

Self and Sensibility: From Locke to Condillac and Rousseau

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I. Introduction: Locke on sensibility and the self

It is well known that Locke's philosophy played an important role in the French enlightenment. Locke's impact in general has been the subject of several scholarly works, and there are of course also studies on particular issues such as John Yolton's survey of Locke's importance to French materialism.¹ In this paper, I focus on an aspect of Locke and French eighteenth-century thought that has been somewhat neglected – the notion of the human subject as a 'sensible Being'.² In *The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility* Stephen Gaukroger highlights the significance of the notion of sensibility in mid-eighteenth-century France: sensibility is thought of as 'a unified phenomenon having physiological, moral and aesthetic dimensions' and as something that 'lies at the basis of our relation to the physical world: it is what natural understanding has to be premised on'.³ Sensibility is considered the foundation of cognition.

This is clearly Locke's idea when he talks about the 'sensible Qualities' that are conveyed to the mind from 'external Objects'. Our relation to the external world 'depends wholly on our Senses', Locke says. Sensation is the source of *ideas* that we acquire of qualities in the objects.⁴ This is what Locke means when he says in the first sentence of the *Essay* that, like other animals, we are 'sensible Beings', i. e. endowed with the faculty of sensation.⁵ The world is given to us in an immediate kind of way through sensory perception. Sensation is 'immediate' in the sense that no other mental activities, no other ideas are required for the production of sensory ideas. The eye perceives light 'only by being directed toward it'. The 'bright Sun-shine', for example, 'forces it self immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the Mind turns its view that way'.⁶ It is for this reason that Locke ascribes passivity to sensation, at least 'for the most part': what the mind 'perceives it cannot avoid perceiving'.⁷

There is another sense in which we are 'sensible Beings', however. It may seem that for Locke access to the inner world, to our own selves is not immediate, for he says that it requires reflection, an inner sense, which in turn requires a special attention to the operations of our own minds. We do not acquire *ideas* of these operations 'till the understanding turns inwards upon itself, reflects on its operations, and makes them the object of its own contemplation'.⁸ It may seem odd, however, to say, as Locke does here, that we have an

immediate relation to the external world but not to our own selves. Are we not present to our own self in an immediate kind of way as well? Locke would say that there is such an immediate self-presence, but that this immediacy does not apply to reflection. Rather such self-presence is an aspect of sensibility – an aspect that is different from the one involved in our relation to the external world. According to Locke, apart from, and prior to reflection there is a more immediate relating to our own selves, and the capacity to relate to our own selves in this immediate kind of way is a feature of Locke's notion of sensibility. Locke indicates what he means in an early Journal note from 1682 on the question of the immortality of the human soul.

The usuall physicall prooffe (as I may soe call it) of the immortality of the soule is this, Matter cannot thinke ergo the soule is immateriall, noe thing can naturally destroy an immateriall thing ergo the soule is naturally immortal ... But methinks if I may be permitted to say soe neither of these speake to the point in question and perfectly mistake immortality whereby is not meant a state of bare substantiall existence and duration but *a state of sensibility*. For that way that they use of proveing the soul immortal will as well prove the body soe too. For since noething can naturally destroy a materiall substance more then immateriall, the body will naturally endure as well as the soule for ever ...

Since then Experience of what we finde dayly in sleepe and very frequently ins swounings and Apoplexys &c. puts it past doubt that *the soule may subsist in a state of insensibility* without partakeing in the least degree of happynesse misery or any perception whatsoever ...

Whatsoever shall establish the existence of the soule will not therefor prove its being in a state of happynesse or misery [i. e. of sensibility], since tis evident that perception is noe more necessary to its being then motion is to the being of body.⁹

So sensibility here refers to an immediate awareness or feeling of one's own state, a feeling which is part of being alive. We are sensible or, as we would say, aware or conscious of our own states. Without this kind of sensibility we would not be able to be happy or miserable, and so immortality without sensibility would be pointless as we would not be able to feel the punishments that God inflicts on us. In the *Essay* Locke's expresses this idea similarly:

I do not say there is no Soul in a Man, because he is not sensible of it in his sleep; But I do say, he cannot think at any time waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to any thing, but to our thoughts; and to them it is; and to them it will always be necessary, till we can think without being conscious of it.¹⁰

In this quotation (and elsewhere) Locke himself links 'being sensible of' to 'being conscious of', or as we might say, 'being aware of'. He argues that we may exist without being 'sensible' or aware of anything, but we would not be a self or a person if our existence were one of 'bare substantiall existence'. Thinking, broadly conceived, involves 'being sensible of

it'. As Locke says elsewhere: 'When we see, hear, smell, taste feel meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so'.¹¹

Locke sometimes accounts for this inner-directed sensibility or consciousness in terms of a certain feeling. Thus he draws an analogy between being conscious of thoughts and the feeling of hunger. Just as one cannot separate the hunger from the feeling of hunger, one cannot separate thinking from being conscious or being sensible of thinking. These are not two distinct, separate acts. Consciousness or sensibility is essential to thought: 'Hunger consists in that very sensation [of feeling hunger], as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks'.¹²

Locke makes a further claim, however. Not only are we immediately aware of our own activity of thinking, in thinking we also become immediately aware of the existence of our own self as the subject of thought. As we are conscious of thoughts, perceptions and experiences, we become immediately conscious or aware of a self or subject of these thoughts perceptions and experiences. It seems that, for Locke, being conscious of thoughts and experience involves a consciousness or an 'intuitive knowledge', as he says, of the existence of a self as the subject of those thoughts and experiences. Locke states: 'In every Act of Sensation, Reasoning or Thinking, we are conscious to our selves of our own Being'.¹³

Further, Locke seems to imply a distinction between this awareness or 'intuition' of one's own existence and an explicit consideration of oneself as oneself.¹⁴ Locke says that a self or person is 'a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can *consider it self as it self*, the same thinking thing in different times and places'.¹⁵ Clearly, for Locke the thinking being's capacity to 'consider it self as it self' involves the capacity explicitly to recognize one's own identity in a discursive kind of way.

Thus Locke implicitly distinguishes between several ways of relating to one's own self: immediately, by being sensible or conscious (1) of one's own thoughts and actions and (2) of the existence of one's own self as the subject of those thoughts and actions; and mediately, for example by (3) reflecting on one's own thoughts and actions and (4) by considering oneself as oneself, recognizing one's own diachronic identity.

Obviously, these ideas are part of Locke's famous account of personal identity.¹⁶ I have explored the latter in detail elsewhere but I give a very brief summary here, as this will be relevant to the discussion of the French material that follows below.¹⁷ First, there is Locke's account the identity of persons in terms of consciousness uniting thoughts and actions. Here

the first kind of relating to one's own self is relevant. Consciousness, Locke says, relates to past and present thoughts and actions and so links the present with the past, thereby constituting personal identity. Second and related to this there is his distinction (i) between personal identity and the identity of the thinking substance or soul and (ii) between personal identity and the identity of the self as 'man' or human being. The self as a person is a self that is sensible of its inner states, including those of happiness and misery. To Locke, I am now the same person I was in the past, not because I am the same living body or because the same substance thinks in me, but because my present conscious experience is connected to my past conscious experiences. Third, there is the affective and forensic or moral aspect of his account. For as long as I am in a state of sensibility, I am concerned for my happiness and so am concerned to be able to ascribe actions to myself that will not result in misery (especially in the afterlife).¹⁸ Here self-consciousness in the sense of 'considering oneself as oneself' becomes relevant, and it involves a relating to one's own future.

As one would expect, Lockean ideas dominated the discussions about consciousness and the self in eighteenth-century France. How was Locke's account of the self debated, evaluated and used, however? As it turns out, the fate of Locke's theory in France makes a complex and philosophically important story, to be told more extensively elsewhere.¹⁹ In this paper I attempt to identify and evaluate only one particular strand of Lockean thinking about inner-directed sensibility in French thought. Moreover, as space is limited, I can discuss only a couple of the significant contributions here. I begin with an attempt at what may at first seem to be a very straightforward empiricist account of inner-directed sensibility and the self as it is present in Condillac. I shall then turn to the complex discussion in Rousseau. Locke's presence in Condillac and Rousseau will become obvious. In the conclusion I highlight some significant and philosophically important differences and I end with critical remarks on French sensiblist accounts of the self.

II. Etienne Bonnot de Condillac: 'The Sentiment of our Being' and the Self as Phenomenon and as Substance

Condillac's empiricism is usually described as a development of Locke's philosophy, and indeed Condillac explicitly acknowledges his indebtedness to Locke. The early *Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines* (1746) operates, in Lockean manner, with sensation and reflection as two independent sources of mental content. In his main later work, the *Traité des sensations* (1754) Condillac, working with the image of a statue that progressively comes to

life, abandons the notion of reflection as independent. He attempts to reduce the origin of all thought to sensation. Condillac's discussion of the self, too, is clearly based on Lockean theory. Like Locke, it seems, Condillac assigns a central role to consciousness and memory. Other notions are important as well, however: the notion of a 'sentiment of our being' or 'sentiment of myself', and the notion of a 'connection that preserves the sequence of our perceptions'. What is meant by these various notions and how do they relate to the issue of the self? Let us begin with consciousness.

1. Consciousness as Sensibility and Reminiscence

The notion of an inner 'sentiment' was present in French philosophical thought long before Condillac and even before Locke with his notion of inner sensibility. The French variants for inner sentiment go back at least to the late seventeenth century, to the writings of La Forge and Malebranche who introduced the notion of *sentiment intérieur* as a philosophical concept. Moreover, the problems surrounding the translation of Lockean 'consciousness' into French early in the eighteenth century lead to the introduction of a variety of terms for relating to one's own self. It is only from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, however, that notions such as that of an inner sentiment were elaborated on and used widely in discussions of the self and personal identity – in thinkers such as Bonnet, Lignac, and of course Condillac and Rousseau. The various French terms for inner feeling or inner experience do not always denote the same thing, however.²⁰

Condillac defines 'consciousness' (*la conscience*) as 'the sentiment that produces this knowledge' of the mind's perceptions 'and that tells us at least partially what goes on' in the mind.²¹ It may seem that consciousness is here understood to be a separate mental act relating to other perceptions. That is not Condillac's considered view, however. For him (as for Locke) consciousness is not a second order mental operation that has other mental operations as its 'objects'. Rather, consciousness is an aspect of perception itself and in this sense immediate. Condillac makes explicit the view that was present implicitly in Locke. Indeed, he states that the terms 'perception' and 'consciousness' denote different aspects of one and the same operation:

Thus perception and consciousness are different names for the same operation. When it is looked upon as the impression made in the mind, we can keep the name 'perception'. When it makes its presence known to the mind, we can call it 'consciousness'.²²

On this basis Condillac can say that all perceptions have this self-reflexive feature, that all perceptions are conscious in this sense.

Elsewhere in the *Essai* Condillac introduces a distinction between consciousness understood as an immediate relating to the present and as a relating to the past. This latter mode of consciousness is ‘a new operation’, called *réminiscence*.²³ Condillac writes:

When objects attract our attention, the perceptions they occasion in us become linked with *our sentiment of our being* and to everything that can bear some relation to it. It follows that *consciousness* not only gives us *knowledge of our perceptions*, but furthermore, if those perceptions are repeated, it often makes us aware that we have had them before and makes us recognize them as belonging to us or as affecting *a being that is constantly the same “self”, despite their variety and succession*. Seen in relation to these new effects, *consciousness* is a new operation which is at our service every instant and *is the foundation of experience*. Without it every moment of life would seem the first of our existence, and our knowledge would never advance beyond an initial perception. I shall call it “reminiscence”.²⁴

Condillac seems to be saying here that without consciousness understood as reminiscence, we could not connect past and present perceptions and could not recognize past perceptions as ours and so could not be convinced that our own self today is the same self it was yesterday. Reminiscence relates both to perceptions and to our own self as the identical subject of those perceptions. Recalling past perceptions leads to the recognition of our identity through time because recalling past perceptions involves recognizing them ‘as belonging to us’. It is important to note that Condillac does not say that reminiscence constitutes our personal identity; rather, he says that we *recognize* our identity through reminiscence. Thus to Condillac, consciousness as reminiscence fulfils an epistemic and not a constitutive role for personal identity. He seems to assume that personal identity is constituted not by consciousness but by some other principle that is not here identified but thought of as presupposed by consciousness and reminiscence. In this regard, then, Condillac’s account differs significantly from Locke’s.²⁵

2. The ‘Sentiment of our Being’ and the Recognition of our own Identity

How is consciousness understood as reminiscence or recollection linked to the notion of the ‘sentiment of our being’ to which Condillac appeals in the above quotation from the *Essai*? This sentiment or feeling relates to the existence of our own self as the subject of perceptions, and Condillac suggests that it is always linked to all our perceptions. It seems to correspond to Locke’s account of the ‘intuitive’ grasp we have of our own existence, cited above. Condillac does not explain this ‘sentiment’ any further here. He suggests, however, that the sentiment of

our being is fundamental and presupposed by reminiscence. At the same time Condillac's formulation that reminiscence is 'the foundation of experience' seems to suggest, rather, that the ability to recall perceptions must be presupposed by the sense or sentiment of our own self. Without reminiscence we could relate only to individual perceptions, but not to a self understood as a being that persists through time. The ability to recollect the past is required for being sensible of such a self. Indeed, it has been argued that Condillac's account is 'circular.'²⁶ He seems to be saying both that the sentiment of our being is presupposed by reminiscence, and that reminiscence is presupposed by the sentiment of our being.

It is not as obvious as it may seem, however, that Condillac is guilty of a circular argument here. The two occurrences of 'sentiment of our being' in the last sentence of the previous paragraph do not refer to the same thing. The first refers to a feeling of self that Condillac assumes is directly connected to individual perceptions - and does not presuppose reminiscence but is required *for* reminiscence. The second occurrence of 'sentiment of our being', by contrast, refers to consciousness insofar as it is involved in the recognition of our own identity through time and as such presupposes reminiscence.

Moreover, Condillac argues that reminiscence is in one sense a 'product' of the connection between perceptions and the sentiment of our being. Only if both past and present perceptions are connected by being linked to the sentiment of our being can we have genuine reminiscence. This is what Condillac expresses in the following passage:

It is evident that if the connection *between the perceptions* I have now, those that I had yesterday, and *my sentiment of myself* was broken, I could not know that what happened to me yesterday, happened to myself. If this connection was interrupted every night, I would, so to speak, each day begin a new life, and no one would be able to convince me that today's self was the self of the day before. Thus reminiscence is the product of the connection that preserves the sequence of our perceptions.²⁷

And insofar as reminiscence recalls perceptions 'we have already had', it is in turn required for and can lead to the recognition of our own identity through time. It makes sense, then, that Condillac distinguishes between two conceptions of reminiscence.

To make a closer analysis of reminiscence, we should give it two names: one insofar as it makes us know our being [as identical through time], the other insofar as it makes us aware of the perceptions that are repeated in it, for those are quite distinct ideas.²⁸ Condillac states that he regards 'this connection [between perceptions and the sentiment of our being] as a fundamental experience which has a right to be considered sufficient to

explain all the others.’²⁹ In terms of this connection itself Condillac does not seem to say explicitly that the sentiment of our being presupposes other perceptions. This view is implied, however, by statements he makes in other contexts. Thus he says that the ‘connection of ideas, either with signs or among themselves’ is a ‘firm fact of experience’ to which ‘everything that pertains to the human mind’ can be reduced.³⁰ It is the basis for everything to do with the self, i. e. including reminiscence and the sentiment of our own being. In other words, there has to be a connection of perceptions for there to be a sentiment of the self, reminiscence and recognition of our own diachronic identity. There could be no sentiment of being without other perceptions, as this sentiment is accounted for in terms of its relation to perceptions. And there could be no remembering of perceptions that could lead us to recognize them as ours and thus make us recognize our diachronic identity, if there were no prior sequence of perceptions. In the last analysis, then, for Condillac both reminiscence and the sentiment of our being are grounded in something fundamental. Prior to any sentiment of self and prior to any act of recalling the past and thus invoking the notion of a continuous self, there is the sequence of connected perceptions.

3. Is Condillac a Bundle Theorist of the Mind?

Condillac, then, seems to regard the sequence of connected perceptions as fundamental. Does he reduce the mind to a sequence of connected perceptions, however? Is he, in other words, adopting a bundle theory of the self, according to which the self is essentially nothing over and above those related perceptions that he considers as basic to sensibility, to consciousness, memory and the recognition of personal identity? It certainly has been claimed in the literature that Condillac adopts such a view of the self, abandoning the notion of the self as substance.³¹ One passage sometimes cited in support of this reading is from a work entitled *Les monades*, first published anonymously in Berlin in 1748³². Here Condillac says that we know our own being only insofar as we feel it and that we feel it only insofar as we have sensations.³³ He says also that our consciousness represents our self only insofar as it is endowed with certain properties and as modified in certain ways.³⁴

This does not, however, amount to a rejection of the notion of the self beyond the perceptions. Condillac does not say that these feelings and sensations are all there is to our selves. The consciousness we have of our own self, says Condillac, represents this self only insofar as it is endowed with certain properties and as modified in certain ways. And that is what we *call* our substance.³⁵ He does not say, however, that these collections of properties or qualities are our

essential selves. His point is, again, epistemic. He argues that we do not encounter a substantial self, or a self beyond the collections of properties and perceptions, as an item in inner experience. He believes, however, that there must be something over and above those collections of properties, a subject, capable of thought and experience.³⁶ And this subject may be a substance. Like Locke, he does not reject the notion of self as substance. All he is saying is that we cannot know its inner nature or, to use Locke's terminology, its real essence.

Still, there are at least a couple of other passages in the *Traité des sensations* that seem to endorse a bundle view of the self. Thus he says about the statue that 'its "I" is only the collection of the sensations which it experiences, and those which memory (*la mémoire*) recalls to it. In a word it is immediate knowledge (*la conscience*) of what it is for itself, and remembrance (*le souvenir*) of what it has been'.³⁷ And in the very last two sentences of the *Traité des sensations* he states: 'The statue is therefore nothing but the sum of all it has acquired. May not this be the same with man?'³⁸ In the light of what has been said above, however, these passages, too, need not be read as endorsing a bundle view. Condillac is talking here about the self insofar as we can know it through inner experience; he is not saying that the self is nothing over and above the perceptions.

Indeed, Condillac also argues explicitly against the bundle-account notion of the self for the notion of a permanent self that.³⁹ In a footnote to *Traité des sensations* I.vi.3 Condillac quotes a famous passage from Pascal that suggests that a person is nothing but the sum-total of its properties or qualities. Condillac says about this suggestion:

But it is not the assemblage of the qualities which makes the person, for then the same man, young or old, beautiful or ugly, wise or foolish, would be so many different persons. Whatever the qualities for which you love me it is always me you love, for the qualities are only me modified differently ... In Pascal's meaning God alone can say "I".⁴⁰

Condillac points out, then, that to adopt Pascal's suggestion would give rise to problems with personal identity through time. He clearly indicates that there is a self or "I" beyond the 'assemblage of qualities'. Against what is implied by Pascal's account he insists that not just God, but human selves, too, can say 'I'.

In a different context Condillac argues that the inner experience of change itself suggests the notion of a self that persists, a self that is distinct from the phenomenal self of inner

sensibility and that remains the same. For Condillac, the notion of self or ‘I’ involves that of relating to one’s own sensations, that of combining them into a unitary self or person:

What we understand by this word ‘I’ seems to be only possible in a being who notices that in the present moment he is no longer what he has been. So long as there is no change, he exists without any reflexion (*retour sur lui-même*) upon himself; but as soon as he changes, he judges that he is the same as he formerly was in another state, and he says ‘I’.⁴¹

Condillac notes here that without change there would be no consciousness of our own selves as identical at different points of time. Although the point concerns directly only the judgement or recognition of our own diachronic identity, it assumes that change and the experience thereof presuppose the existence of an identical subject that undergoes change. For Condillac the experience of change need not lead us to sceptical conclusions about identity. On the contrary, Condillac argues that

the succession of my modifications makes me perceive that I endure. It is this variation from moment to moment, this change from pleasure to pain and from pain to pleasure, from one state to its opposite, which was necessary to bring me to the knowledge of myself.⁴²

Elsewhere, Condillac explicitly invokes the notion of the self as substance. Thus he states in the *Essai* that

we must admit a point of reunion, a substance that is at the same time a simple and indivisible subject ... and ... consequently distinct from the body – in short, a mind.⁴³

For Condillac, then, there are at least two aspects under which we can consider the self – (1) phenomenologically, as the collection of perceptions or experience to which consciousness and *réminiscence* or memory have access, and (2) ontologically, as the underlying but in its nature unknowable substance or soul.⁴⁴ In short, there is a distinction in Condillac between the notions of a phenomenal self and a substantial self.

4. The Origin of Self-consciousness

Since Condillac argues that both the sentiment of being and reminiscence require a prior sequence of perceptions, it is plain that for him there can be no ‘original’ or ‘pre-existent’ sentiment of being and recognition of one’s own diachronic identity. Moreover, Condillac points out not only that the experience of change suggest the notion of a permanent self but also that the recognition of one’s own diachronic identity requires the experience of change. In the *Traité des sensations* Condillac states that the statue can say ‘I’ only once it has experienced change.⁴⁵ This experience in turn requires memory, for without memory we could not have the experience of change as we would not be able to relate to our own past. In short, self-consciousness depends on memory and the experience of change.

The distinction between the phenomenal self and the substantial self, too, can help to illuminate seemingly contradictory passages concerning the origin of self-consciousness. In the *Traité des sensations* Condillac states: ‘At the first moment of my existence I knew nothing of what was going on within me. I could not distinguish anything. I had no consciousness of myself.’⁴⁶ Here Condillac implies that the existence of the self is independent of self-consciousness, that the latter requires experience and is thus a later development. Elsewhere, however, in *Les monades*, he states that the existence of that which I call my self begins at that moment at which I begin to have a consciousness of myself.⁴⁷ This suggests that the existence of the self is linked inseparably to the consciousness of self. One cannot have the former without the latter. Yet it is plain that the two passages do not contradict each other. The second passage, from *Les monades*, refers to the ‘beginning’ of the phenomenal, self-conscious self; but for that to come into existence the existence of the self as substance, independently of self-consciousness, is presupposed. Condillac appeals to the latter notion in the first passage quoted from the *Traité des sensations*.

When Condillac speaks in these passages of the ‘consciousness of myself’, it may not seem clear whether he has in mind the mere sentiment of existence, or a notion of self-consciousness that involves a recognition of one’s own diachronic identity. As he invokes the notion of the capacity to distinguish between perceptions, however, his idea of consciousness clearly does involve a relating to one’s own past perceptions. Further, as a relating to one’s own past perceptions involves the recognition of oneself as identical over time, what is said here may relate to both the sentiment of our being and the consciousness of our own diachronic identity.

In Condillac, then, there are three basic forms of sensibility that involve a relating to one’s own self, and they are closely interconnected: (1) the sentiment of our own being (linked to individual perceptions); (2) reminiscence or memory (in one sense) is a relating to one’s own past perceptions, and (3) a consciousness of self that involves a recognition of one’s own diachronic identity. Yet there is at least one other feature of sensibility that is of importance in this context, one that relates to the self as a bodily being.

5. The Self and the Sense of Touch

The intrinsic nature of the substantial self remains unknown to us, according to Condillac. How does he account for the nature of the phenomenal self, however? Condillac does not

explicitly distinguish between what Locke calls ‘man’ and ‘person’. Locke left open what the real nature of ‘man’ or human being might be, but it was plain that he considered ‘man’ a bodily being. And this seems to be applicable to Condillac’s phenomenal self or person, too. Condillac endorses a notion of ‘man’ as a union of soul and body, but he holds that we are aware of our own selves directly only as bodily beings. The phenomenal self consists of a multiplicity of experiences and these are linked to the body. In *Les monades* Condillac states that ‘the union of the soul with the body is such that we have a consciousness of ourselves only insofar as we feel the weight of our body’.⁴⁸ As for Condillac self-consciousness always relates to the body, he would seem to reject the notion that self-consciousness relates in any direct way to the soul.

The body as it is present to us in direct experience is not, however, the body as material substance; rather, it is just part of the multiplicity of subjective experiences. Condillac suggests that we experience our own body and its distinctness from other bodies through the sense of touch. The self discovers the non-self and thereby its distinction from other things through the sense of touch.

Placing its hands on itself it will discover that it has a body, but only when it has distinguished the different parts of it and recognized in each the same sentient being. It will discover there are other bodies when it touches things in which it does not find itself.⁴⁹

Further, Condillac argues that ‘the statue learns to know its body and to recognize itself in all its component parts, because as soon as it places its hands upon one of them, the same sentient being replies in some way from one to the other: *this is myself*’.⁵⁰ Thus, in Condillac’s account, we individuate our own selves only as bodily beings, through the sense of touch; and we regard ourselves as diachronically identical beings on the basis of the experience of change and memory of ourselves as bodily beings.

As we saw, however, Condillac reduces the self neither to its sensations nor to its bodily being, for he allows for the notion of a soul, as a simple and immaterial substance which underlies all experience and memory. Still, the notion of soul as substance plays no explicit explanatory role in his account of the workings of the mind and indeed in his account of personal identity and self-consciousness.

III. Rousseau on the *sentiment de l'existence* and the Self

As in the case of Condillac, the notions of sentiment and sensibility are central in Rousseau's thought. Rousseau was certainly familiar with Locke's work, he knew and met Condillac and refers to him in his writings.⁵¹ In *Émile ou de l'éducation* (1762) Rousseau states that 'to exist, for us, is to sense; our sensibility is incontestably anterior to our intelligence, and we had sentiments before ideas'.⁵² The notion of the self, too, is central in Rousseau. He discusses a variety of issues relating to the self in various, scattered places of his writings, including literary presentations.⁵³

1. Varieties of Self-love and Sentiments of Existence

Sensibility and selfhood are closely related to one another in Rousseau. There are some sentiments, he believes, that are natural to us, or innate, and these relate to the self. 'These sentiments, as far as the individual is concerned, are the love of self (*amour de soi*), the fear of pain, the horror of death, the desire for well-being.'⁵⁴ Importantly and famously, however, Rousseau distinguishes between two kinds of self-love – between *amour de soi*, as in the passage just quoted, which is a natural feeling and connected with the striving for self-preservation, on the one hand, and *amour-propre* on the other. The latter is not innate but develops through the association with others. It has to do with the striving for acceptance or recognition; it can become excessive, may have negative effects and turn into a striving for domination. In the *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité* (1755) Rousseau explains the distinction thus:

One must not confuse *amour-propre* with *amour de soi-même*, two very different passions in their nature and their effects. *Amour de soi-même* is a natural sentiment that prompts every animal to watch over its own preservation and that, guided in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue. *Amour-propre* is only a relative, artificial sentiment born in society, a sentiment that prompts each individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone else, that triggers all the evil they do to themselves and others, and that is the real source of honour.⁵⁵

This distinction between two types of self-love is crucial to Rousseau's philosophy as a whole, but although the account in the quoted passage seems clear enough, other passages seem less straightforward and, inevitably, there is an ongoing debate among Rousseau scholars about the precise meaning of the two notions and their relationship to one another.⁵⁶ It seems clear, however, that *amour de soi* is the more basic sentiment; Rousseau says in *Émile* that *amour de soi* is 'a primitive, innate passion, which is anterior to every other, and of which all others are in a sense only modifications'.⁵⁷

Here, my main concern is not with *amour de soi* and its relation to *amour-propre* but with the notion of a sentiment that is even more basic than *amour de soi* and equally important to Rousseau's philosophy: that of the sentiment of our own existence. Interpretation of this notion is no easier or more straightforward, however, than that of *amour de soi* and *amour-propre*. As scholars have noted, Rousseau uses this notion in more than one sense, and he provides no systematic discussion of it.⁵⁸ Moreover, the terminology is not uniform either. Apart from 'sentiment de l'existence' Rousseau uses 'conscience de soi-même', 'sentiment de notre être', 'sentiment interne', 'sentiment du moi', 'sentiment intérieur', and 'sentiment intime'.⁵⁹ It is not at all clear that these expressions are always used synonymously. Sometimes but not always some of these expressions seem to denote the same as *sentiment de l'existence*.⁶⁰ But what is the *sentiment de l'existence*? In one sense the notion would not be basic or fundamental at all. In a letter to Voltaire, for example, Rousseau writes of a 'pleasant *sentiment de l'existence*, independent of all other sensation', of an *enjoyment* of life, it seems, that one has in spite of bad experiences.⁶¹ This kind of feeling of existence is not basic as it assumes other sentiments and experiences. Similarly, in *Les rêveries du promeneur solitaire* Rousseau says that the sentiment of existence is 'in itself a precious sentiment of contentment and of peace'.⁶² Elsewhere, Rousseau's *sentiment de l'existence* denotes a sentiment of one's own worth. This sentiment is based 'on the judgements of others' and seems to presuppose *amour-propre* and so cannot be basic.⁶³

In the context of some of the epistemological considerations in the *Profession de foi du vicaire savoyard* in Book IV of *Émile*, however, a somewhat different and more elementary notion of *sentiment de l'existence* comes into play.⁶⁴ This is the notion that we are familiar with from our discussion of Locke and Condillac, a notion that goes back to Malebranche and other broadly Cartesian thinkers in the late seventeenth- and early eighteenth centuries. This notion, too, is related to *amour de soi* and *amour-propre*, but in a more fundamental way than is *sentiment* understood as enjoyment or contentment. This notion of *sentiment de l'existence* is that of an immediate awareness or consciousness of one's own existence as a subject of perceptions. Clearly, this kind of awareness is presupposed by both kinds of self-love. Both self-preservation and the striving for recognition by others assume that I am aware of my own existence; only if I am aware of my own existence as a subject of perceptions can I become an object of self-love and of recognition. Here, I shall focus on the *sentiment de l'existence* in this basic sense; other aspects of the notion hinted at above cannot be discussed in this context.

2. *Sentiment de l'existence* as Self-awareness

Rousseau speaks not only of a sentiment or consciousness of one's own existence, but like Locke and Condillac, also of a 'consciousness of our sensations'.⁶⁵ It is precisely the relationship between these two types of consciousness that raises a fundamental question for Rousseau, relating to the nature of the sentiment of existence:

I exist, and I have senses by which I am affected. This is the first truth that strikes me and to which I am forced to acquiesce. Do I have a particular sentiment of my existence, or do I sense it only through my sensations? This is my first doubt, which it is for the present impossible for me to resolve; for as I am continually affected by sensations, whether immediately or by memory, how can I know whether the sentiment of the I is something outside these same sensations and whether it can be independent of them?⁶⁶

Rousseau clearly believes that the existence of my own self is immediately and absolutely certain. What is questionable, according to him, is *how* I know this. He presents the reader with two possibilities: (a) there is a sentiment or feeling of existence which is separate from all my other feelings and sensations; (b) the feeling of my existence is felt only through sensations and thus dependent on them. Some commentators have identified (b) with the (allegedly) Humean view that the self does not exist apart from its perceptions.⁶⁷ This is not, however, what is stated: (b) makes no claim about the nature of the self and the manner of its existence; it does not suggest that the self is a bundle or collection of perceptions. Rather it makes a statement about the means of knowing the existence of my own self, whatever its nature. It says that the feeling of my own existence depends on other sensations. Only through the consciousness of sensations can I become aware or conscious of the being (my own self) who has those sensations. Further one could ask if (b) is the view that the sentiment of existence is an aspect of the other sensations themselves or derived from them. However that may be, (b) is quite consistent with the view that the self is a unitary thing or substance. Rousseau says that it is difficult to answer the question whether (a) or (b) is true, because we are in fact never without sensations, and we cannot tell whether or not 'the sentiment of the I' is something independent of them.

Rousseau does not elaborate further on that issue in the *Profession de foi*. The idea present in the quotation above, however, that our own existence is a 'first truth' seems to suggest that the sentiment of existence is independent and does not require other sensations. Elsewhere, Rousseau states that the 'first' sentiment of a human being is that of its own existence which again indicates the independence of this sentiment.⁶⁸ Yet other passages in *Émile* suggest that Rousseau thinks there cannot be a special sentiment of one's own self that is independent of

all other sensations. Thus, immediately after the passage quoted above Rousseau says that ‘my sensations ... make me sense my existence’.⁶⁹ Indeed not unlike Condillac, Rousseau states at one point that at the beginning of our existence we have no inner-directed sensibility, no sentiment of our own existence. ‘We are born capable of learning but able to do nothing, knowing nothing. The soul, enchained in imperfect and half- formed organs, does not even have the sentiment of its own existence’.⁷⁰ Also, Rousseau says that the *sentiment de l’existence* depends on the existence of sensations of external things and is thus not independent at all. ‘To live’, he says in *Émile*, ‘is to act; it is to make use of our organs, our senses, our faculties, of all the parts of our selves which give us the sentiment of our existence’.⁷¹ If the sentiment of existence is mediated by other activities in this way, then it cannot be ‘first’ or independent. Possibly, when Rousseau says that one’s own existence is the first truth one knows, ‘first’ is not to be taken in a temporal sense, but this not what his formulations in the relevant passages cited above suggest. In short, the precise relationship between the sentiment of one’s own existence and other thoughts and perceptions (and our consciousness of these) remains unclear.⁷² While a distinct notion of *sentiment de l’existence* as self-awareness can be identified in the *Profession de foi*, there is no systematic discussion of this idea. Still, Rousseau ascribes to the *sentiment de l’existence* a special function for diachronic self-identity.

3. The Sentiment of Existence and Identity: Rousseau and Buffon

Rousseau’s remarks on personal identity through time appeal to ideas we are familiar with from Locke and Condillac. Like Condillac, Rousseau links the notion of the *sentiment de l’existence* to that of memory. He distinguishes between the *sentiment de l’existence* as a relating to one’s own present existence and a consciousness of self which involves linking the present to the past. Here, Buffon seems to be a likely source for Rousseau as well, as there are significant similarities.⁷³ Buffon’s main interest is of course in the workings of physical nature, but in the chapter ‘De la nature de l’homme’ which opens his *Histoire naturelle de l’homme* (1749) he reflects on how human subjects relate to their own selves. The existence of our own soul is absolutely certain, he argues, for ‘being and thinking are the same thing in us’, this is an intuitive truth, and ‘independent of our senses, of our imagination, of our memory’.⁷⁴ Buffon speaks of a ‘sensation of existence’ in both animals and human beings. This ‘sensation’ is a relating to one’s own present existence. Only human beings, however, are capable of a ‘consciousness of existence’ that involves a relating to the past, animals do not have that capacity.⁷⁵ Thus, ‘consciousness of existence’, for which Buffon also uses the

expression *sentiment intérieur*, is composed of the sensation of our present existence and the memory of our past existence. This *sentiment intérieur* is what makes us a proper self.⁷⁶ Similarly, Rousseau argues that the *sentiment de l'existence* is a feeling that is always with us but as such relates only to the present. Memory, for Rousseau, extends this sentiment to the whole of our existence. This consciousness of self across time is essential, Rousseau suggests, to the self as a moral being, and that is, as a proper human being:

It is at this second stage that the life of the individual begins. It is then that he gains consciousness of himself. Memory extends the sentiment of identity to all the moments of his existence; he becomes truly one, the same, and consequently already capable of happiness or unhappiness. It is important, therefore, to begin to consider him here as a moral being.⁷⁷

For Rousseau, then (as for Locke), only the self considered in terms of its ability to relate to both its present and past is a moral being or a moral self. The mere sentiment of existence cannot constitute the self as a moral being; memory is required as well. Insofar as memory is understood as 'extending' the sentiment of existence beyond the present moment, however, it seems that the latter feeling is prior; there could be no memory without the sentiment of existence. Now, does memory fulfil a constitutive role for diachronic self-identity? The following passage seems to endorse such a view:

I sense my soul. I know it by sentiment and by thought without knowing what its essence is, I know that it exists. I cannot reason about ideas I do not have. What I know surely is that the identity of the *I* is prolonged only by memory, and that in order to be actually the same I must remember having been. Now, after my death, I could not recall what I was during my life unless I also recall what I felt, and consequently what I did; and I do not doubt that this memory will one day cause the felicity of the good and the torment of the wicked. Here on earth countless ardent passions absorb the inner sentiment and lead remorse astray.⁷⁸

Like Locke, Rousseau seems to be saying here that, as we do not and cannot know what the real essence of the self is, it can have diachronic identity (for us) only through (consciousness and) memory. Memory, according to this passage, is essential; the self would not have diachronic identity if it did not have memory – 'in order *to be* actually the same I must remember having been' (my italics). This claim seems to be inconsistent, however, with other passages in which Rousseau asserts (without invoking memory) that the self simply exists and continues to exist as the same being. For example, in the earlier quote from the *Profession de foi* Rousseau says: 'I exist, and I have senses by which I am affected. This is the first truth that strikes me and to which I am forced to acquiesce'.⁷⁹ Here, Rousseau seems to be saying that the self is simply given and not constituted by any activity of the self. Once we take a closer look, however, it becomes clear that there is only a seeming inconsistency between the two passages. When Rousseau speaks of the self as simply existing he is speaking metaphysically, referring to the self as a soul or thinking substance; when he invokes memory as constitutive

of self-identity he is talking about the self as a ‘moral being’. This is indicated by the comment on immortality in the longer quotation above. Remembering ‘having been’ includes remembering what I have done; and this memory of my deeds ‘will one day cause the felicity of the good and the torment of the wicked’. Thus, again like Locke, Rousseau distinguishes between the self as a mental substance and its identity on the one hand, and the self and its identity as a moral being requiring memory on the other.⁸⁰ Rousseau is not saying, then, that memory creates the self’s identity through time in a metaphysical sense (i.e. as a thinking substance). This is given prior to memory. Rather, memory constitutes the self and its identity in a moral sense, as a being that is capable of happiness and misery.⁸¹

We noted above that for Locke the self, by being ‘concerned’ for its own happiness, relates to its own future, as well as to its present and past thoughts and actions. In Buffon the relating to the future is also relevant, but he argues for this in a different way. He says that memory is dependent on the power of reflection because our memory of past things supposes not only the renewal of earlier sensations but also comparisons that our souls have made of those sensations. The soul establishes the connections between those things through comparing and, that is, through reflecting.⁸² It is this power of reflection that enables us, as human beings, not only to be certain of our past life but also to relate to our own future.⁸³ For Buffon, then, self-conscious existence consists essentially in the activity of linking past, present and an anticipated future.

While Rousseau seems to be focused on the link between past and present, his account of the self, too, invokes a relating to the future, through the notion of the afterlife, also relevant in Locke’s account. Our memory of our past deeds will determine if we will be happy or miserable; therefore, our decisions and actions in this life relate to our future lives. Recall the passage quoted above:

Now, after my death, I could not recall what I was during my life unless I also recall what I felt, and consequently what I did; and I do not doubt that this memory will one day cause the felicity of the good and the torment of the wicked.⁸⁴

4. Rousseau on the Active Forces of the Self

Much has been made of Rousseau’s emphasis on the active nature of the self. Some scholars have contended for a connection between Rousseau and Kant in this respect.⁸⁵ And indeed Rousseau argues that we do not passively perceive the connection between our sensations, but

that this perception requires an activity of the self. He states: ‘I reflect on the objects of my sensations; and finding in myself the faculty of comparing them, I sense myself endowed with an active force which I did not know before I had’.⁸⁶ Only through my activity can there be a ‘communication’ among my sensations so that I can combine them; and only through our activity of combining is it possible for us ‘to know that the body we touch and the object we see are the same’. Without such activity ‘either we would never sense anything outside of us, or there would be five sensible substances for us whose identity we would have no means of perceiving’.⁸⁷ It is the self or ‘I’ or soul that brings about this synthesis and thereby makes possible the knowledge of objects:

Let this or that name be given to this force of my mind which brings together and compares my sensations; let it be called *attention, meditation, reflection*, or whatever one wishes. It is still true that it is in me and not in things, that it is I alone who produce it, although I produce it only on the occasion of the impression made on me by objects.⁸⁸

Moreover, at a more fundamental level, Rousseau argues that, in formulating propositions, we connect ideas through the copula ‘is’: ‘the distinctive faculty of the active or intelligent being is to be able to give sense to the word *is*’.⁸⁹ This requires a unitary self, understood as an immaterial substance. Buffon, too, in spite of his focus on the physical nature of the self, sees human beings as composed of two substances, one extended, material and mortal, the other not extended, immaterial and immortal.⁹⁰ In Rousseau, the anti-materialist position is, in part at least, arrived at through epistemological considerations. It is plain that for Rousseau the self is not a passive receptor of sensations, and it is the active nature of the self that, to him, speaks against materialism:

A machine does not think; there is neither motion nor figure which produces reflection ... No material being is active by itself, and I am. One may very well argue with me about this; but I sense it, and this sentiment that speaks to me is stronger than the reason combatting it.⁹¹

These comments, however, point to the fact that Rousseau’s reflections on the active nature of the self may not be as innovative and forward-looking as some have thought. It is obvious that for philosophers such as Locke, too, the mind is active, for example, in the creation of complex ideas, in basic cognitive capacities such as reflecting, comparing and abstracting, and in the formation of propositions that may be true or false. In Locke this does not involve a commitment to an immaterialist conception of the human mind or soul. It seems doubtful, then, that Rousseau’s emphasis on the active nature of the self could be used to establish a special connection between him and Kant.⁹² Many anti-materialist philosophers both before

and after Rousseau, including Buffon and several German thinkers, such as Kant's teacher Martin Knutzen, made the point that the self or soul is active, for example in connecting ideas in a proposition, and therefore cannot be material (as matter is inert).⁹³ For the most part, Rousseau reproduces standard anti-materialist arguments here.⁹⁴

Finally, Rousseau does not seem to attempt to combine his various remarks on the self (concerning memory and personal identity, the *sentiment de l'existence*, and the active forces) into a coherent account. It remains unclear, for example, how the notion of the active, synthesising self is to be related to the *sentiment de l'existence*. The function ascribed to memory, however, can be made consistent with the notion of the synthesising self: it functions as a unifier of past and present experiences, thus constituting moral personal identity through time.

IV. Conclusion

The presence of Locke's ideas about the self and sensibility in French thinkers such as Condillac and Rousseau is obvious from the account above. There are, however, not only similarities but also several philosophically important differences. Condillac and Rousseau (as well as Buffon) work with the notion of an immediate sentiment or consciousness of one's own existence. We saw that in Rousseau this notion has several features and that one of these relates to Locke's idea of the 'intuitive knowledge' we have of our own existence, an idea that is present in Condillac's notion of the 'sentiment of our own being'. In Locke and Condillac this kind of self-consciousness is derived from the consciousness of other perceptions; there is no 'original' self-consciousness independently of other perceptions. Rousseau seems to leave the question open of whether there could be such an independent self-consciousness. It is significant, however, that he considers the nature of the sentiment of existence at all.

Locke, Condillac and Rousseau discuss other ways of relating to one's own self, apart from the mere sentiment or intuition of existence. Most important to all of them is the relating to the past, through memory. According to Locke, the consciousness of the present and the memory of the past are constitutive of our diachronic personal identity. In Condillac, by contrast, we merely recognize our identity through consciousness and memory. Rousseau is closer to Locke here in that he suggests that consciousness and memory are constitutive of the self as a 'moral being' (see below). Moreover, Locke distinguishes between the human subject as a person, as a man or human being and as a soul or substance. Certainly Locke's

distinction between the soul, as substance, and the person is present, in different ways, in both Condillac and Rousseau. In Condillac, there is a distinction between the soul and the phenomenal self to which we have access through consciousness and memory; and Rousseau distinguishes between the soul and the self as a moral being. It seems that Rousseau and Condillac highlight different (psychological and moral) aspects of Locke's account of the person. Both Locke and Rousseau also speak of a relating to one's own future. In Locke, this belongs to the 'forensic' nature of personhood and to the fact that we are 'concerned' for our happiness and misery. In the last analysis, this 'concern' relates to the afterlife. We saw that similar ideas are present in Rousseau.

Condillac is sometimes seen as a 'bundle' theorist, 'radicalising' Locke's account of the mind; even Rousseau is occasionally read as at least playing with this idea. As we saw, however, neither thinker sees the mind essentially as a bundle of perceptions. Both Condillac and Rousseau endorse the notion of the soul as a substance. While Locke leaves open the question about the real essence of the soul, Condillac and Rousseau insist that the soul is a 'simple and indivisible', immaterial substance. In Rousseau, the immaterial nature of the soul is even a matter of sentiment. Materialists, he says, are 'deaf to the inner voice crying out to them in a tone difficult not to recognize'.⁹⁵ In this sense at least, Condillac and Rousseau are less 'radical' than Locke.

There can be no doubt that the relating to our own body is relevant to both Locke's and Rousseau's accounts. Thus Locke suggests that the body becomes part of the person through consciousness and is in this sense relevant to our personal identity. It seems, however, that the body has a more central and fundamental status in Condillac than it does in Locke and Rousseau. This is evident in Condillac's notion discussed above that the self discovers the non-self and thereby its distinction from other things through the sense of touch.

In short, then, Lockean ideas are taken up, adopted, criticised and modified in variety of fruitful ways. It would be misleading, however, to speak of a particular, progressive development of thought from Locke to Condillac and Rousseau on this issue. One critical question raised by the French sensiblist accounts of the self may be formulated as an elaboration of Rousseau's question cited above. Rousseau asks if the sentiment of existence is derived from sensations or if it is independent of them. One could ask further, if there is any evidence for the existence of such a 'sentiment' at all. Can it be empirically identified? It

seems that the sensiblist accounts, for all their emphasis on experience, simply assert the existence of such a sentiment. If we cannot empirically identify a sentiment of existence but still consider the notion of self-consciousness in this basic sense important, then it is obvious that the purely experiential approach has reached its limits.⁹⁶

NOTES

¹ Yolton, *Locke and French Materialism*.

² Locke, *Essay* I.i.1.

³ Gaukroger, *The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility*, 390.

⁴ Locke, *Essay* II.i.3.

⁵ Locke, *Essay* I.i.1.

⁶ Locke, *Essay* IV.ii.1.

⁷ Locke, *Essay* II.ix.1. It is worth noting that Locke uses sensation to illustrate the immediacy of intuitive knowledge (*Essay* IV.ii.1). For a recent analysis of latter, see Weinberg, 'Locke's Reply to the Sceptic', 394-399.

⁸ Locke, *Essay* II.i.8.

⁹ Locke, Journal note of 20 Feb 1682, in Locke *An Early Draft of Locke's Essay together with Excerpts from his Journals*, 121-123 (my italics).

¹⁰ Locke, *Essay* II.i.10.

¹¹ Locke, *Essay* II.xxvii.9.

¹² Locke, *Essay* II.i.19.

¹³ Locke, *Essay* IV.ix.3. For a more detailed discussion of Locke on consciousness and the intuitive knowledge of one's own existence, see Thiel, *The Early Modern Subject*, 118-120; and Thiel, 'Der Begriff der Intuition bei Locke', 95-112.

¹⁴ The distinction between (2) and (4) corresponds to Galen Strawson's distinction between self-awareness and 'full or express' self-consciousness (Strawson, *The Evident Connexion*, 86 and 91).

¹⁵ Locke, *Essay* II.xxvii.9 (my italics).

¹⁶ Locke, *Essay* II.xxvii.

¹⁷ For a detailed discussion of Locke on personal identity, see Thiel, *The Early Modern Subject*, chapters 3-6.

¹⁸ 'The Sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all Persons shall have, that they *themselves* in what Bodies soever they appear, or what Substances soever that consciousness adheres to, are the *same*, that committed those Actions, and deserve that Punishment for them' (Locke, *Essay* II.xxvii.26).

¹⁹ Thiel, *The Enlightened Subject* (in preparation).

²⁰ See Thiel, *The Early Modern Subject*, 9-10. Compare also the overview in Spink, 'Les avatars du "sentiment de l'existence" de Locke a Rousseau', 269-298.

²¹ Condillac, *Essai* I.ii.1, §4; *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 11; *Essay on the Origin*, 20. See also *Traité des*

sensations IV.vii.4 (*Treatise on the Sensations*, 226; *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 309). Consciousness is a feeling ‘of what is passing within us’ (‘notre conscience, c’est-à-dire, le sentiment de ce qui se passé en nous’). In his *Dictionnaire des synonymes* Condillac defines *conscience* as ‘sentiment intérieur. Nous connoissons notre ame par conscience’ (*Oeuvres philosophiques* III, 143).

²² Condillac, *Essai* I.ii.1, § 13; *Essay on the Origin*, 24 (‘Ainsi la perception et la conscience ne sont qu’une même opération sous deux noms. En tant qu’on ne la considère que comme une impression dans l’ame, on peut lui conserver celui de perception; en tant qu’elle avertit l’ame de sa présence, on peut lui donner celui de conscience’, *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 13). Compare also *Essai* I.ii.1 § 16 (*Essay on the Origin*, 26): ‘This impression, considered as giving the mind notice of its presence, is what I call consciousness ... Somehow consciousness says to the mind: there is a perception’ (‘Cette impression, considérée comme avertissant l’ame de sa présence, est ce que j’appelle conscience ... La conscience dit en quelque sorte à l’ame, voilà une perception’, *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 14).

²³ In the *Essai* Condillac distinguishes between imagination, memory and reminiscence. The imagination ‘revives the perceptions themselves’, memory ‘recalls only the signs or the circumstances’, and reminiscence ‘reports those we have already had’ (*Essai*, I.ii.2, §25; *Essay on the Origin*, 30; *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 16). In the later *Traité des sensations* Condillac does not seem to make use of this distinction, and he accounts for personal identity in terms of memory (*le souvenir*).

²⁴ Condillac, *Essai* I.ii.1, §15, *Essay on the Origin*, 25-26; my italics. (‘Lorsque les objets attirent notre attention, les perceptions qu’ils occasionnent en nous, se lient avec le sentiment de notre être et avec tout ce qui peut y avoir quelque rapport. De-là il arrive que non seulement la conscience nous donne connoissance des nos perceptions, mais encore, si elles se répètent, elle nous avertit souvent que nous les avons déjà eues, et nous les fait connoître comme étant à nous, ou comme affectant, malgré leur variété et leur succession, un être qui est constamment le même nous. La conscience, considérée par rapport à ces nouveaux effets, est une nouvelle opération qui nous sert à chaque instant et qui est le fondement de l’expérience. Sans elle chaque moment de la vie nous paroît le premier de notre existence, et notre connoissance ne s’étendrait jamais au-delà d’une première perception: je la nommerai *réminiscence*’, *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 14).

²⁵ The account of personal identity Condillac gives in the *Traité des sensations* (I.vi.1) is consistent with the relevant passages in the *Essai*. Condillac explicitly links the idea we have of our own self to memory (*le souvenir*): ‘If it [the statue] is able to say ‘I’ (*moi*) it can say it in all the states of its duration; and at each time its ‘I’ will embrace all the moments of which it might have preserved recollection’ (*Treatise on the Sensations*, 43; ‘Si elle pouvoit dire *moi*, elle le diroit dans tous les instans de sa durée; et à chaque fois son *moi* embrasseroit tous les momens dont elle conserveroit le souvenir’, *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 238). Sensations which the statue cannot recollect is not part of the idea it has of its personality (*Traité des sensations*, I.vi.3: ‘Les odeurs, dont la statue ne se souvient pas, n’entrent donc point dans l’idée qu’elle a de sa personne. Aussi étrangères à son *moi*, que les couleurs et les sons, dont elle n’a encore aucune connoissance; elles sont à son égard, comme si elle ne les avoit jamais senties’, *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 239). Again, Condillac comments on *the idea* we have of our own personality and what we regard as ourselves. Unlike Locke, he does not state that personal identity itself is constituted through consciousness and memory.

²⁶ Ryding, ‘La notion du moi chez Condillac’, 126ff.

²⁷ Condillac, *Essai* I.ii.1, § 15; *Essay on the Origin*, 25; my italics. (‘Il est évident que si la liaison qui est entre les perceptions que j’éprouvai actuellement, celles que j’éprouvai hier, et le sentiment de mon être, étoit détruite, je ne saurois reconnoître que ce qui m’est arrivé hier, soit arrivé à moi-même. Si, à chaque nuit, cette liaison étoit interrompue, je commencerois, pour ainsi dire, chaque jour une nouvelle vie, et personne ne pourroit me convaincre que le *moi* d’aujourd’hui fut le *moi* de la veille. La réminiscence est donc produite par la liaison que conserve la suite de nos perceptions’, *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 14).

²⁸ Condillac, *Essai* I.ii.1 § 15, *Essay on the Origin*, 25-26. (‘Afin de mieux analyser la réminiscence, il faudroit lui donner deux noms: l’un, en tant qu’elle nous fait reconnoître notre être; l’autre en tant qu’elle nous fait reconnoître les perceptions qui s’y répètent: car ce sont-là des idées bien distinctes’, *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 14).

²⁹ Condillac, *Essai* I.ii.1, § 15; *Essay on the Origin*, 25 (‘Je regarde cette liaison comme une première expérience qui doit suffire pour expliquer toutes les autres’, *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 14).

³⁰ Condillac, *Essai*, Introduction; *Essay on the Origin*, 5; *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 4.

³¹ See, for example, Davies, *Conscience as Consciousness*, 81-82. Compare also Aliénor Bertrand, who seems to think that the main difference between Locke and Condillac is that the latter abandons the notion of self as a substance. He sees this as a ‘radicalisation of Locke’s theory’ that is linked to Condillac’s rejection of the autonomy of reflection in the *Traité des sensations* (Bertrand, ‘Individualité et personnalité’, 483).

³² The work is a prize essay that Condillac submitted to the Berlin Academy. It was rediscovered and republished in 1980 (Condillac, *Les monades*). For commentary on this work, see Kreimendahl, ‘Condillac und die Monaden’, 280-88.

³³ ‘Nous ne connaissons notre être qu’autant que nous le sentons, nous ne le sentons qu’autant que nous avons des sensations’ (*Les monades*, 146).

³⁴ ‘La conscience que nous avons de ce que nous appelons *nous*, le représente d’abord comme revêtu de certaines qualités, et comme modifié d’une certaine manière’ (*Les monades*, 145).

³⁵ ‘Voilà proprement ce que nous nommons notre *substance*’ (*Les monades*, 145).

³⁶ As Condillac says: ‘il y a en nous quelque chose capable de sensation’ (*Les monades*, 146). Similarly, when Condillac expresses scepticism about the possibility of knowing the nature of our own self in the *Traité des sensations*, he does not thereby deny the existence of an underlying substantial self whose nature remains unknown to us: ‘I know this body belongs to me, though how, I cannot understand. I see myself, I touch myself, I am conscious of myself, but I do not know what I am. If I believe myself sound, taste, colour, smell, I am no nearer to the true knowledge of what I myself actually am’, *Traité des sensations* IV.8.6; *Treatise on the Sensations*, 235-6. (‘Je sais qu’elles [les parties de ce corps] sont à moi, sans pouvoir le comprendre: je me vois, je me touche, en un mot, je me sens, mais je ne sais ce que je suis; et, si j’ai cru être son, saveur, couleur, odeur, actuellement je ne sais plus que je dois me croire, *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 313).

³⁷ *Traité des sensations* I.vi.3; *Treatise on the Sensations*, 44. (‘Son *moi* n’est que la collection des sensations qu’elle éprouve, et de celles que la mémoire lui rappelle. En un mot, c’est tout-à-la-fois et la conscience de ce qu’elle est, et le souvenir de ce qu’elle a été’, *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 239).

³⁸ *Traité des sensations* IV.ix.3. *Treatise on the Sensations*, 238. (‘Elle n’est donc rien qu’autant qu’elle a acquis. Pourquoi n’en seroit-il pas de même de l’homme?’, *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 314).

³⁹ Thus, my reading is in agreement in this respect with that of Knight and Perkins (rather than with that of Bertrand and Davies). Knight states that Condillac ‘annexed the collection of sensations to a soul and declared the soul to be a spiritual substance, unified and immortal, doomed by original sin to dependence on the body’ (Knight, *The Geometric Spirit*, 98). Knight refers to the *Essai*, *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 7-8, but also to the *Traité des animaux*, in *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 371. Compare also Perkins who speaks of Condillac’s notion of ‘the true self, the self which exists behind the mere content of the self’ (Perkins, *Concept of the Self*, 55). Condillac ‘always had the metaphysical concept of the soul to fall back on ... The soul exists as an independent entity, unified and comprehensive, to which all the passing perceptions, emotions and ideas could be attached’ (ibid., 56). John C. O’Neal’s long chapter on Condillac in *The Authority of Experience*, 13-59, does not deal with the issues of substance and personal identity.

⁴⁰ *Traité des sensations* I.vi.3; *Treatise on the Sensations*, 43. (‘Ce n’est pas l’assemblage des qualités qui fait la personne; car le même homme, jeune ou vieux, beau ou laid, sage ou fou, seroit autant de personnes distinctes; et pour quelques qualités qu’on m’aime, c’est toujours moi qu’on aime; car les qualités ne sont que moi modifié différemment ... Dans le sens de Pascal, Dieu seul pourroit dire, *moi*’, *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 239).

⁴¹ *Traité des sensations* I.vi.2; *Treatise on the Sensations*, 43. (‘Ce qu’on entend par ce mot [*moi*], ne me paroît convenir qu’à un être qui remarque que, dans le moment présent, il n’est plus ce qu’il a été. Tant qu’il ne change point, il existe sans aucun retour sur lui-même: mais aussitôt qu’il change, il juge qu’il est le même qui a été auparavant de telle manière, et il dit *moi*’, *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 238). See also the following passage: ‘By passing ... through these two states [present smell and remembered smell] the statue feels that it is no longer what it was. The knowledge of this change makes it relate the first smell to a different moment from that in which it is experiencing the second, and this makes it perceive a difference between existing in one state and remembering having existed in another’ (*Traité des sensations* I.ii.10; *Treatise on the Sensations*, 7; ‘En passant ... par deux manières d’être, la statue sent qu’elle n’est plus ce qu’elle a été: la connaissance de ce changement lui fait rapporter la première à un moment différent de celui où elle éprouve la

seconde: et c'est là ce qui lui fait mettre de la différence entre exister d'une manière et se souvenir d'avoir existé d'une autre', *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 226).

⁴² *Traité des sensations* IV.viii.1; *Treatise on the Sensations*, 229. ('Par la succession de mes manières d'être, je m'aperçois que je dure. Il falloit donc que ce moi variât à chaque instant, au hasard de se changer souvent contre un autre, où il m'est douloureux de me retrouver', *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 310).

⁴³ *Essai* I.i.1, § 6; *Essay on the Origin*, 13; ('Il faudra donc admettre un point de réunion; une substance qui soit en même temps un sujet simple et indivisible ... distincte, par conséquent, du corps; une ame, en un mot', *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 7). See also *Traité des sensations* II.iv: 'Since the sensations belong only to the soul, they can be modifications only of that substance.' ('Les sensations n'appartenant qu'à l'ame, elles ne peuvent être que des manières d'être de cette substance', *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 254).

⁴⁴ Erik Ryding has argued that, in addition to the notions of a phenomenal and a substantial self, there is, third, the notion of a 'formal self' in Condillac (Ryding, 'La notion du moi chez Condillac', 129). This notion of a *moi formel* is that of a mere unifier of thoughts or perceptions. According to Ryding, the *moi formel* is that which provides a link between our perceptions and guarantees our personal identity. Ryding does not provide sufficient textual evidence, however, for his ascription of such a notion to Condillac. It could perhaps be argued that the 'sentiment of our being' fulfils such a role, as it is linked to perceptions and makes reminiscence and self-consciousness possible. This is a 'sentiment' in Condillac, however, not a third notion of 'self'. We have seen also that Condillac postulates a subject that underlies perceptions and that provides the 'liaison entre des perceptions' (Ryding, 127) required for memory and personal identity. This self beyond the perceptions in Condillac just is the soul, as substance, however. In short, Ryding's rather Kantian sounding reading of Condillac does not succeed. For a different Kantian reading of Condillac that does not focus on the notion of the self, see M. W. Beal, 'Condillac as Precursor of Kant', in *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 102 (1973), 193-229.

⁴⁵ *Traité des sensations* II.i.3; *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 251.

⁴⁶ *Traité des sensations* IV.8.1; *Treatise on the Sensations*, 228. ('Au premier moment de mon existence, je ne savois point ce qui se passoit en moi; je n'y démêlois rien encore; je n'avois aucune conscience de moi-même', *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 310).

⁴⁷ 'Qu'importe que j'existe, si par moi-même je suis incapable de me sentir? Et proprement l'existence de ce que j'appelle moi, où commence-t-elle, si ce n'est au moment où je commence à en avoir conscience?' (*Les monades*, 201-2).

⁴⁸ 'L'union de l'ame avec le corps est telle que nous n'avons conscience de nous-mêmes qu'autant que nous sentons le poids de notre corps', *Les monades*, 145.

⁴⁹ *Traité des sensations* II.v.2; *Treatise on the Sensations*, 85-6. ('En les portant sur elle-même, elle ne découvrira qu'elle a un corps, que lorsqu'elle en distinguera les différentes parties, et qu'elle se reconnoîtra dans chacune pour le même être sentant; et elle ne découvrira qu'il y a d'autres corps, que parce qu'elle ne se retrouvera pas dans ceux qu'elle touchera', *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 255).

⁵⁰ *Traité des sensations* II.v.4; *Treatise on the Sensations*, 89. ('La statue apprend donc à connoître son corps, et à se reconnoître dans toutes les parties qui le composent; parce qu'aussitôt qu'elle porte la main sur une d'elles, le même être sentant se répond en quelque sorte de l'une à l'autre: c'est moi, *Oeuvres philosophiques* I, 256).

⁵¹ See, for example, the *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité*, in *Oeuvres complètes* III, 148, and *Les confessions*, in *Oeuvres complètes* I, 237, 280. Compare Fräbdford, *Die psychologischen Anschauungen J. J. Rousseaus*, 23.

⁵² *Emile or On Education*, 290; *Oeuvres complètes* IV, 600: 'Exister pour nous, c'est sentir; notre sensibilité est incontestablement antérieure à notre intelligence'.

⁵³ For references to literary representations of memory and personal identity in Rousseau, see, for example, Perkins, *Concept of Self*, 91,104-106. There are, of course, more detailed discussions of this aspect of Rousseau's writings. Reinhard Brandt, for example, examines the notion of the self in Rousseau's early comedy *Narcisse* (Brandt, 'Der Einzelne und die Andern, 263-287). As Brandt shows, *Narcisse* is concerned with the idea that in being oneself one must lose oneself in another. See also Rousseau's adaptation of the Pygmalion-motif, in his 'scène lyrique' entitled *Pygmalion* (*Oeuvres complètes* II, 1224-1231). Here, the statue's first

perception is to touch itself and say ‘I’ (ibid., 1230). Compare the discussion in Starobinski, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Transparency and Obstruction*, chapter 4.

⁵⁴ *Emile or On Education*, 290. (‘Ces sentiments, quant à la individu, sont l’amour de soi, la crainte de la douleur, l’horreur de la mort, le désir du bien-être’; *Oeuvres complètes* IV, 600).

⁵⁵ *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, 115. (‘Il ne faut pas confondre l’amour-propre et l’amour de soi-même; deux passions très différentes par leur nature et par leurs effets. L’amour de soi-même est un sentiment naturel qui porte tout animal à veiller à sa propre conversation et qui, dirigé dans l’homme par la raison et modifié par la pitié, produit l’humanité et la vertu. L’amour-propre n’est qu’un sentiment relatif, factice et né dans la société, qui porte chaque individu à faire plus de cas de soi que de tout autre, qui inspire aux hommes tous les maux qu’ils se font mutuellement et qui est la véritable source de l’honneur’, *Oeuvres complètes* III, 219).

⁵⁶ I have benefited greatly from the excellent account in Neuhouser, *Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love*, especially 13-18, 29-37, 43-5.

⁵⁷ *Emile or On Education*, 213; (‘passion primitive, innée, antérieure à toute autre, et dont toutes les autres ne sont, en un sens, que des modifications’, *Oeuvres complètes* IV, 491).

⁵⁸ See, for example, the discussion in Neuhouser, *Rousseau*, 35f., and in Cooper, *Rousseau, Nature and the Problem of the Good Life*, 20-30, at 21.

⁵⁹ For a list of the terms employed by Rousseau for relating to the self, see Davies, *Conscience as Consciousness*, 75.

⁶⁰ Philip Robinson notes that ‘conscience’ and ‘sentiment’ are ‘interchangeable in Rousseau when they relate to one’s own existence. See Robinson, ‘*La Conscience: A Perceptual Problem in Rousseau*’, 1385.

⁶¹ Letter to Voltaire of 18 August 1756; ‘un doux sentiment de l’existence, indépendant de toute autre sensation’; *Oeuvres complètes*, IV, 1063. Compare Fräbendorf, *Die psychologischen Anschauungen J. J. Rousseaus*, 209. For an account of *sentiment de l’existence* as enjoyment of life, see the discussion in Cooper, *Rousseau*, 22-25.

⁶² ‘Le sentiment de l’existence ... est par lui-même un sentiment précieux de contentement et de paix’ (*Oeuvres complètes* I, 1047).

⁶³ *Emile or On Education*, 215; (‘sur les jugements d’autrui’; *Oeuvres complètes*, IV, 494). See the discussion of this in Neuhouser, *Rousseau*, 83-4, 156.

⁶⁴ For the *Profession de foi* in general, see the notes in Masson, *La Profession de foi du vicar savoyard de Jean Jacques Rousseau. Edition critique*.

⁶⁵ *Emile or On Education*, 39 (‘la conscience de nos sensations’, *Oeuvres complètes* IV, 248).

⁶⁶ *Emile or On Education*, 270. (‘J’existe et j’ai des sens par lesquels je suis affecté. Voilà la première vérité qui me frappe, et à laquelle je suis forcé de’acquiescer. Ai-je un sentiment propre de mon existence, ou ne la sens-je que par mes sensations? Voilà mon premier doute, qu’il m’est, quant à présent, impossible de résoudre. Car étant continuellement affecté de sensations, ou immédiatement, ou par la mémoire, comment puis-je savoir si le sentiment du *moi* est quelque chose hors de ces mêmes sensations, et s’il peut être indépendant d’elles?’; *Oeuvres complètes* IV, 570-71).

⁶⁷ Perkins believes that Rousseau’s question is ‘whether in fact a self *exists* apart from its sensations’ (Perkins, *Concept of Self*, 86; my emphasis). See also Brandt, ‘Rousseau und Kant’s “Ich denke”’, 9.

⁶⁸ See *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, 55: ‘Man’s first sentiment was that of his existence’. (‘Le premier sentiment de l’homme fut celui de son existence’, *Oeuvres complètes* III, 164). Rousseau relates this first sentiment to man’s first concern: his own preservation (‘son premier soin celui de sa conservation’, ibid.).

⁶⁹ *Emile or On Education*, 270. (‘Mes sensations ... me font sentir mon existence’, *Oeuvres complètes* IV, 571).

⁷⁰ *Emile or On Education*, 61 ('Nous naissons capables d'apprendre, mais ne sachant rien, ne connoissant rien. L'ame, enchaînée dans des organes imparfaits et demi-formés, n'a pas même le sentiment de sa propre existence', *Oeuvres complètes* IV, 279-80).

⁷¹ *Emile or On Education*, 42 ('Vivre ... c'est agir; c'est faire usage de nos organes, de nos sens, de nos facultés, de toutes les parties de nous-mêmes, qui nous donnent le sentiment de notre existence', *Oeuvres complètes* IV, 253).

⁷² Compare the brief account in Fräßdorf, *Die psychologischen Anschauungen J. J. Rousseaus*, 209. Manfred Frank's comment on this issue is too one-sided. Frank focuses only on those passages in Rousseau that suggest a distinct feeling of existence. 'Dies ursprüngliche Selbstgefühl, das „j'existe“ zum Gehalt hat, ist von den einzelnen Sinneseindrücken verschieden' (Frank, *Selbstgefühl*, 81).

⁷³ For Rousseau and Buffon, see, for example, Jean Starobinski's study, 'Rousseau and Buffon', in Starobinski, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Transparency and Obstruction*, 323-333.

⁷⁴ 'Être & penser, sont pour nous la même chose, cette vérité est intime & plus qu'intuitive, elle est indépendante de nos sens, de notre imagination, de notre mémoire, & de toutes nos autres facultés relatives' (Buffon, *Oeuvres philosophiques*, 294).

⁷⁵ 'Les animaux ... ont aussi la conscience de leur existence actuelle, mais ils n'ont pas celle de leur existence passée' (Buffon, *Oeuvres philosophiques*, 331).

⁷⁶ 'La conscience de son existence, ce sentiment intérieur qui constitue le *moi*, est composé chez nous de la sensation de notre existence actuelle, & du souvenir de notre existence passée' (Buffon, *Oeuvres philosophiques*, 332).

⁷⁷ *Emile or On Education*, 78. ('C'est à ce second degré que commence proprement la vie de l'individu, c'est alors qu'il prend la conscience de lui-même. La mémoire étend le sentiment de l'identité sur tous les momens de son existence; il devient véritablement un, le même, et par conséquent déjà capable de bonheur ou de misère. Il importe donc de commencer à le considérer ici comme un être moral', *Oeuvres complètes* IV, 301). Compare the brief discussions of this point in Davies, *Conscience as Consciousness*, 74; Perkins, *Concept of Self*, 96; Fräßdorf, *Die psychologischen Anschauungen J. J. Rousseaus*, 208).

⁷⁸ *Emile or On Education*, 283. ('Je sens mon ame, je la connais par le sentiment et par la pensée; je sais qu'elle est, sans savoir quelle est son essence; je ne puis raisonner sur des idées que je n'ai pas. Ce que je sais bien, c'est que l'identité du *moi* ne se prolonge que par la mémoire, et que, pour être le même en effet, il faut que je me souvienne d'avoir été. Or je ne saurais me rappeler, après ma mort ce que j'ai été durant ma vie que je ne me rappelle aussi ce que j'ai senti, par conséquent ce que j'ai fait, et je ne doute point que ce souvenir ne fasse un jour la félicité des bons et le tourment des méchants. Ici-bas mille passions ardentes absorbent le sentiment interne et donnent le change aux remords', *Oeuvres complètes* IV, 590-91).

⁷⁹ *Emile or On Education*, 279; *Oeuvres complètes* IV, 570.

⁸⁰ Reinhard Brandt, too, notes a distinction in Rousseau between the soul or thinking substance and the self. Brandt thinks, however, that this distinction concerns the soul as substance and the self as an active, synthesising force: 'Rousseau setzt an die Stelle der Seele und ihrer Vermögen das "Ich"' (Brandt, 'Rousseau und Kant's "Ich denke"', 10). We will see below, however, that for Rousseau the soul itself is this synthesising active force. As noted above, the distinction Rousseau invokes is an essentially Lockean distinction between the soul as substance whose essence is unknown to us and the moral self which is constituted by consciousness and memory. In ascribing to Rousseau a different distinction between soul and self, Brandt seems to be guided by the idea of a close link between Rousseau and Kant. It appears, however, that Rousseau's thinking here is closer to Locke's than it is to Kant's.

⁸¹ Compare the discussion in Perkins, *Concept of Self*, 96, 106.

⁸² 'Chez nous la mémoire émane de la puissance de réfléchir, car le souvenir que nous avons des choses passées suppose, non seulement ... le renouvellement des nos sensations antérieures, mais encore les comparaisons que notre ame a faites de ces sensations, c'est à dire, les idées qu'elle en a formées. ... C'est notre ame qui établit ces rapports entre les choses, par la comparaison qu'elle fait des unes avec les autres;

c'est elle qui forme la liaison des nos sensations & qui ourdit la trame de nos existences par un fil continu d'idées' (Buffon, *Oeuvres philosophiques*, 333).

⁸³ 'C'est par la puissance de réfléchir qu'a notre ame, & par cette seule puissance que nous sommes certains de nos existences passées & que nous voyons nos existences futures' (Buffon, *Oeuvres philosophiques*, 332).

⁸⁴ *Emile or On Education*, 283. ('Or je ne saurais me rappeler, après ma mort ce que j'ai été durant ma vie que je ne me rappelle aussi ce que j'ai senti, par conséquent ce que j'ai fait, et je ne doute point que ce souvenir ne fasse un jour la félicité des bons et le tourment des méchants.', *Oeuvres complètes IV*, 590-91).

⁸⁵ See especially Henrich, 'Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht', 191; and Brandt, 'Rousseau und Kant's "Ich denke"', 16. Brandt sees 'parallels' between Rousseau's and Kant's notions of the self but he does not claim that Rousseau's remarks on the topic were in any way a decisive influence on Kant.

⁸⁶ *Emile or On Education*, 270. ('Je réfléchis sur les objets de mes sensations, et trouvant en moi la faculté de les comparer, je me sens doué d'une force active que je ne savais pas avoir auparavant', *Oeuvres complètes IV*, 571). Comparative ideas (relational ideas), Rousseau says, are not sensations, 'although my mind produces them only on the occasion of my sensations' (*Emile or On Education*, 271; 'Ces idées comparatives ... ne sont certainement pas des sensations, quoique mon esprit ne les produise qu'à l'occasion de mes sensations', *Oeuvres complètes IV*, 572).

⁸⁷ *Emile or On Education*, 271. ('Ou nous ne sentirions jamais rien hors de nous, ou il y auroit pour nous cinq substances sensibles, dont nous n'aurions nul moyen d'apercevoir l'identité', *Oeuvres complètes IV*, 573).

⁸⁸ *Emile or On Education*, 271. ('Qu'on donne tel ou tel nom à cette force de mon esprit qui rapproche et compare mes sensations; qu'on l'appelle attention, méditation, réflexion, ou comme on voudra; toujours est-il vrai qu'elle est en moi et non dans les choses, que c'est moi seul qui la produis, quoique je ne la produise qu'à l'occasion de l'impression que font sur moi les objets', *Oeuvres complètes IV*, 573).

⁸⁹ *Emile or On Education*, 270. ('La faculté distinctive de l'être actif ou intelligent est de pouvoir donner un sens à ce mot *est*', *Oeuvres complètes IV*, 571).

⁹⁰ Buffon, *Oeuvres philosophiques*, 293.

⁹¹ *Emile or On Education*, 280. ('Une machine ne pense point, il n'y a ni mouvement ni figure qui produise la réflexion ... Nul être matériel n'est actif par lui-même, et moi je le suis. On a beau me disputer cela, je le sens, et ce sentiment qui me parle est plus fort que la raison qui le combat', *Oeuvres complètes IV*, 585).

⁹² Scholars who would like to see a connection between Kant and Rousseau on this point typically emphasise the fact that there is a reference to Rousseau on the self in Kant's lectures on anthropology. That reference, however, relates to the notion of the sentiment of existence and identity, not to the active forces that Rousseau discusses elsewhere. See Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol XXV, 12, for quotations from Rousseau's *Émile* (*Oeuvres complètes IV*, 571 and 590): 'Étant continuellement affecté de sensations, ou immédiatement, ou par la mémoire, comment puis-je savoir si le sentiment du moi est quelque chose hors de ces mêmes sensations, et s'il peut être indépendant d'elles? Rousseau. L'identité du moi ne se prolonge que par la *mémoire*'. See the discussion in Brandt, 'Rousseau und Kant's "Ich denke"', 6-7.

⁹³ For Knutzen, see Thiel, *The Early Modern Subject*, 329-30.

⁹⁴ For example, Rousseau repeats the old argument that materialism cannot account for the unity and individuality of the self. See *Emile or On Education*, 279; *Oeuvres complètes IV*, 584.

⁹⁵ *Emile or On Education*, 280. ('Ils sont sourds ... à la voix intérieure qui leur crie d'un ton difficile à méconnoître', *Oeuvres complètes IV*, 585).

⁹⁶ Of course, other thinkers of the time developed the foundational role of an immediate relating to one's own self in different ways. See for example the discussion of J. B. Mérian in Thiel, *The Early Modern Subject*, 372-76.

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