities is often a reciprocal process. As each subject seeks to perform its identity,*

⁶⁶ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, New York, 2003.

⁶⁷ Dunne, Tim and Wheeler, Nicholas J., *We the Peoples’: Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights Theory and Practice*, in: *International Relations* (Volume 18, Number 1), 2004, pp. 9-23, at p. 18.

⁶⁸ Freedom fighters, national liberation movements and emancipation movements throughout history have supported this argument.

⁶⁹ Booth, Ken, *Security and Emancipation*, at p. 321.

⁷⁰ Møller, Bjorn, *National, Societal and Human Security: General Discussion with a Case Study from the Balkans*, at p. 48.

it threatens others, whose identities are consolidated in response."⁷¹ As an example one can regard the public debates and xenophobic discourses towards immigrants in one society or reforms in terms of granting rights to sexual minorities. The situation of Roma throughout Europe in their respective countries does not register minority-majority armed group conflict, except for the personal and community insecurities depicted above. Even when, there is no prior conflict between two groups, affirmative action policies as part of emancipation can be perceived as a zero-sum game by members of the other community.

Before examining the carriers of emancipation, one ought to consider the limits to emancipation. Neufeld points out to the problems that this approach carries and those are the dangers of going into abstract utopianism and elitism; the first "*abstract utopianism*" – "*a utopianism which stripped its theorizing of its critical content*", and elitism by "*viewing ordinary people not as active and reflective partners in the process of emancipatory change, but as empty vessels to be filled with our objective truths, once again losing sight of the fact that it is not ideas but people who change circumstances.*"⁷² Both problems identified are correct in portraying the concept as distanced and detached from reality. However, when activists and policy-makers initiate reforms in line with the discourse of human security and employ the concept of emancipation the results are considerable.⁷³ Therefore, one should focus on the "*role of security discourse in policy-making, implementation and legitimation*".⁷⁴

Finally, there is the issue of the state's role in emancipation and the role of consolidated democracy and civil society as a framework for emancipation. There are rather opposing views of the state's role and ability to emancipate. According to the social-democratic view, "[d]emocracy produces a more responsive state that can appropriately chaperon its people through the development process, as opposed to relying on outside aid."⁷⁵ However, when it comes to the question of the state's

⁷¹ Weldes, Jutta et al. (eds.), *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1999, pp. 1-33, at p. 15.

⁷² Neufeld, Mark, *Pitfalls of Emancipation and Discourses of Security: Reflections on Canada's 'Security with Human Face'*, at p. 111.

⁷³ Lloyd Axworthy, Canada's Minister for Human Resources (1995–7) attempted to initiate a major renewal of Canada's social programmes, in line with the current discourse of human security: "As Axworthy presents it, the rethinking of security was a government initiative occasioned by policy-makers' own recognition of the limitations of the traditional notion of security". See Neufeld, Mark, *Pitfalls of Emancipation and Discourses of Security: Reflections on Canada's 'Security with Human Face'*, at p. 115.

⁷⁴ Neufeld, Mark, *Pitfalls of Emancipation and Discourses of Security: Reflections on Canada's 'Security with Human Face'*, at p. 111.

⁷⁵ Gough, Mark, *Human Security: The Individual in the Security Question - The Case of Bosnia*, Contemporary Security Policy (Volume 23, Number 3), 2002, pp.145-191, at p. 147.

ability as emancipator and protector there is a different argument as to which “[i]n the brave neoliberal world order, however, we are now instructed that domestic progress towards the good life is a luxury we can no longer afford. The purview of the discourse of progress and the good life has been restricted to the international realm.”⁷⁶ How can emancipation as security in case of the Romani issues be achieved and who would be the primary actor in this endeavour? International and national non-governmental organizations have already initiated this process by advocating for respect of human rights, human dignity and quality of living of the Roma communities. Education, health, employment and housing are the four pillars defined by the Decade of Roma Inclusion.⁷⁷ Furthermore, the framework of human security can serve as a universal structure along which different agents, governments and international organizations can cooperate in advancing the issues Roma communities face throughout Europe. In the overall discourse and search for meaning of what emancipation represents, one should not forget to look at the grassroots human needs, which ask for real, concrete actions to be conducted.

V. Conclusion

The present analysis focused on Roma communities throughout European countries, their protracted deprivation of human needs, exacerbated with extremism and anti-Gypsyist manifestations, through the prism of a human security approach. The concepts underpinning human security can play a normative role at international, national and local levels. Human security of Roma in this regard can be explored as a normative-political issue that has the potential to eventually influence public policy and initiate reforms to improve the protection of human rights and reach quality standard of living. Contemporary Roma issues can be treated as human security issues, and consequently addressed as such. Illustrative examples are presented throughout the analysis from documented cases within different countries: Bulgaria, the Check Republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania.

Five sets of identified threats were taken as parameters for the analysis: economic, health, personal, community and political security. It is important to note that all areas are intertwined and very often insecurity arising from one area affects the security within other areas. Poverty and unemployment are two of the most salient and urgent issues that fall into the area of economic insecurities. The percentage of Roma people experiencing poverty and extreme poverty is considerable. The impoverishment reflects negatively upon the health of Roma

⁷⁶ Neufeld, Mark, *Pitfalls of Emancipation and Discourses of Security: Reflections on Canada's 'Security with Human Face'*, at p. 121.

⁷⁷ Decade of Roma Inclusion. Official web-site: <http://www.romadecade.org/about>.

communities and vice versa: deteriorated health condition of the general Roma population causes considerably impaired working ability, thus intensifying poverty. Personal insecurities of Roma people are on the rise with growing numbers of documented cases of violent and racist outbursts against them. Community security issues are manifested on a large and often systematic scale, through extreme forms of spatial segregation. Two most common forms of spatial segregation have been identified in education and housing policies. Political representation and recognition for the Roma communities, as a first step to exercising active citizenship, is present throughout the countries; however a more organized approach by Roma intellectual elites needs to be undertaken.

Discrimination and insecurities cause mistrust of the people regarding other communities and the states where they live and prevents them to fully exercise their civil rights. Assessing the level of insecurity for the Romani communities in each of these areas may represent a starting point for an academic debate and as a baseline for further policy considerations. The human security approach on issues Roma people face can be a beginning of a broader research project. A multidimensional approach offered by the human security paradigm for protection and empowerment of Roma communities throughout Europe needs to be recognized as a priority.

Human Security as 'Ethnic Security' in Kosovo

Adem Beha and Gezim Visoka¹

In Kosovo, the concept of human security is invoked in a three-fold manner. First of all, the international community has applied human security for the purpose of maintaining a fragile peace and stability in Kosovo. For the international community, maintaining the fragile peace meant tolerating the establishment and operationalization of Serbian parallel institutions. This leads to the second application of human security: the parallel institutions claim that their existence is necessary to provide human security for the Serbian community in Kosovo. Consequently, this undermines the capacity of Kosovo's public institutions to exercise legal authority in the north of Kosovo and in other territorial enclaves. Parallel to this, Kosovo's institutions have viewed the human security approach as a means to prove the institutional capacity of independent self-government to provide inclusive security, welfare, and integration policies for all people in Kosovo, with a special emphasis on ethnic minorities. Accordingly, human security is used by different actors in Kosovo to pursue different political agendas, which have not resulted in achieving the primary goal of furthering human welfare and fulfilment beyond mere physical security. To the contrary, the (ab)use of human security has created the conditions for fragile governance, protracted ethnic destabilization, and stagnating economic and human development.

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I. Introduction

Even after ten years of international administration and two years since its independence from Serbia, Kosovo continues to face ethnic and socio-economic problems that have the potential to undermine the progress achieved and threaten the country's stability. In 1999 the international community intervened to halt the Serbian authorities' violence against Kosovar Albanians and began its decade-long administration of Kosovo, aiming to coordinate reconstruction, maintain law and order, protect human rights, and create democratic institutions. From 1999-2008, the international administration (UNMIK and its partners) coordinated the deployment of over 20,000 NATO troops, provided over three billion Euro in foreign aid, and undertook large projects in peace- and institution-building. Despite these investments many criticize the international administration for being ineffective in satisfying the real needs of the Kosovar population, constructing social trust across ethnic communities and in realizing economic recovery and psycho-social reconstruction. The international administration is also criticized for deepening ethnic fragmentation (consequently strengthening Serbian parallel institutions) asserting international primacy, thereby inhibiting local ownership and making bottom-up approaches to transition and normalization impossible. Instead of supporting the strengthening of the social contract and enhancing the participation of all communities in political decision-making, international actors have prioritised "*short-term security at the price of long-term sustainable peace and economic development*".²

This article explores the factors that have undermined the societal progress and the improvement of human conditions in Kosovo from a human security perspective. Although human security was implicit in the mandates of the international administration and local institutions, this article explores how human security has been instrumentalized as 'ethnic security' in post-conflict Kosovo. In particular, we argue that the international administration in Kosovo has undertaken activities related to human security primarily seen as conflict resolution and short-term stability; that the Kosovo institutions use it as a means to justify the self-governance capacities and act as the principle public services and human security provider; and that the Serbian parallel institutions invoke activities similar to human security that aim to legitimize their 'contested' presence in the enclaves across Kosovo. As a consequence of these multiple agencies and their implicit invocation of human security we argue that human security has not been an end in itself for these three agencies, but has functioned as a means to achieve different political agendas.

² Montanaro, Lucia, *The Kosovo Statebuilding Conundrum: Addressing Fragility in a Contested State*, FRIDE Working Paper 91, October 2009, at p. 19.

II. A New Approach to Human Security

There is no consensual definition for the scope and the nature of human security. However, in a broad sense, it challenges the traditional view of security, which is focused on military capabilities and state security, and supports broadening the human development paradigm. At its core, human security involves “a change of focus from a state-centred understanding of security that is, top-down and territorial, to an individual-based and therefore bottom-up and de-territorialized model”.³ It reorients the conception of security by considering certain dimensions of the concept. ‘Security for whom’ focuses on individuals and peoples and has wider meaning for values and goals such as dignity, equity and solidarity.⁴ ‘Security from what’ identifies the agency-based and structural causes of insecurity, such as economic threats, personal security threats, environmental threats, and political threats.⁵ Finally, ‘security by what means’ empowers individuals to become ‘agents’, who can be actively engaged in defining potential security threats, and who can participate in efforts to mitigate them.⁶ The 1994 *UNDP Human Development Report* (HDR) synthesized threats to human security into seven components: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security,⁷ while human development focuses on “flourishing or fulfilment of individuals in their homes and communities, and the expansion of valuable choices”⁸, “[t]he objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, without impeding long-term human fulfilment”.⁹

Parallel to this, a European conception of human security perceives human security as the security of individuals and communities – an interrelationship of ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’.¹⁰ A research group convened by the EU has elaborated several principles of new conflict management informed by

³ Kostovicova, Denisa, *Legitimacy and International Administration: The Ahtisaari Settlement for Kosovo from a Human Security Perspective*, in: *International Peacekeeping* (Volume 15), 2008, pp. 631-647, at p. 632.

⁴ Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou and Anuradha M. Chenoy, *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*, Routledge, Oxford, 2007, at p. 13.

⁵ Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou and Anuradha M. Chenoy, *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*, at p. 14.

⁶ Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou and Anuradha, M. Chenoy, *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*, at p. 16.

⁷ UNDP, *Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.

⁸ Alkire, Sabina, *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Working Paper No. 2, Oxford, 2003, at p. 5.

⁹ Alkire, Sabina, *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*, p. 2.

¹⁰ Kaldor, Mary, *Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention*. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007, at p. 185.

human security. These principles include: (a) *the primacy of human rights* that distinguishes the human security approach from traditional state-based approaches; (b) *legitimate political authority*, which has enforcement capacity and can gain the trust of the population; (c) *multilateralism*, since the human security approach is global, it should be implemented through multilateral action; (d) *a bottom-up approach*, which considers communication, consultation and dialogue with the local people as essential tools for both development and security; (e) having a *regional focus*, as new wars have no clear boundaries.¹¹

Nonetheless, as the thinking on human security grows, various critiques have questioned its meaning, scope and its political and moral implications. The main conceptual criticism concerns its lack of precision: as a concept, it is too broad to consider responses to threats, it lacks a concise research agenda, which is complicated by its inter-disciplinarity and inter-sectorality. Concerning the political implications of human security, Buzan is sceptic about its effect and sees it as “*a new tool for existing governing agencies to shape and control civil populations*” and argues that “[*h*]uman security remains state-centric despite the supranational dimensions of the concept, allowing for a prominent role of the state as a necessary condition for individual security”.¹²

Moving from theory to practice, it is clear that human security is increasingly employed in post-conflict situations. From Bosnia and Herzegovina to Timor-Leste, Kosovo and Afghanistan, the comprehensive nature of these interventions, including democratic institution-building, civil society assistance, economic development, human rights promotion, reckoning with war crimes and so on, corresponds closely to key human security concerns.¹³ Learning from these cases, the *Report of the Commission on Human Security (CHS)* called for a new framework and a funding strategy that rebuilds conflict-torn states and focuses on the protection and empowerment of people. Such a human security framework, according to CHS must “*emphasize the linkages among the many issues affecting people, such as ensuring people’s safety through strengthening civilian police and demobilizing combatants; meeting immediate needs of displaced people; launching reconstruction and development; promoting reconciliation and coexistence; and*

¹¹ See *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities*, Barcelona, 2004; *A European Way of Security: The Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group comprising a Proposal and Background Report*, Madrid, 8th November, 2007; and Kaldor, Mary, *Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention*.

¹² See Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1998, at p. 37.

¹³ Kostovicova, Denisa, *Legitimacy and International Administration: The Ahtisaari Settlement for Kosovo from a Human Security Perspective*, at p. 633.

advancing effective governance".¹⁴ Furthermore, CHS recognizes that in conflict situations it is necessary to go beyond peacekeeping and peace-building presence by "*setting up unified leadership for all actors close to the delivery point of human security.*"¹⁵

However, the invocation of human security as a strategy to deal with many issues in underdeveloped societies, war-torn territories, and weak or fragile states poses several challenges. For instance, engaging different national and international agencies to provide human security can undermine the development of a single political structure being responsible for delivering services to its constituents and accountable through democratic mechanisms. On the other hand, assisting weak governments is considered a sustainable approach to deliver public security and welfare services, but risks the long-term goal of improving human rights and investment in people. Thus, a balanced approach of having functional and accountable public institutions that ensure equilibrium between public security for the public domain and at the same time investing in humans through prioritizing education, health, and social welfare would be an ultimate strategy to ensure overall societal stability and development. However idealistic this may sound, effective aid and political conditionality combined with on-ground assistance would serve as a mechanism to ensure gradual progress thereto.

III. The (Ab)Use of Human Security in Kosovo

As a concept, human security has not been explicitly used to describe the mandate of international administration and international organizations; nor was it employed by the Kosovo government as an integrated and guiding strategy for development. However, if we deconstruct the goals of the international administration in Kosovo (including UNMIK, the donor community, and EULEX) we notice that their mandate and activities implicitly reflect the concept of human security. Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy called the NATO presence in Kosovo a new security vocation seeing the defence of human security as a global concern and the humanitarian imperative that galvanised NATO into action.¹⁶ Similarly, the Kosovar government has established an institutional and legal environment to facilitate human security and design policies and funding dedicated to sectors that aim to provide human security. Meanwhile, the Serbian parallel institutions provide public services, health and education for the Serbian population in Kosovo, activities that are directly related to the human security agenda. In the following sections, we

¹⁴ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, New York, 2003, at p. 2.

¹⁵ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, at p. 2.

¹⁶ Axworthy, Lloyd, *NATO's new security vocation*, NATO Review (Number 4), 1999, pp. 8-11. Available online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9904-02.htm> (All websites used in this article were last checked on 3 November 2010).

explore the main factors that have undermined human security in Kosovo. These are: the nature of the international presence in Kosovo; legacies of top-down approaches; the primacy of stability and ethnic security; the multiplicity of political authorities; the politics of institution-building; widespread corruption and finally the presence of Serbian parallel structures.

A. *The Nature of the International Presence in Kosovo*

The nature and open-ended mandate of the UN international administration of Kosovo created conditions that later undermined the functioning of Kosovo institutions, local sovereignty and social cohesion. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) was the head of UNMIK and the highest international civilian official in Kosovo. Indeed the SRSG enjoyed “*maximum civilian executive powers envisaged and vested in him by the Security Council in its resolution 1244 (1999), and will also be the final authority on their interpretation [...]*”.¹⁷ UNMIK was structured around four pillars. The first two pillars, coordinated by UNMIK, dealt with public security issues and the judicial system, and managed domestic public administration and the international civilian presence. The third pillar was administrated by OSCE, which dealt with democratization through institution building, strengthening local police and municipal authorities, as well as promoting the rule of law and an independent media and active civil society. The fourth pillar mandated the EU to undertake economic reconstruction and development, including privatisation, customs and property issues. With such a broadly-mandated international administration, UNMIK “*suffered from having too many masters*”.¹⁸

From 1999-2003, the international community delayed transferring power to local institutions, and did little to promote local ownership of reconstruction processes. This was partly due to Kosovo’s unresolved political status and the fear that any transfer of power to Kosovo’s local institutions would be seen by Serbs in Kosovo as threat. In an attempt to ‘balance’ these fears, SRSG Michael Steiner outlined a series of benchmarks in April 2002, which “*should be achieved before launching a discussion on status*”.¹⁹ Following consultations with the PISG, UNMIK formulated these benchmarks as ‘Standards for Kosovo’ in December 2003 and unveiled a more complex and ambitious ‘Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan’ on 31 March 2004. These ‘standards’ incorporated critical areas such as “*rule of law, functioning democratic institutions, the economy, freedom of movement, the*

¹⁷ United Nation Secretary-General, 1999, UN Doc of 12 July of 1999. Available online at <http://www.unmikonline.org/UNMIKONLINE2009/SRSG.htm>.

¹⁸ King, Iain, and Whit Mason, *Peace at any price: How the world failed Kosovo*, Hurst & Company, London, 2006, at p. 249.

¹⁹ UN Doc. S/PV/4518. 24 April 2002, p. 3.

*return of internally displaced persons and refugees and contributions to regional stability”.*²⁰

While these issue areas correspond clearly to the fulfilment of the requirement of normative and democratic legitimacy, and overall stabilization of Kosovo, it is questionable whether these standards reflect ‘conditional sovereignty’ or represent a ‘delaying strategy’ to avoid addressing Kosovo’s status in order to maintain the immediate necessity for ‘negative’ peace and stability on the ground. While these standards reflect human security concerns, many commentators argue that they were aimed at delaying discussion of Kosovo’s future (final) political status. It was argued that this delay aimed to incorporate Serbs into Kosovo institutions and society, according to the international mandate. Nonetheless, the incremental transferral of competence to the locals made both Serbs and Albanians sceptical about their future prospects in Kosovo. Instead of creating and investing in domestic conditions, which would provide durable peace and human security in Kosovo, the policy of the international community in Kosovo was shaped by a pre-occupation with stability. Accordingly, Dominik Zaum argues that “*such a policy [...] makes the international presence a condition of stability, rather than an instrument to attain self-sustained peace.*”²¹

Discussions on the determination of Kosovo’s final status also illustrate a lack of local ownership. In 2005, the process of defining a future (final) status for Kosovo final status was initiated and the UN Security Council appointed Martti Ahtisaari as Special Envoy to mediate between Serbia and Kosovo. Negotiations ended without mutual agreement and Martti Ahtisaari proposed ‘supervised independence’ for Kosovo, with broad decentralization for the Serbian community and an EU ‘monitoring’ mission to supervise the plan’s implementation and the rule of law and justice. However, the drafters of this proposal engaged only with donor-driven agents of civil society²², which was not an adequate representation of the people who would be affected by the proposal. Only a Kosovar movement demanding self-determination travelled to areas which were to be decentralized and provided the local population with a platform for their concerns. According to Vetëvendosje, “*through decentralization, Serbia is intending to expand and define the borders of enclaves, create continuous territory through enclaves with the planned return of Serbs by the government of Serbia, take the high peaks of hills and*

²⁰ Press Release 719, *Address to the Security Council by Michael Steiner*, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UNMIK 24 April 2002. Available online at: www.unmikonline.org.

²¹ Zaum, Dominik, *States of Conflict: A case study of state-building in Kosovo*, Institute for Public Policy Research, 2009, at p. 1.

²² UNDP, *Civil Society and Human Development*, 2008, at p. 42.

mountains with undisputable strategic and military importance, and legitimize its parallel structures in Kosovo."²³

After the failure of UNSC to approve the Ahtisaari plan, the 'people of Kosovo' issued the unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008. To date, Kosovo has been recognized by over 67 states and has also been accepted as full member of the IMF and the World Bank.²⁴ Expressing their anger at Kosovo's Declaration of Independence, local Serbs from Mitrovica (the northern part of Kosovo), in reaction to the Kosovo declaration of independence, destroyed two custom points in northern Kosovo. In December 2008, the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) was deployed in Kosovo, the biggest EU civilian mission enacted under the (then) European Defense and Security Policy (EDSP). According to the Barcelona Report, human security missions should be led by a civilian²⁵ but this is not the case with the EULEX, which is led by a former Kosovo KFOR General, Yves de Kermabon. Although EULEX is tasked to monitor, mentor and assist Kosovo's own authorities, including police, justice and customs²⁶, Kosovo still faces problems regarding justice, the court system and corruption. EULEX, in cooperation with the Kosovar government, is working on a strategy to integrate Mitrovica, (which has been ruled by Serbian parallel institutions since 1999) into the Kosovo political system and make Kosovo law applicable in the area.

As seen here, one of the major challenges for international administrations in post-conflict situations is finding a balance between goals that incorporate both immediate social needs and long-term political goals. While the latter includes ensuring physical security, promoting economic reconstruction and building political institutions to transfer powers to local institutions, immediate social needs include returning people to their homes, providing them with adequate living conditions, health and social welfare services. As demonstrated by Kosovo, international administrations often try to cover all these sectors at the same time. As a result of trying to prioritize the issues of ethnic relations and ensuring immediate results to maintain peace and stability, international administrations often neglect economic development, employment generation and rural development. While many other international and local NGO's try to bridge this gap, a lack of operational coordination and overlapping activities often result in ignoring essential areas including, water, energy and infrastructural development. Thus, one of the generic

²³ Levizja Vetevendosje, *Serbia's Plan for Kosova*, Prishtina, 2006. Available online at: <http://www.vetevendosje.org>.

²⁴ Kosovo became a member of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in July 2009.

²⁵ *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities*, at p. 17.

²⁶ Tamminen, Tanja, *Human Security in Post-status Kosovo: A Shared Responsibility*, CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Centre (Volume 1, 2008), at p. 17.

problems of international administrations is seeing human security through the lens of physical security at “ignoring the role that equitable economic development can play towards peace.”²⁷

B. Legacies of Top-down Approaches

The ‘legitimacy dynamics’ of the international administration in Kosovo have evolved over time. In the first years after the war UNMIK enjoyed public support and cooperation for delivering its mandate for societal reconstruction. However, as time passed and the promised progress was not achieved, the Kosovars’ supportive perception of UNMIK began to change. According to UNDP polls, over 60% of Kosovars were satisfied with UNMIK work in 2002, while by 2009 support has decreased to approximately 10%, and people no longer consider UNMIK as a responsible authority in Kosovo.²⁸ The sustainable transformation of Kosovar society cannot be achieved without a meaningful bottom-up process, which would incorporate people’s concerns into political agendas. The efforts to divide tasks among different actors, including UN agencies, OSCE, EU, and NATO proved unsuccessful. Instead, they employed “a top-down policy in nearly all dimensions of the civilizing process and its related human rights functions, which led to an alienation of democratically elected representatives of the Kosovo people from state responsibilities.”²⁹ Thus, this top-down approach of institution-building ultimately led to a ‘top-down local democracy’ which did not answer to people’s concrete needs. A bottom-up approach, as described in the *Barcelona Report*, means that “involving marginal groups and civil society actors, is not only a matter of moral but effectiveness as well.”³⁰ It seems that this recommendation was not considered by UNMIK administration in Kosovo.

Nonetheless, to avoid citizen dependency and to promote domestic participatory processes, the key guiding principles of development policy should have been partnership, local ownership and participation. As Kaldor advocates, “people who live in zones of insecurity are the best source of intelligence. Thus communication, consultation and dialogue are essential tools for both development and security, not simply to win hearts and minds but in order to gain knowledge and understanding.”³¹ In particular, the exclusion of sensitive groups, such as former

²⁷ Montanaro, Lucia, *The Kosovo Statebuilding Conundrum: Addressing Fragility in a Contested State*, at p. 14.

²⁸ UNDP, *Early Warning Report 24*, Prishtina, Kosovo, 25 November 2009. Available online at: http://www.ks.undp.org/repository/docs/FF_24_English.pdf.

²⁹ Dulic, Dragana, *Peace Building and Human Security: Kosovo Case*, in *HUMSEC Journal* (Issue 3), 2007, pp. 1-16, at pp. 8-9.

³⁰ *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities*, at p. 17.

³¹ Kaldor, Mary, *Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention*, at p. 189.

combatants encouraged them to engage in spoiling behaviour, which threatened to undermine progress. Similarly, as experienced in many post-conflict settings, the exclusion of groups with special needs can lead to unintended consequences, where “spoilers oppose the peaceful settlement for whatever reason, from within or (usually) outside the peace process, and who use violence or other means to disrupt the process in pursuit of their aims.”³² Excluded groups can easily use “the peace process as a means of gaining recognition and legitimacy, gaining time, gaining material benefit, or avoiding sanctions.”³³

Nevertheless, using the terminology of the Madrid Report on a *European Way of Security*, the successful implementation of human security in Kosovo is undermined for a number of reasons, including a lack of a coherent bottom-up approach; no consultation with civil society in legislation and policy-making; insufficient attempts at institutionalising consultation mechanisms to redirect ownership to Kosovars; failure to engage minorities directly (e.g. Kosovo Serbs); and continued existence of low standards of accountability, capacity, corruption leading to local mistrust.³⁴ The rise of NGOs in Kosovo has also been accompanied by the fear that civil society organizations are not driven by authentic and deep-rooted needs, but embark on projects to meet the requirements of their foreign donors.³⁵ Although NGOs are associated with the promotion of human rights, inter-ethnic dialogue and democratization, their intentions and good-will are questioned as they prioritize their activities based on the requests of the donors (top-down approach) rather than the needs of community. Instead of pursuing a bottom-up approach to address people’s needs, civil society has been criticized for attending to donor agendas and self-interested motivation. Consequently, the public continues to have a low level of acceptance of NGO work, largely because of misconceptions about their role and function.³⁶ This also raises concerns regarding the validity of the proclaimed values of civil society to address societal problems. It also raises suspicion that civil society uses human security as a ‘trendy’ label to attract funding from the donor community. For example, major donors such as USAID and UNDP have prioritised activities related to human security such as security, justice, economic, social protection, environment, gender, youth, corruption, conflict mitigation, and human capacity development, and make funding conditional upon

³² Newman, Edward and Oliver Richmond (eds.), *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution*, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2006, at p. 4.

³³ Newman, Edward and Oliver Richmond (eds.), *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution*, at p. 4.

³⁴ *A European Way of Security: The Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group comprising a Proposal and Background Report*, at p. 21.

³⁵ UNDP, *Civil Society and Human Development*, 2008, at p. 40.

³⁶ UNDP, *Civil Society and Human Development*, 2008, at p. 42.

these priority areas.³⁷ In this context, one can argue that the top-down approach to institution-building in Kosovo lacked local legitimacy and was mainly constructed from above by international administration. According to this interpretation, the international community used civil society as a mechanism to address and reach the public through their policies, undermining its role as a place for people to raise their concerns and problems with the international administration of Kosovo.

C. *Between Stability and Ethnic Security*

One of the main problems concerning the international administration of Kosovo and other war-torn territories is the focus on achieving some kind of 'stability' and ethnic security, rather than approaching all citizens equally. At first glance, the argument made by Doyle and Sambanis that "*the deeper the hostility, the more the destruction of local capacities, the more one needs international assistance to succeed in establishing a stable peace*"³⁸, seems true, at least in theory. But in practice, the international community perceives stability and stable peace as involving a number of aspects, including the absence of ethnic confrontation; humanitarian aid; conflict resolution; and economic redevelopment. Together, these are the preconditions of regional stability. However, instead of creating a society of "*fair and just governance that would be able to satisfy human needs regardless of communal or identity cleavages, and promote communal harmony and social stability*"³⁹, the transition period in Kosovo has involved accommodating elites, who 'represent' ethnic interests and ignore the needs of the whole community. Consequently, perceiving stability through the lens of ethnic relations, rather than focusing on the needs of individuals, led to controversy about the consolidation of development and governance, which questions to what extent this consolidation brought ethnic elites personal and communal leverage. Nonetheless, if this approach was intended as conflict prevention and management, then it ultimately failed to address the people's needs and created a fragile ethnic environment.

Kosovo still has one of the least developed economies in Europe: according to a World Bank estimate, approximately 45 percent of the population live in poverty and 15 percent live in extreme poverty⁴⁰. The recent global financial crisis

³⁷ See USAID Kosovo Special Initiatives and Cross Cutting Programs at http://www.usaid.gov/kosovo/eng/program_other.html and the UNDP's Priorities at <http://www.ks.undp.org/?cid=2,160>.

³⁸ Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2006, at p. 4.

³⁹ Azar, Edward E., *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Case*, Dartmouth Publishing Company, London, 1990, at p. 11.

⁴⁰ World Bank, *Country Brief 2009*, Prishtina, Kosovo, 2009, Available online at: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/KOSOVOEXTN/>

also affected Kosovo, albeit indirectly. Foreign investment and the foreign presence declined, reduced Diaspora remittance is taking effect, and many small businesses have closed.⁴¹ Certainly this situation threatens stability and further deepens poverty. The 2006 *Internal Security Sector Review Report in Kosovo* (ISSR) warns that the “*threat of internal division in Kosovo remains present and may increase if economic and unemployment issues are not comprehensively addressed.*”⁴² The same report goes further by arguing that the “*infrastructure problems, such as the inadequate provision of electric power, undermine economic growth and have the capacity to spark public protest.*”⁴³ Although the international community has largely focused on the issue of inter-ethnic violence, the ISSR found that “*for the people of Kosovo high unemployment, a lack of economic development and widespread poverty have created an atmosphere of insecurity.*”⁴⁴ Furthermore, despite extensive international aid for reconstruction, Kosovo’s economy was unable to recover in a situation where potential private investors did not know whether they were investing in a province of Serbia or a future independent Kosovo’.⁴⁵ Arguably, “[e]conomic instability has exacerbated problems such as ethnic violence, corruption, increased crime rates and contributed to a growth in mistrust of Kosovo’s key institutions of government, both international and indigenous”.⁴⁶ This certainly poses threats to the principles of human security of putting people first and treating them equally, a threat reflected in the different concerns of the two groups. While most Kosovo-Serbs see the potential aggravation of ethnic relations as the main threat to stability, for Kosovo-Albanians, unemployment and poverty are the greatest threats to stability.⁴⁷

D. Human Insecurity Due to Multiple Political Authorities

In order to maintain a stable situation, the international community allowed the establishment of more than one political authority. Rather than focusing equally on the needs of individuals, the international community approached peacekeeping, development assistance and governance issues from an ethnic perspective. This strategy failed to create conditions to facilitate the consolidation of a single and legitimate political authority in Kosovo, which would facilitate human security. On

0,,contentMDK:20629286~menuPK:297777~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:297770,00.html.

⁴¹ Nimani-Musa, Nora, *The effect of Global Financial Crisis in Kosovo*, Kosovo Institute for Journalism and Communication, Prishtina. Available online at: <http://www.kijacnews.net/vnews/display.v/ART/2009/03/04/49ad68f6b6466>.

⁴² UNDP, *Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review*, 2006, p. XIV.

⁴³ UNDP, *Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review*, 2006, p. XIV.

⁴⁴ UNDP, *Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review*, 2006, p. XIII.

⁴⁵ Tanja Tamminen, *Human Security in Post-status Kosovo: A Shared Responsibility*, at p. 10.

⁴⁶ UNDP, *Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review*, 2006, p. XIII.

⁴⁷ UNDP, *Early Warning Report 24*.

the contrary, this strategy contributed to 'human insecurity' resulting from multiple political agencies. In principle, we agree that "*human security depends on the existence of legitimate institutions that gain the trust of the population and have some enforcement capacity.*"⁴⁸ As illustrated in Kosovo, the failure to create a single and legitimate authority and the toleration of the establishment of Serbian parallel institutions had the unintended consequence of 'authority diffusion', which, in turn, led to unclear allocation of authority and multiple centres of governance in Kosovo, which are overlapping, conflicting and unnecessary.

Indeed, Kaldor argued that "*legitimate political authority does not necessarily need to mean a state; it could consist of local government or regional or international political arrangements like protectorates or transitional administrations.*"⁴⁹ However, the flaws of the political authority in Kosovo made it virtually impossible to increase the level of human security. Concerning the sources of legitimacy, UNMIK and the international community justified their extensive authority to run post-conflict reconstruction, by invoking the need to consolidate of political and economic institutions and to create conditions and a political space for a lasting peace. On the other hand, Kosovo institutions believed that they were the legitimate political authority, elected through democratic elections and responsible for the state-building process. Meanwhile, the Serbian parallel institutions claimed to be the legitimate political representatives of the Serbian population in Kosovo, due to what they considered a failure of the international community and Albanian population of Kosovo to protect Serbs after the war in Kosovo.

The main problem is that these three 'legitimate political authorities' in Kosovo pursued three different political agendas. Such ambiguous priorities and actors produced limited results for addressing the socio-economical needs of people in Kosovo. While the international community aimed to implement UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) and to maintain a stable situation on the ground through its overwhelming civil, police, and military presence, the democratically-elected institutions of Kosovo aimed at state-building by creating conditions for the declaration of independence and statehood. On the other hand, the Serbian parallel institutions operating in the north of Kosovo and other enclaves within Kosovo provide a wide range of services, from providing public services, education and health, to issuing documents, in order to undermine the new political space created in Kosovo. As such, parallel structures constitute a major challenge and require more consideration, as discussed in the next section.

⁴⁸ Kaldor, Mary, *Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention*, at p. 187.

⁴⁹ Kaldor, Mary, *Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention*, at p. 187.

E. Human (In)Security: Parallel Structures in Kosovo

As a consequence of the 1999 conflict, most Serbs living in urban areas left Kosovo, while those who were scattered in rural areas remained. After the NATO-led troops and UNMIK administration were deployed in Kosovo, “200.000 ethnic Serbs fled the province [...] due to fear, intimidations, and direct physical violence.”⁵⁰ Immediately after the war, Serbs established parallel structures in Kosovo, which relied heavily on the support and guidance of the Belgrade authorities. These parallel structures were created with the aim of undermining the UN administration of Kosovo and later the Albanian self-governing local institutions.

These parallel structures arguably aim to create a situation that increases Serbs' distrust towards Kosovo institutions. Ultimately, they create the conditions for resettlement or another division of Kosovo along ethnic lines. It seems that these structures were developed to give Belgrade the ability to impose control over local Serbs, to manipulate and destabilize processes in Kosovo, and ultimately to hold bargaining incentives for Serbia's own national political and economic interests. Despite the fact that these parallel structures are ill-organized, they continue to operate and pose a direct threat to the functioning of Kosovo's institutions within areas populated by Serbs, and to the overall territorial integrity and internal security of Kosovo. Serbia continues to strengthen this network of parallel structures, which provide administrative, education and health services for the 120,000 Serbs in Kosovo. The Belgrade government continued to hold election within Serb areas of Kosovo and considers their parallel structures as legitimate representation. Indeed, these parallel institutions constitute a significant obstacle to the representation and participation of Serbs in Kosovo's institutions.

As noted by the European Centre for Minority Issues, “most Kosovo Serbs boycotted the elections of 17 November, 2007, and instead voted in the Serbian elections of 11 May, 2008, electing their representatives to the so called Assembly of the Community of Municipalities of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija”⁵¹ and new mayors of Kosovo Serb parallel municipalities. Members of the Serbian community often make use of parallel administrations, which were elected in the 11 May 2008 parallel elections, organised by Serbia and declared illegal by the UN.⁵² There is an “extensive network of parallel, Serbian language schools run by the Serbian government in Kosovo, which further hinders integration

⁵⁰ International Crisis Group, *Kosovo Ethnic Dilemma: The Need for a Civic Contract*, ICG Balkans Report N°143, 28 May 2003, at p. 8. Available online at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org>.

⁵¹ European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI), *Minority Issues*, ECMI, Office in Kosovo 2009. Available online at: http://www.ecmi-map.com/map/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=30&Itemid=58&lang=en.

⁵² ECMI, *Minority Issues*.

of Serb pupils into Kosovo educational structures.”⁵³ Moreover, “doctors and other health personnel working for the parallel health institutions, in addition to salaries received by Kosovo government, also receive salaries from the Serbian government.”⁵⁴ In addition, during 2008 and 2009 most Serbian members of the Kosovo Police boycotted their jobs and returned to work only after Belgrade ordered them to do so. Significantly, these interferences show the tendencies of Serbia to exercise control over the Kosovo Serbs and to play an important role in domestic politics.

However, we argue that the Government of Serbia did not support the Serbian parallel structures to maintain human security. On the contrary, the Government of Serbia has used the parallel structures to demonstrate its presence and desire to cement the partition of Kosovo. In 2008, Serbia has maintained the parallel system with €1,332,463, out of which 81% were directed to northern Kosovo, as the biggest Serbian enclave in Kosovo.⁵⁵ Estimations indicate that €2.9 million was invested in 2009.⁵⁶ The Serbian government repeatedly states that it does not support the Serb participation in Kosovo’s local elections in November 2009. The State Secretary in the Ministry for Kosovo in the Serbian Government, Oliver Ivanovic, confirmed the decision that Serbia does not support the elections in Kosovo is an order. Ivanovic further reaffirmed Serbia’s parallel structures in Kosovo saying that “Serbia now has its local self-governing institutions in Kosovo, and how effective they are we can talk all the day long, but Serbia will not give up these institutions.”⁵⁷ This illustrates Belgrade’s interference and its continued tendency to threaten local Serbs to participate in Kosovo’s political life. As OSCE notes, in order to address the key factors that have determined the continuation of parallel structures, UNMIK and Kosovo institutions must meet the demands of the local Serbs, such as economic development, freedom of movement, supervised returnee, security and gain their confidence and reduce the capacity of the parallel system, increase the Kosovo government structures services and, ultimately, dismantle the Serbian parallel structures.⁵⁸

⁵³ ECMI, *Minority Issues*.

⁵⁴ ECMI, *Minority Issues*.

⁵⁵ Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED), *Kosovo at Cross-road: Decentralization and the Creation of New Municipalities*, Policy Brief Series, Policy Brief #14, Prishtina, July 2009, at p. 5.

⁵⁶ KIPRED, *Kosovo at Cross-road: Decentralization and the Creation of New Municipalities*, at p. 5.

⁵⁷ BBC Albanian, *Serbët 'duhet të votojnë'*, Prishtina, Kosovo, 2009. Available online at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/albanian/news/2009/10/091026_kos_elex_debate_serbs.shtml.

⁵⁸ OSCE, Mission in Kosovo, Department of Human Rights, Decentralization and Communities, *Parallel Structures in Kosovo 2006-2007*, at p. 10.

F. Political Battle Between 'Us' and 'Them'

Political parties are still organized along ethnic lines in Kosovo. The Kosovo Albanian parties, who populate most institutions in Kosovo, were not pro-active in appealing for protection of Kosovo Serbs. On the other hand, the predominant political leadership in Kosovo was not using productive language with regards to integrating Serbs in Kosovo. Since 2000, when voter turnout reached 79 % in the municipal elections, Kosovo political leaders believed it was not in their interest to play their power game outside the realm of ethnicity. National elections were held in November 2001, and Kosovo Serbs participated in the political system and their political coalition *Povratak* (Return) won 11 % of the votes. LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo) and PDK (Democratic League of Kosovo) created a broad coalition, and international community welcomed and applauded the participation of Serbs.

Simon Chesterman argues that frequent elections in Kosovo were held in order to maintain the status quo and fragile stability.⁵⁹ He cites an OSCE representative who said that “[e]lections will buy us three years of stability”.⁶⁰ Accordingly, elections were portrayed as non-violent political activity and were intended to create a moderate leadership, include Serbs ‘in the system’ and highlight the absence of alternatives.⁶¹ However, the OSCE projection was not accurate. Serbs boycotted the 2002 and 2007 elections and a moderate political leadership did not emerge. From 2002 onward, the pattern of zero sum game among Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb political leadership has prevailed as a model for politics. Constructing a political battle of ‘Us’ against ‘Them’ was the easiest way to gain political legitimacy. Albanian leadership and Serbian leadership failed to address and solve the fundamental problems of their respective community, and attributed the ‘causes’ of the problem to ‘others’.

Simonsen argues that it is in the self-interest of political leaders to present themselves as defenders of their ethnic groups.⁶² By doing so, ethnic leaders increase their political strength and fuel the ethnicization of the conflict, as reflected in the voting behaviour in Kosovo: “Serbs will vote for Serb parties and Albanians for Albanian parties in Kosovo.”⁶³ Although Serbs and other minorities are

⁵⁹ Chesterman, Simon, *Kosovo in Limbo: State-Building and 'Substantial Autonomy'*, International Peace Academy, at p. 6.

⁶⁰ Chesterman, Simon, *Kosovo in Limbo: State-Building and 'Substantial Autonomy'*, at p. 6.

⁶¹ Chesterman, Simon, *Kosovo in Limbo: State-Building and 'Substantial Autonomy'*, at p. 6.

⁶² Simonsen, Sven Gunnar, *Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-Building: Lessons from Recent Cases*, in: *Security Dialog* (Volume 36, Number 3), 2005, pp. 297–318, at p. 300.

⁶³ Simonsen, Sven Gunnar, *Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-Building: Lessons from Recent Cases*, at p. 300.

guaranteed representation in Kosovo institutions, as long as voting behaviour is conducted along ethnic lines, the “quotas are not enough to realize UNMIK’s ambition of rooting ‘multi-ethnicity’ in Kosovo.”⁶⁴ Perhaps time is running out, as Kosovars are increasingly disappointed with their political leadership, and their public participation is rapidly decreasing. Voter turnout has decreased from 79 % from the 2000 elections to 49.52 % in the election of 2004 and 39.4 % in the 2007 elections. The international community in Kosovo should work to remove the ‘zero sum game’ mentality of Kosovo’s elite politicians, and to undermine their position as the real ‘defenders’ of their respective ethnic groups. To do so, it will be necessary to promote inter-communal elite cooperation and to empower the human security in Kosovo as centred on individuals, not ethnicity.

G. Corrupting Human Security

The 2009 Freedom House Report for Kosovo acknowledges the stability of national democratic governance, which continues to improve the functioning of institutions, and election processes are considered ‘free and fair’ by observers. Despite the acknowledged progress, Freedom House places Kosovo under the category of ‘partially free country’, pointing out further challenges in addressing widespread corruption, strengthening institutions, establishing an integrated Kosovo, and laying the foundation for Kosovo’s economic development. The Office of the Auditor General has shown unnecessary annual losses up to 1.5 million Euros in each ministry. The 2008 EU Commission progress report identifies corruption as a widespread problem in Kosovo and devotes an entire section to Anti-Corruption policy. The EU Commission progress report identifies three reasons for the persistence of wide-spread corruption in Kosovo: insufficient legislation; implementing measures and, weakness of the judicial system.⁶⁵ Parallel to this, the EU progress report points out that “[t]he legal framework needs to be further improved to remedy differences in the definition of corruption between the current anti-corruption law and the provisional penal code.”⁶⁶ Furthermore, the Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency in its report of 2008 submitted 53 cases to the prosecution and explained that the suspected institutions of corruption in Kosovo are government, public enterprises, courts and local government.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Simonsen, Sven Gunnar, *Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-Building: Lessons from Recent Cases*, at p. 312.

⁶⁵ Commission of the European Communities (2008), Kosovo (under 1244 UNSCR 1244/99) 2008 Progress Report accompanying the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: *Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009*, {COM(2008)674}, Brussels, 05.11.2008, at p. 16.

⁶⁶ Commission of the European Communities (2008), Kosovo (under 1244 UNSCR 1244/99) 2008 Progress Report, at p. 16.

⁶⁷ Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency, *No Corruption*, Prishtine, June 2009, at p. 27.

In this respect, Kaufman identified an interesting correlation between civil freedoms and corruption.⁶⁸ He concludes that countries with low levels of freedom have high levels of corruption, while countries with high levels of civil freedoms possess low levels of corruption. Based on this, Kosovo remains a country with widely limited freedoms and very widespread corruption. Indeed, Kosovo's political leadership has failed to be transparent with regards to financing their political campaigns, and declaring their own assets. Widespread corruption hindered the establishment of legitimate institution and the cultivation of a mature political leadership, which responds to people's needs, especially the need for public accountability.

IV. Conclusion

Kosovo illustrates how the political dimensions of human security can be undermined, misused and misapplied in post-conflict situations, due to the interests of different authorities. These authorities (whether international, national or illegal) can invoke human security for different purposes, including maintaining stability, managing ethnic relations, and building statehood institutions and practices. This analysis of Kosovo illustrates how human security can be used as ethnic security. The international community applied political strategies informed by human security for the purpose of maintaining fragile peace and stability in Kosovo. Consequently, this approach tolerated the establishment and operationalization of Serbian parallel institutions, which continue to undermine the capacity of Kosovo's public institutions to exercise legal authority in northern Kosovo. Moreover, the Kosovar institutions have viewed the human security approach as a means to prove the institutional capacity of independent self-government to provide inclusive security, welfare, and integration policies for all people in Kosovo, with a special emphasis on ethnic minorities. However, as long as there are two parallel political and social systems, Kosovo cannot establish an integrated, cohesive and multiethnic society.

As Kosovo illustrates the limits of multiple political authorities and 'uncoordinated multilateralism', we propose that some of the principles invoked in the Human Security Doctrine for Europe need to be reformed and applied correctly. For instance, these principles suggest that transitional international administration can serve as 'legitimate political authority'. However it is important that the international governance of post-conflict territories is short, focused and effective, otherwise 'protractedness' and 'extensiveness' risks undermining local governance with potential implications for long term peace and stability, for contributing to a deficit in democratic governance, and for weakening local sovereignty. Furthermore, multilateralism seems to be problematic as different organizations pursue different agendas. Perhaps it is important to revise this principle and promote a more narrow

⁶⁸ World Bank, *Empowerment and Poverty Reduction: A Sourcebook*, 1 May 2002, at p. 3.

coordination of aid assistance and avoid unnecessary multiplicity of projects through establishing sector-based coordination agencies and involve from the beginning local authorities as well.

The article argued that a protracted and extensive international administration endangers the consolidation and recognition of a single legitimate political authority, which should play an important role in post-conflict normalization. Alongside weak social and economic conditions and fragile ethnic relations, the extensive mandate of multiple international agencies, minimal local ownership of decision-making, the existence of illegal and parallel structures, ultimately undermines (and abuses) the primary goal of achieving human security and sustainable peace in post-conflict situations. Therefore, dismantling Serbian parallel structures is necessary to allow the rule of law to prevail in Kosovo. A coordinated effort of Albanian political leadership, Serbian political representatives in Kosovo institutions, and the new international presence should employ a functioning human security framework for Northern Kosovo, to provide communities access to an integrated system of public services, education, health, social welfare, development assistance, and local self-governance. In order to make human security a reality in Kosovo there should be sufficient political will and commitment from all parties engaged to put people first and treat them equally despite their ethnic, religious or linguistic background.

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