National and European identity

A study of their meanings and interrelationships

Résumé

On peut distinguer deux conceptions de l'identité nationale, l'une fondée sur le concept d'État-nation, l'autre qui s'appuie plutôt sur des références culturelles, historiques ou ethniques. Partant des données de l'enquête International Social Survey Programme de 2003 relatives à l'identité nationale, l'article cherche à tester la prévalence de ces deux conceptions en Europe de l'Ouest et de l'Est. Les résultats ne corroborent pas l'hypothèse d'une dualité des conceptions de l'identité nationale : les Européens attachent autant d'importance aux dimensions politiques et aux dimensions culturelles de leur identité nationale. Si une distinction peut être faite, c'est plutôt entre les caractéristiques héritées et celles qui sont liées à l'engagement social et politique. Ces formes de participation constituent une composante centrale de l'identité nationale et expliquent la vitalité de l'attachement à la Nation.

The relevance of nation and national identity in present-day Europe

We are faced with a paradox today: on the one side, at the end of the "long Twentieth century", the "age of nationalism" (Rejai, 1991) seems to have come to an end. This applies particularly to Europe. After two devastating World Wars, the inclination to war as a means to dissolve international conflicts seems to have disappeared. National sentiments are eroding all over Western Europe (Dogan, 1994). As a consequence of the breakdown of the communist system, the ominous antagonism between East and West Europe has faded away. Moreover, economic globalization is undermining the political-economic autonomy of nation states seriously; new international governmental and non-governmental actors are gaining influence (Albrow, 1997).

Sociologists have argued that also European integration represents a step toward a wholly new kind of a "cosmopolitan", tolerant and multicultural political community (Giddens, 1991; Habermas, 1998; Beck and Grande, 2004).

Yet, other events and trends lead to a less optimistic view about the disappearance of nationalistic, destructive and aggressive forces. First, the events after the dissolution of the communist bloc showed that nationalistic senti-
ments are still very powerful forces not only in Europe, but also in many other parts of the world (Spohn, 2003). Second, in some West European countries with significant internal economic and cultural subdivisions—such as Belgium—the preservation of state unity is an open question. Within these and other internally heterogeneous states (such as Spain, Great Britain and Italy), we can observe persistent conflicts between the dominant and subordinate ethnic-national groups or between central governments and regional movements (Keating, 2004). Third, a massive labour immigration led to the emergence of sizable new minorities in many of the rich West and North European countries. The rise of new right-wing parties in many European countries is partly a reaction to this immigration.

Thus, the phenomena of ethnic and national revival in East-Europe are not only aftermaths of processes which have occurred in more advanced regions in earlier centuries. Regionalistic and secession movements often are initiated by the highly developed regions (e.g., the more developed states Slovenia and Croatia, Northern Italy, Bask and Catalan provinces, Wales and Scotland); their activists and leaders are well-educated people.

Seen from a general point of view, it might not be true that there exists a contradiction between the aims connected with national unity and identity, and the issues traditionally central to sociological theorizing and research, such as social inequality and justice. The successful realization of social movements which often aim toward a more equal distribution of rights and opportunities between centers and peripheries, typically presupposes the inclusion of national sentiments and issues (Vogler, 1985; Blomert et al., 1993; Ailon-Souday and Kunda, 2003). This may also apply to West Europe. Here, social unrest becomes evident particularly among deprived social groups including a strong ethnic component. The violent uprisings in many French cities in November 2005 were led by young, second- or third-generation immigrants assimilated to French culture, but deprived in terms of access to the labour force and societal inclusion.

Conceptual and theoretical considerations

Modernity, the nation-state, and national identity. The predominant approach

National identity is a phenomenon which must be analysed at the three levels: at the level of the individual person, the political system and the ideological level (Haller, 1992, 1999; on nationalism in general, see Estel, 2002; Leoussi and Grosby, 2004; Kunze, 2005). Here, we are investigating mainly individual attitudes. A central argument of this paper is, however, that even in analyses at this level the effects of the other two have to be considered carefully.

At the level of the individual, the social-psychological aspect of ethnic and national identity is at issue. Here, nationalism is often considered as a
concomitant of modernization. Since traditional social groups and institutions, such as kinship, the village, religious and other communities, have been weakened or dissolved, identification with the nation can provide a substitute (Esser, 1988). Modern societies are characterized as "risk societies" (Beck, 1986). In situations of uncertainty and multiple choices, the notion of "ontological trust" becomes particularly important (Giddens, 1991). Individuals today have to face many decision situations during their course of life since it is much less structured by institutionally fixed patterns. In highly mobile and rapidly changing modern societies, identity in general becomes a central issue of the individual (Weigert et al., 1986; Scheff, 1990). The question is: which role is played by the anchoring of an individual in a certain nation state today compared to other facets of political affiliation (such as local attachments on the one side, and a European or cosmopolitan identity on the other side)? Can national identity provide a man or woman with some of the basic trust which is an important element of a mature personality (Erikson, 1950)?

Here, the answer of the theorists in this tradition goes as follows: ethnic and national identity and feelings are only a kind of negative reactions to processes of modernization. They arise particularly in those persons and among those social groups (often also denoted as "losers of modernisation") who are not able to come to grips with these processes. By focusing their social bonds and political emotions on ethnic and national units, they try to find personal support and emotional anchoring in a fast changing, impersonal world. They are unable to identify with ongoing social change and humanity as a whole, to establish farther-ranging, "modern" social ties.

Turning to the level of political system, we can define the modern nation-state (following Weber, 1964) as "a set of institutionalized forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence" (Giddens, 1985, p. 121; Anderson, 1991). The political-administrative unity of a state cannot exist as such alone, but must represent also a kind of "cultural community". Only in this case, a satisfying level of mutual trust and internal communication can take place between governments and people and between the members of a nation (Deutsch, 1966). From this point of view, a nation-state is a "conceptual community in a way in which (earlier) territorial states were not" (Giddens, 1985, p. 219). We would argue further that a state in order to become a nation must involve also a certain degree of emotional attachment of its elites and citizens ("patriotism"). Thus, we have here an important positive aspect of national identity.

The relevance of this aspect is corroborated by the fact that also the European Union is aiming toward the development of such an attachment of its citizens. In the 1992 Maastricht Treaty for the European Union, the concept of "European identity" has been mentioned explicitly in several paragraphs. The refusal of the new Constitution for Europe by the citizens of France and the Netherlands in 2005 has been interpreted by many as a sign that such a European identity is still missing.
The third level concerns nationalism as an ideology (Lemberg, 1964; Kohn, 1968; Rejai, 1991). This aspect of the modern state contains the idea of a specific historical mission of a nation, a justification of its coming into existence, a certain interpretation of its past actions and experiences (including the painful ones), of its territorial anchoring and cultural uniqueness, a legitimation of its mission for the future. Intellectuals, historians, literary writers and political leaders contribute to create a national ideology, history and mythology in this sense (Haller, 1996). The appeal to national unity and strength serves the purpose of advancing common national interests, also in the present-day age of globalization.

In order to come to terms with this issue, we have to look more closely at the ideology of nationalism. The exponents of the approach sketched out before argue that national identity and nationalism today, in the era of globalisation, are outdated phenomena (Anderson, 1991, p. 141; see also Schöpflin, 2000, p. 3 ff.). Nation states are losing their independance and autonomy, and nationalism more and more must be considered as a backward, even reactionary ideology. Its normative appeal has definitely been destroyed by the aberration into fascism.

We would like to argue, however, that nationalism is not only fundamentally different from fascism, but is also quite differentiated within itself. We must distinguish here between at least three forms: formative nationalism, aiming at the founding of new nations; prestige nationalism, trying to improve the power and status of existing nations; and expansive or aggressive nationalism, aiming at increasing the power of the nation by aggressive, military means, as it was the case in the form of imperialism (Rejai, 1991, p. 25 ff.). In present-day Europe, all these forms were and are still alive and active. The first has already been mentioned; it was most effective after the breakdown of the communist systems in Central and East Europe.

The second is still relevant both at the level of the single nation states and at the level of the European Union. It has been stated that the European unification was a means to "rescue the power of the nation states" (Milward, 1992). This was true in particular for France and Germany. They were relegated to the status of second-order world powers as a consequence of their defeats in the Second World War and/or the loss of their colonial empires afterwards. In Germany, participation in European integration to a large degree is seen as a substitute for the lost national identity and pride (Haller, 1999).

From this point of view, the emergence of the European Union can be seen as an attempt to establish a new type of nation, maybe even a "supra-nation" (Galtung, 1973). For this aim, it has developed its own symbols of national identity like the flag, the hymn, the motto and the Day of Europe. An European identity is expected to be developed in particular as a consequence of a common foreign and defense policy. Moreover, one could argue that the European Union also follows the model of "expansive nationalism", albeit in a peaceful form. So far, it avoids meticulously to define clear territorial
boundaries of “Europe”, but declares that the access to the Union is open to every European nation which respects its basic values.

Thus, there exists a clear indication of the relevance of national identity at all three levels of political units. Even regional or sub-national ethnic and nationalistic movements in Europe often appeal to the European Union and try to form alliances with its political bodies (particularly the Commission and the Parliament) in order to promote their aims against the governments of their nation states (Blaschke, 1980; Keating, 2004).

Out of these general considerations, we can develop a few concrete hypotheses regarding the meaning, correlates and determinants of national and European identity.

Hypotheses on the components of national identity and their relation to European identity

What does “national identity” mean? Which components does it have? Referring to the relevant literature on identity (Weigert et al., 1986), we might distinguish between three elements: 1) a self-image, a consciousness of the specific characteristics of one’s own nation, its strengths and weaknesses compared to others (the cognitive component); 2) a certain kind of love for and attachment to the nation, including national pride and shame (these are both primarily emotional components); 3) the readiness to act on behalf of the nation and to support political measures to strengthen and protect the nation (the action component).

In this paper, we will focus on the first two, namely, the ideas and images about the central components of a “nation” and the relation between the attachment to the state-nation compared with that toward lower, sub-national political units (such as regions, provinces, cities and communities) as well as with Europe as a whole. The research questions are: what are the central components of national identity in the minds of the general public? Are they compatible with the aim of the European Union to develop a “European identity” among the citizens of its member states? How strong is the attachment to “Europe” compared with that toward the lower-level political communities, in particular, the nation state? Let us first look more closely at the meaning of the concept of “national identity”.

The concepts of “state-nation” versus “ethno-cultural nation”

Historians of nationalism (Meineke, 1928; Lemberg, 1964; Kohn, 1968) have often juxtaposed two models concerning the self-image or self-consciousness of a state-nation and its citizens; this distinction has been recently also taken up by sociologists and political scientists (Smith, 1991; Brubaker, 1992; Münkler, 1996; Wodak et al., 1998). 1) The concept of “state-nation” means that membership in a nation is based primarily on
political criteria, especially citizenship; everybody who gets the citizenship (say, by his birth in a country) is regarded as a full member of the nation; Switzerland, France, and the United States are seen as examples for this conception. 2) The concept of “ethno-nation” or “culture-nation” means that members of a nation should have their roots in the generations that have lived in the nation’s territory and share its customs and culture (e.g., language, religion) since childhood. One of the constitutional elements connected with this concept is the *ius sanguinis* which means that the prerequisite for becoming a citizenship is that also the parents have been citizens. Seen from this perspective, it seems nearly impossible to change one’s “nationhood” during a lifetime; this can be effected only over the course of generations. Germany is often quoted as an example for such a concept. In fact, people in Poland or Russia who can prove that their ancestors were of German origin, are entitled to immigrate and get German citizenship. On the other side, it is uncommon for the several millions of guest-workers, now often living for decades in Germany, to become German citizens (Heckmann, 1992; Brubaker, 1992).

The distinction between the political or state-nation and ethnic-cultural concept includes also a normative component: it is assumed that the first is a more universal, progressive and “modern” form, while the latter is more traditional and conservative. In this vein, already Alexis de Tocqueville ([1835]1947) has distinguished between “natural” or “traditional patriotism”, based on feelings of connectedness with the place of birth and traditional customs, veneration of ancestors and glorification of the past; and “rational patriotism”, unfolding due to the laws and growing in a person only by exercising social and political rights, and merging with his/her personal interests (see also Miller, 2000; Spohn, 2003). Given the ethnic-cultural diversity of Europe, an implication of this distinction would be that European integration and the development of a new “European identity” is compatible only with the rational-political, but not with the ethnic-cultural conception of the nation. The following two hypotheses are set forth in this regard:

*Hypothesis 1:* In general, we will find two different concepts of nationhood among the respondents: one pointing to the concept of the “state-nation”, stressing citizenship and loyalty to the political institutions, another pointing to the concept of “ethnic or culture nation” stressing national ancestorship and life-long acquaintance with the customs and the culture (language, religion, etc.) of the respective nation. To the degree that the latter conception is found, European integration and the development of a European identity will be impeded.

The following hypothesis is formulated concerning the prevalence of the two concepts among different groups of the population and in different types of nations:

*Hypothesis 2:* The state-nation concept will be more prevalent a) among persons and population groups which are more open to modern developments, such as younger and better educated persons, persons in more qualified occupational positions, persons leaning toward left parties, and less religious
persons; b) in more highly developed nations; in nations whose citizenship law is based on the *ius soli*; in nations which are more differentiated internally in ethnic and religious terms; and in nations which did not experience the political communist system. The concept of the ethno-cultural nation, *vice versa*, should be more prevalent in the opposite cases, that is, among the older and less educated, persons in less qualified occupational positions, persons who are more religious and politically more conservative; in macro terms, it should be more prevalent among less developed, ethnically and culturally more homogeneous nations and in former communist nations.

*The prevalence of different concepts of nation in different parts of Europe*

Some authors consider the distinction between the two concepts of state-nation also as a historical sequence. The German historian Theodor Schieder (1964) has related the concepts of state-nation *versus* ethno-cultural nation to the rise of nationalism in Europe. He notes that the old system of states in Europe has been constituted by high nobility which was truly European and international. Beginning with the XV*th* century, the rise of national languages and cultures can be observed. The birth of the modern nation, however, took place through the British and French revolutions of the XVII*th* and XVIII*th* centuries; here, the state is created by the political elites, the identification of the citizens follows step by step. A closely circumscribed territory, a state oriented toward the *volonté générale* (Rousseau), the “third estate” or people (*Volk*) as the ultimate sovereign are the new characteristics of this state. Citizens have been born on the state’s territory, independent of blood, ancestry or estate. In the second stage of nation-building in Europe, the XIX*th* century, nation-building occurs in processes of unification of hitherto divided territories and peoples into larger, homogeneous nations. Now, language determines who belongs to a nation; Germany and Italy are paradigmatic examples. In this stage, writers, historians and other intellectuals (like Herder and Fichte in Germany, Mazzini in Italy) have played a decisive role to define the true “spirit” *Volksgeist* of a people or nation (Haller, 1996). In the third stage of nation building in Europe, in the late XIX*th* and XX*th* centuries, the continued existence of the multinational empires in East and South East Europe (Austria-Hungary, Russia, Ottoman Empire) was decisive. National consciousness in these cases was aroused against these empires which were characterized as “people’s prisons”. Many of these efforts were successful after First World War when the leading political elites of these empires were defeated. However, also the new “nation states” established in the early 1920ies (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union) remained political units with large minorities or heterogeneous populations. Therefore, their dissolution after 1989 and the establishment of many new small nation states may be considered as the ultimate victory of the principle of national self-determination and homogeneity in Europe.

A further distinction is made by Uri Ra’anan (1991). In addition to the Western principle of national identity, based on the *ius soli*, and the Eastern
principle, based on the *ius sanguinis*, ancestry and ethnic-cultural characteristics, he sees a Southern European principle where religion is a basic characteristic of national identity. Its origins lie in the Ottoman institution of *millet* within which the subjugated peoples could enjoy some degree of religious and civil autonomy.

A short note on the concept of “Europe” may be in order at this point. We are very critical of the equation of “Europe” with “European Union” as it is more and more done in public discourse. Yet, Europe is a much broader concept than that of the European Union. Geographers, historians and others have characterized Europe as a cultural unit long before the European Community was established (Pomian, 1990; Kaelble, 1987; Jordan, 1988). The European Union is a rather “young” political Unit, Europe as a whole was never united politically. Still today, the European Union does not include all “European” nations, particularly in the East, but also in the West (Norway, Switzerland). A particular case in this regard is Russia. From the viewpoint of the history of civilization, its belonging to Europe has been a contested issue. Criteria which cannot be used to exclude Russia from Europe include its ethnic-linguistic character (Slavic language) and its orthodox religion. A historic difference has been the 200-years long period of Mongolic domination in the Middle Age, and the geographic extension of present-day Russia till the Far East (Halecki, 1950; Bagby, 1976). We think, however, that the European character of present-day Russia (at least its core “Western” part till the Ural mountains where about two-thirds of its population are living) cannot be denied. Therefore, we included Russia in our analysis which compares countries throughout Europe as a whole (1).

Out of these considerations, we can formulate the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 3:** We will find two or three different concepts of national identity in Europe; the state-nation concept will be prevalent in the West, and the ethnic-cultural concept will be prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe; a sub-variant of this concept will exist in South Europe, stressing the importance of religion as an element of national identity.

**The relation between national and European identity**

The final issue to be investigated in this paper concerns the relationship between local, national and European identities. Here, we can distinguish between three types of attitudes and persons: “Localists”, who are active mainly at the levels of neighborhoods, towns, provinces and regions; “Nationalists” or “Patriots”, who focus on the nation-state in their interests, attachments and activities; and *Europeans*, whose identity is focusing on “Europe”, rejecting localism, regionalism or nationalism as conservative, outdated attitudes. Following the logic of the aforementioned authors, the following hypothesis can be put forward concerning the relation between these different attitudes:

(1) In a future analysis, one could distinguish between the different macro-regions of Russia.
Hypothesis 4: We can distinguish three clusters of attitudes and types of people or groups concerning their primary unit or level of attachment: Localists, that is people who are oriented mainly to their neighborhood, village, town or province; nationalists or patriots who are oriented mainly to the nation state; and Europeans who identify themselves mainly with Europe. There will be a negative correlation between local and national identity on the one side and European identity on the other side. A prevalent European identification will be found in particular among higher educated, mobile and universally-minded people.

Data sources, countries compared and methods of analysis

The data presented in this paper have been collected within the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). ISSP is a continuing project of comparative social scientific research, established in 1984/85. It now comprises research institutes in about 40 countries around the world. Its intent is to supplement regular national social science surveys by an international part which collects strictly comparable survey data. Each year a different module is fielded; modules are replicated usually at about 5 to 7 year intervals. Countries are obliged to carry out well-selected representative samples of the adult population (2). Sample size is in most countries around 1,000; in East Germany it was about 400; in France, Norway and Portugal between 1,500 and 1,700, in Russia 2,383. When we compare country distributions, the data have been weighted by using the country-specific weights; in this way it is assured that the samples are representative for the adult population of each country. For the regression analyses, the raw data have been used because they give more accurate coefficients.

The topic “National Identity” has first been surveyed in 1995 and replicated in 2003 (3). It contains six sections covering the following topics: 1) feeling of closeness to different territorial units (commune, city, province/region, nation-state, continent—which, in this case, is equal to Europe); 2) characteristics considered as being important for a member of one’s own nation; 3) a series of statements trying to capture patriotic, nationalistic and chauvinistic attitudes; 4) national pride in general and in ten different dimensions as well as measures considered as necessary to protect one’s own

(2) For more information see Davis and Jowell (1989); http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/issp.
(3) Each module is first developed by a drafting group. The drafting group for the module “National identity I” included the United States, The Philippines, Hungary and Italy; the chair of the group was the first author of this paper, as representative of Austria. The drafting group for the module “National identity II” which is to a large part a replication of the first module, included Spain as convenor (Juan Diez-Medrano as chair), Bulgaria, Great Britain, Hungary, Norway, Portugal, United States.
nation; 5) attitudes toward ethnic minorities and immigrants. Most of these topics were formulated as statements with a four or five point answer scale.

In *National identity II* (2003), the data set which we are using here, 34 nations participated, including the following 21 European countries:

- West and Central Europe: Great Britain, Ireland, France, Germany and Austria; Germany is differentiated in our analysis into two cases, West and East Germany (the latter comprising the five new *Bundesländer* which formerly were part of the GDR); and Switzerland as a non-member of the European Union;
- North Europe: Denmark, Finland and Sweden; and Norway as non-member of the European Union;
- East Europe (former communist countries): Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia; and Bulgaria and Russia as non-members of the European Union;
- South Europe: Spain and Portugal.

Thus, we have a representative coverage of all the 3 or 4 main areas of Europe distinguished in hypothesis 2. In Bulgaria and Latvia, one relevant question was not included; in some analyses we will have, therefore, only 19 cases. Prior analyses of these data sets include Jones and Smith (2001a, 2001b).

In the data analysis, we use factor analysis to prove if the proposed basic dimensions—the state- *versus* ethno-cultural concept of nation—do exist in the minds of the people. Multilevel regression analysis is used for investigating the determinants of the affinity to the one or the other of these dimensions. The multilevel analysis is the appropriate method here since we assume that both individual and macro level variables or characteristics are important (on this method see, for instance, Goldstein, 1995; Hadler, 2004).

**Empirical findings**

Let us now have a look at the empirical findings concerning our three hypotheses. First, we present the findings relevant for the concept of nation and national identity, then those related to the differences between European macro-regions, and, finally, those concerning the relations between local-regional, national and European identity.

**Concepts of nation and national identity**

Our first hypothesis was related to the issue how a nation is conceived. The main question is if we can distinguish between the concept of a state-nation on the one side, and that of an ethno- or culture-nation on the other side. In the survey, the following item battery was developed to capture this dimen-
sion (4) (in parenthesis, we indicate the theoretical dimension to which the items belong).

"Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [nationality corresponding to country]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is...

(very important/fairly important/not very important/not important at all/can't choose):

a. to have been born in [country] → (Theoretical Concept)
b. to have [country nationality] citizenship → (state-nation)
c. to have lived in [country] for most of one's life → (state-nation)
d. to be able to speak [country language] → (ethno-cultural nation)
e. to be a [Christian] → (ethno-cultural nation)
f. to respect [country nationality] political institutions and laws → (state-nation)
g. to feel as [country nationality] ancestry. » → (ethno-cultural or state-nation)
h. to have [country nationality] ancestry. » → (ethno-cultural nation)

Items a – c and f can be allocated to the state-nation concept because they concern the political aspects of nation membership (citizenship, respect institutions) or are related to the ius soli (have been born in, have lived long in...). Items d, e and h indicate the ethno-cultural concept since they include cultural aspects (language, religion) or the ethnic origin (ancestry). Item g (feel as...) may be somewhat ambiguous.

As a straightforward way to test our hypothesis, factor analyses of this item battery were carried out. It is well known from comparative research that the results of factor analyses can vary by countries. In order to control for this, all analyses were carried out separately for each country, as well as for the whole sample. We shall show the general results as well as those for the individual countries.

Hypothesis 1 stated that two different concepts of nation and national identity should exist: The first one pointing to the concept of "state-nation", the second to that of "culture-nation". The findings of factor analysis show that this is definitely not the case (see Table I): In the whole sample, as well as in 13 out of the 19 country cases (5), 2 dimensions did emerge but they do not coincide with hypothesis 1; in the other 7 cases, only 1 factor came out. How do these factors look like?

(4) In Bulgaria and Latvia item h ancestry was not included; so, we cannot compare these two countries with the others when we consider this item battery as a whole.

(5) In the factor analysis (without item h) for Bulgaria one factor and for Latvia two factors emerge.
### Table I. – Factor analysis of items relating to different concepts of national identity (factor loadings)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Total Sample*</th>
<th>Subsample with one factor**</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Important : to have been born in [country]</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Important : to have [country nationality] citizenship</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Important : to have lived in [country] for most of one’s life</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>d) Important : to be able to speak [country language]</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>e) Important : to be a [religion]</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.53</td>
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<tr>
<td>f) Important : to respect [country nationality] political institutions and laws</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Important : to feel [country nationality]</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) Important : to have [country nationality] ancestry</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explained variance (in %)</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>48.9</td>
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</table>

*Method:* Principal component analysis. Varimax with Kaiser normalization.

*19 European countries (N=23,309)** Spain, Portugal, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Russia

*Source:* ISSP-2003 "National identity II".

Two items show high loadings in Factor 1: “born in a country” and “have national ancestry”; in addition, the factor includes items c (“having lived for long time in the country”) and e (“being a Christian”). Factor 2 comprises two items with high loadings: “speak the language of a country” and “respect its institutions and laws”. Two items –citizenship and feeling as a co-national– seem to be quite ambiguous since they load on both factors. Thus, the neat theoretical distinction between political items on the one side (citizenship, respect institution) and ethno-cultural items on the other side (ancestry, language, religion) does not come out at all (see also Jones and Smith, 2001a, for similar results).

This is also proved if we look at results of the factor analyses for the single countries. In 13 of the 19 cases, 2 factors emerged. If we look at the specific items, making up the factors, we can see (Synopsis I): The 3 most frequent items significant for Factor 1 are “born in the country”, “lived long in the country” and “national ancestry”. Next come the items “religion” and “citizenship”. Thus, also here items from both theoretically hypothesized dimensions (state-nation versus ethno-cultural nation) are included. Factor 2 includes most frequently the item “respect the institutions and laws of the nation”; then, the items “speak the national language” and “feel as a member of the nation” follow.
**SYNOPSIS 1.** Elements of citizenship in 13 European countries (items with high loadings in the factor analysis)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st component</th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>Ire</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G-W</th>
<th>G-E</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Fin</th>
<th>Sw</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>Slo</th>
<th>NFL**</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born in [country]</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have citizenship</td>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived in [country]</td>
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<td>Speak [country language]</td>
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<td>Feel [country nationality]</td>
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<td>Have ancestry</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* ■■ Factor loading higher than 0.80.
  ■ Factor loading 0.6 – 0.79.
** Number of high factor loadings.


Again we see that Hypothesis 1 is clearly disproved by the data. The respondents in the countries investigated do not differentiate between a state-nation and a culture-nation concept. The concept of “nationhood” comprises everywhere at the same time political, cultural and emotional components to a stronger or lesser degree. This fact turns out most clearly when we look at those seven countries, where all the items loaded on only one factor (see Table I). The most important, highly loading items in this overall factor are birth and long residence in a country, citizenship, language, feeling country nationality and ancestry.

It seems that the two dimensions which came out in the majority of the countries can be interpreted in a quite different, but meaningful way. We can see here a distinction between more ascribed characteristics or aspects assigned to a person by the external circumstances (have been born and grown up in the country, member of the dominant religion) and the more functional or action-related components of citizenship. In fact, it is a characteristic of both the items “respect the institutions and laws” and “speak the dominant national language” that these can be acquired by anybody and are related to actual behaviour. On
the other side, it is evident that ancestry and the place of birth are characteristics which cannot be changed or will not be changed normally but are given once and for ever. From this point of view, even citizenship can be considered as a characteristic which has an ascribed quality for most people.

We might argue also from a normative point of view that it may be legitimate for a nation to use also “ascribed” characteristics in this regard for granting citizenships. There exists a famous historic example—in fact the country which invented the principle of democracy. When Athens got its first citizenship law in 451 B.C., under the initiative of Perikles, it was decreed that in the future only all those would be citizens of Athens whose both parents were such citizens. By this law, citizenship became at the same time more exclusive but also more democratic and egalitarian; also poor people could attain full citizenship ( Ehrenberg, 1973; Spahn, 2000).

Further evidence for the lack of a clear distinction between the two concepts of “state-nation” versus “ethno-cultural nation” turns out if we look at the distribution of the answers to the single items (Figure I). Four characteristics are considered as the most important for being a true member of a nation: The mastery of the nation’s language, the feeling as a member of the nation (two items that one would classify as belonging to an ethno-national or cultural concept), citizenship and respecting the institutions of the country (two items referring to the “state-nation” concept). Between 85 and 90% of the respondents consider all these as “very important” or “important” for national identity. But also the items “have been born in” and “have lived long in the country” are considered as being important by three-fourths of the respondent; 62% consider “ancestry” as important.

**Figure I.** The relative importance of different criteria for membership in a nation among the public in 19 European countries (in %)

The only criterion not considered as important by a majority is religion ("to be a Christian"). This is a clear indication that the secularization process has gone quite far in Europe, implying—among other things—a definite distinction between the state and nation on the one side, and religious membership and participation on the other side in the minds of the people (Höllinger, 1996; Greeley, 2003).

*Individual and macro-level determinants of the two concepts of national identity*

In our second hypothesis, we have argued that the state-nation concept will be more prevalent among those persons and social groups which can be considered as being more open to modern developments, such as the young, the well educated, persons in higher positions, and less religious and politically more "progressive" persons. Also the macro characteristics (see Table IV) of a country should have some effects; the state-nation concept should be more prevalent among the more highly developed and more heterogeneous nations, among nations with the *ius soli* and among nations which did not experience communism.

Now, even if the analysis has shown that the distinction between the state-nation and the ethnic-cultural nation does not come out as it was hypothesised, we might nevertheless try to see if these hypotheses can be proved. We computed two indices for a "state-nation" and an "ethno-cultural nation orientation". The first included the items "citizenship" and "respect institutions and laws", and the second the items "national ancestry", "religion" and "speaking the national language". The reliability of these scales was satisfying from the statistical point of view (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.69$ for the first, and 0.56 for the second).

Table II shows the results of the analysis. As far as the determinants of a state-nation concept are concerned, we can see a considerable number of significant effects at the individual level. Such an orientation is more frequent among women; among the older and the less educated; among persons not working and persons in lower status occupations; among members of all three Christian denominations (Catholics, Protestants and Orthodox) compared to non-members of a church; among those with a conservative or rightist political orientation; and among those whose parents have been citizens. These findings are rather surprising and clearly contradict our hypotheses. The support of a state-nation concept is not more frequent among those population groups which can be considered as being more "progressive" but rather among the more traditional social groups.

At the macro level, the following country characteristics are significant: people are leaning more toward the state-nation concept if they live in countries with the *ius soli*. In dominantly catholic countries the state-nation concept is less important whereas in dominantly orthodox countries, the state-nation concept is more important. In countries with few foreigners the state-nation concept is less important than in countries with a higher proportion of foreigners. No effect comes from the level of socioeconomic development.
Here, we can say that some results correspond to our hypotheses but others again are disproved.

**Table II. – Multilevel regression analysis of state-nation-concept and cultural nation-concept in 19 European countries (very important – not important at all)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State-nation concept A</th>
<th>Ethno-cultural nation concept B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Micro indicators</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (1 = male, 2 = female)</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
<td>-0.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age  (^c)</td>
<td>-0.14*</td>
<td>-0.22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (0 = no formal education, 5 = university)</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status (1 = employed, 2 = not employed)</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational position (1 = higher (^d), 2 = else)</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance (1 = several times a week, 8 = never)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion - Catholic (1 = cath, 2 = else)</td>
<td>0.13*</td>
<td>0.25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Protestant (1 = prot, 2 = else)</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Orthodox (1 = orth, 2 = else)</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation - left (1 = left, 2 = else)</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- right (1 = right, 2 = else)</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship parents (1 = both parents, 2 = one parent, 3 = no parent)</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Macro indicators</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (in PPS)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of nation for citizenship (1 = ius sanguinis, 2 = mixed or ius soli)</td>
<td>-0.21*</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic-linguistic homogeneity (homogeneous-heterogeneous)</td>
<td>-0.22*</td>
<td>-0.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of Catholicism (^b)</td>
<td>-0.09*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of Orthodoxy</td>
<td>0.15*</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of foreigners (low-high)</td>
<td>-0.18*</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of residence for granting citizenship (4 years-12 years)</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post communist country (1 = yes, 2 = no)</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Square microlevel</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Square macrolevel</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((N))</td>
<td>(20,743)</td>
<td>(20,197)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant effects \((p < 0.05)\).

\(^a\) State-nation \((2 = \text{very important}, 8 = \text{not important at all})\): a) Important: to have \([\text{country nationality}]\) citizenship, b) Important: to respect \([\text{country nationality}]\) political institutions and laws.

\(^b\) Cultural-nation \((3 = \text{very important}, 12 = \text{not important at all})\): a) Important: to be able to speak \([\text{country language}]\), b) Important: to be a \([\text{religion}]\), c) Important: To have \([\text{country nationality}]\) ancestry


\(^d\) Higher position = ISO 88 1110-4223

\(^e\) Categories = 1: more than 70%, 2: 30-69%, 3: less than 30%. Three macro-indicators for religion were analyzed; because of the statistical problem of over-determination, one of them (Protestantism) has to be excluded in these regression models.

What about the determinants of the ethno-cultural concept of the nation? It is rather surprising, that—at least at the individual level—practically the same variables are significant and have similar effects as in the case of the state-nation concept. That is, also here the older, the less educated and so forth are more supporting the concept. In addition to the effects valid in the other dimension, here also the occupational position (persons in higher positions are less inclined to this concept), and a leftist political orientation (reducing the support for this concept) are significant. Furthermore, the effect of personal church affiliation is stronger. In this case, most of the findings are in accordance with our theoretical expectations.

At the macro level, only two country characteristics have a significant effect on the preference of an ethnic- or culture-nation concept: if the country is heterogeneous in ethnic-linguistic terms, people are more inclined to this concept, and the same is true if the laws of a country prescribe a long duration of residence for foreigners before they can become citizens. Again, the socioeconomic level of development of a country has no effect.

The conclusion from these findings is straightforward and they corroborate our results in the foregoing section: it is clearly not true that the concepts of the state-nation and that of the ethnic or cultural-nation can be distinguished from each other in a way which sees the former as a modern, progressive, and the latter as a traditional, maybe outdated concept. Rather, both concepts can be found among the same population groups. Their preponderance is also not related to structural characteristics of the countries investigated in the expected way. People in more differentiated nations are inclined more to the cultural concept of nation than to the state-nation concept. A clear falsification of the predominant theory of national identity can also be seen in the fact that socioeconomic progress as such has no effect on the prevailing concepts of national identity. People in the most advanced West European nations are not tending more to the state-nation concept than those in the less developed nations; people in the latter, vice versa, are not thinking about the state-nation only in ethno-cultural terms.

*Do the concepts of nation vary among different macro regions of Europe?*

Our third hypothesis was related to the question if the perception of the most important dimensions of national membership and identity varies between the different countries and macro-regions of Europe. Can we find here some indications that there might exist different concepts of nation as outlined in hypothesis 2?

Partial answers to this question can already be given at the basis of the findings presented so far. The factor analyses have shown that in 7 out of the 21 country cases compared, the population did not distinct at all between the state-nation and ethno-cultural concept of the nation. The multivariate analysis of the determinants of these 2 concepts did give some indications for the thesis that in different European countries different concepts of national identity may be prevailing. People in catholic countries are supporting less frequently the
state-nation concept, in orthodox countries people support it more frequently; the latter is also true for people in countries with the *ius soli*.

As a more direct approach to this question, let us look at the distribution of the responses to the single items concerning the characteristics of a co-national. First, we look at the two most pronounced indicators for the concept of a "state-nation" (according to conventional theory).

As far as *citizenship* as a characteristic of a member of a nation is concerned, we see first, that this item is considered as fundamental throughout Europe. If we add the two positive categories, 85% agree that it is important; the variations between the countries are not large: they go from about 70% in Latvia and Slovakia up to about 90% in Austria, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, Portugal and Spain. The same is shown when we look at the mean values, assigning 1 to "very important" and 4 to "not important at all" (see Figure II): The aggregate mean value is 1.7, corresponding to the answer category "agree". As the list of countries mentioned before shows, there exists neither a distinction between West and former communist East, nor between North and South Europe. The variations between the countries are larger if we look only at the answer category "very important": The percentage of this is highest in Austria (63%) — thus disproving clearly that this is (at least in the eyes of the general population) a typical *ius sanguinis*-country like Germany (6) and lowest in Spain (37%) and Slovakia (33%). Again, the distribution of the answers does not produce any clear country pattern in terms of levels of socioeconomic development, political history (communist period or not) or dominant religion (Protestant vs. Catholic vs. Orthodox Christianity).

The populations interviewed are also quite unanimous as far as the item "*to respect the institutions and laws of a country*" as a criterion for being a true member of a nation is concerned. Overall, 48% consider this as a "very important" and some more 40% as an "important" characteristic for being a member of a nation. Here, some systematic differences emerge between different groups of countries. In Scandinavia (with the exception of Finland), this item is considered as being very important, in the post-communist countries (with the exception of Bulgaria), it is usually considered as being less important; the other West and Central European countries stay in the middle (with the exception of France, where it is considered as very important, and Ireland where it is less important). East Germans attribute significant lower importance to this item than the West Germans. The interpretation of this finding seems straightforward: as a consequence of nearly half a century rule of communism, with lack of real democratic rights and freedoms, and a considerable amount of state and party control of public life, trust in state and public authorities has significantly been undermined.

Let us also look shortly at two items belonging to the ethnic or cultural concept of nation. We have already seen that the item "*To be able to speak the

(6) For the reasons for the significant difference between Germany and Austria in this regard see Haller et al. (1996, pp. 463 ff.); Kindermann (2003).
language" is considered as the most important among all; the mean value is 1.5, that lies exactly between "very important" and "important". The inspection of the distribution of this item by countries shows that it is considered as highly important in practically all countries, with only a few exceptions. One is Ireland with a rather low mean value of 2.7, another one Spain (mean value 1.9). Both cases can be explained easily: in Ireland, the language is no distinctive national characteristic, it is shared with Great Britain, a nation which dominated Ireland for centuries. In addition, British domination of Ireland has led to the extinction of the original Irish-Gaelic language. In Spain, there are important sub-national groups—particularly Bask and Catalans—who do not share the dominant Spanish language.

Partly a reverse pattern shows itself in the truly ethno-national item "to have national ancestors". This item, by and large, is supported more in post-communist East Europe, but also in the South (or in the "Catholic" Europe), than in the West and North. The approval is highest in Ireland, Spain and Portugal, and in Hungary, Poland and Russia (mean values below 2.0). It is lowest in Great Britain, Sweden, Finland, France, Germany, Switzerland, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic (mean values 2.4 and less). Thus, here we see a weak indication of a dividing line between Central, West and North Europe on the one side, and South and East Europe on the other side; there exist exceptions from this rule, however.

Let us look more shortly also at the other items. "To have been born in" is more frequently considered as being important by Portuguese, Spanish and Irish people, as well as by the Bulgarians, Poles and Russians; it is considered as being least important by the West Germans, the Swiss (in contrast to the ius soli, valid in Switzerland) and the Swedes. A comparable pattern emerges in the item "Having lived long in the country": this is approved most in Bulgaria and Russia, and least in Germany, Switzerland, Finland and Sweden. "(Christian) religion" is approved much less in all countries (41% consider it as "very important" or "important"). However, 30-40% of the Russians, Bulgarians and Irish, and between 20 and 30% of Austrians, Hungarians, Slovaks, and Portuguese consider it as "very important". On the other side, this is the case only for less than 10% of the population in three Scandinavian countries and Latvia, in France and East Germany. Finally, quite significant differences between the countries emerge in the item "To feel as a...". This is seen as an important national characteristic significantly more often by the Irish, the Danes and Austrians, and by Hungarians and Bulgarians (mean values 1.5 and lower, indicating high importance). It is considered as significantly less important by the British, the Germans (West and East), by the Latvians and the Russians (mean values 1.9 and lower). Thus, here again there is no distinction between East and West Europe, but rather one between the larger and smaller nations.

Three preliminary general conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, again there is no neat distinction between state-nations and ethno- or culture-nations. While the two South European and the East European countries could be assigned more to the latter concept, we cannot find evidence for the
existence of the first type. The Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and a few others would be candidates in the first place, but their population also considers language—primarily a cultural criterion—as very important. The same is true for Austria and Ireland whose populations mention both political (citizenship) and ethno-cultural criteria (religion, feel as a member) as very important.

Second, it seems that the populations of Great Britain and Germany, two of the larger countries, are not characterized by a particular high level of national identity and consciousness. This applies particularly to Germany (see also Topf et al., 1990). Contrary to what one might have expected, the populations of the smaller European countries are more conscious of their national identity than the populations of the larger countries.

Third, people in the Catholic countries (Spain, Portugal, Ireland, to some weaker degree also Austria) clearly mention religion (being a Christian) more frequently as an important criterion for national identity than the Protestant or mixed countries (Germany, Netherlands) or the former communist countries. However, even in the former cases, religion is no more a highly significant criterion of national identity. This seems rather to be the case in former post-communist countries, like Bulgaria and Poland, where the churches have been the single institution able to preserve some degree of autonomy from the dominant state authorities.

A straightforward way to answer the question if there exist different concepts of national identity in the different parts of Europe is to carry out a cluster analysis of the items concerning the different dimensions of the concept. Here, it comes out that four clusters are the best solution to the pattern emerging from the eight items considered. The resulting clusters, however, do not form a coherent pattern in terms of the main parameters of differentiation within Europe (West-East, North-South). Rather, the following groups of countries (clusters) emerge (see the map of Europe in Figure II and the cluster characteristics in Figure III):

- Cluster 1: Ireland; this cluster is characterized in particular by the low importance of language as a characteristic of national identity.

- Cluster 2: This cluster is composed of two subgroups: Great Britain, Finland, Denmark, Germany East, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Spain; and Germany West, Switzerland, Slovakia. Generally, this cluster is characterized by a relatively low importance of religion and national ancestry.

- Cluster 3: Norway, Sweden, France; this cluster is characterized by the lowest importance of religion, but a relatively high importance of “respect institutions and laws”.

- Cluster 4: Portugal, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Russia; the countries in this heterogeneous cluster (in terms of geography) show middle levels in most characteristics; slightly more important than in the mean are the values in connection to religion, ancestry and feeling close to the country.
Thus, our general conclusion is confirmed again: in terms of the meaning of “national identity”, no neat distinction between the macro regions of Europe, differentiated from each other by history, language, dominant religion and so forth can be found. There are some indications that items associated with the state-nation concept are supported more in the West and North, and those associated with the ethno- or culture-nation concept more in the East and South. However, throughout Europe, both aspects—the political and the ethno-cultural—get strong support among the population. There do not exist two fundamentally different concepts of “nation” as many theorists have maintained.

(7) Based on a cluster analysis of 8 characteristics of national identity.
Local, national and European identity

The final issue to be analysed here concerns the relations between local, national, and European identity. This differential attachment to different geographical-territorial units concerns cognitive, emotional and conative (action-related) aspects of national identity. The cognitive aspect includes knowledge about the history, structure and relevance of these different contexts; the emotional aspect, the love or attachment to these levels or units (8); the conative aspect concerns the issue of active engagement at these different levels. Hypothesis 3 stated that we can distinguish three kinds of primary attachments here: localists should be oriented mainly to their immediate territorial contexts—their neighbourhood, village, town and, maybe, county or province; nationalists should be oriented mainly to their nation-state; and Europeans (or cosmopolitans) should be oriented to an even higher-level unity such as Europe or humanity as a whole.

As a first test for this hypothesis, a factor analysis of the 4 items was carried out. The findings to this analysis are relatively straightforward (see Table III): looking at the whole sample, there exists only one factor on which the attachment to all 4 geographical-territorial levels loads positively. The same structure emerges in 17 out of the 21 countries if one looks at the data country-by-country. Thus, also our hypothesis about the existence of 3 quite different kinds of territorial identification is clearly disproved. In the overall sample, the most highly loading items are the first 3 (attachment to town or city, county and nation); only the highest level—that of the continent (Europe)—does have a weaker relation to this general dimension “territorial, regional and national attachment”.

### Table III. — The relation between local, regional, national and European identity: results of factor analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Total Sample*</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How close do you feel to...</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... your town-city</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... your [county]</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... your [country]</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Method: Principal component analysis. Varimax with Kaiser normalization.*


(8) In German language, there exist several concepts for capturing the attachment to the community or town and nation-state: *Ortsverbindung* (attachment to the place or community) and *Vaterlandsliebe* (love of the fatherland); *patriotism* certainly is a concept capturing similar meanings but including also the action component. The term *Heimatliebe* (love for the homeland) may include both local units and their national context.
Our hypothesis is disproved, however, also when we look at those four countries—Great Britain, France, Denmark and Finland—where two factors exist. Here, the first factor includes mainly the two items “attachment to town” and to “county”, and the second includes the items “attachment to country (nation)” and to “Europe”. Thus, we get some indication that there exists a specific attachment that could be called “localism”. This factor seems to have a weak negative relation to a European attachment. But—as in the whole sample—national and European attachments are related positively to each other! It may be noted that these four countries (maybe, with the exception of Finland) are also those where the population exhibits quite a critical attitude toward the European Union. This critical attitude is widespread and deep-going in Great Britain (Figure V). It is evident, however, also in France and Denmark, as shown, by the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty and the new Constitution, respectively, in population referenda in these two countries (9).

In the light of the predominant theory, this is again quite a surprising result. How can it be explained? We think that it does make sense if one considers that involvement on different levels of administrative-territorial units often is more complementary than exclusionary. A parliament deputy, for instance, clearly acts primarily at the national level; but his constituency and his voters are based locally. In countries with a federal constitution, like Austria, Germany and Switzerland, the Bundesländer or Kantons have played a decisive role in establishing the federal state and still are important units and actors in the political system of these countries. In Austria close attachment to a Bundesland typically goes hand in hand with a strong national identity (Bruckmüller, 1996; Haller et al., 1996). In Catalonia the majority of the population perceives itself as both Spanish and Catalan or mainly Spanish (Giner, 1990, p. 676; Diez, 1999). But local and regional attachments are also strong and growing in relatively centralized nation states as Italy (Gubert, 1992), France and Great Britain (for overviews see Blaschke, 1980; Kleinsteuber and Rossmann, 1994; Keating, 2004).

The same may be true for national and European identity. The European Union has been constructed as a common effort of the single European nation states, but has not been imposed from above by some central, unifying power. Thus, still today the heads of government and their assembly, the European Council, are the most decisive units of the European Union. A similar mechanism may be true at the level of individual identity: today, in an era of increasing interconnection between all countries of Europe and the world, citizens of a single state may feel themselves more and more as Europeans at the same time as they also become aware of their specific characteristics as Norwegians, Germans, or Italians, or even as Bavarians, Piedmontese or Catalonians.

(9) This may explain why Carey (2002) found a negative effect of national identity on the evaluation of the European Community. They also find that “a strong national identity is not necessarily a negative prediction of support for the European Union...” (p. 402).
Let us look shortly at the absolute levels of attachment and the relations between the strength of attachment to the levels of the nation-state and Europe (Figure IV). First, we can see that identification with the nation-state is by far the strongest of all forms of regional-territorial attachment: 88% of all respondents in the 21 countries feel attached “very close” or “close” to their country! Next comes the attachment to the village or neighborhood, the town and the province; as many as three-fourths of the respondents (81 and 75%, respectively) feel attached closely to these units. The attachment to Europe is considerably weaker: only 57% in the mean feel attached to the continent.

**Figure IV.** *Levels of attachment to the different regional-political units in Europe (in %)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How close do you feel to:</th>
<th>0%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>40%</th>
<th>60%</th>
<th>80%</th>
<th>100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your town-city</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your county</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Very close**  **close**  **Not very close**  **Not close at all*


There exist rather strong differences between the countries in the strength of attachment to the different territorial-regional units. But again we can see more indications of complementary and positive than of conflicting relationships. In most countries where national attachment is strong, also the attachment to Europe is stronger. There are only a few outliers whose position can be explained rather well (Figure V). Britons and particularly Russians show a relatively lower level of attachment to Europe. This is quite understandable given their history as imperial powers with close relationships to countries and provinces outside Europe. Another exception are the Germans whose attachment to the nation state is lower than that to Europe. Many studies have shown that this is a consequence of the fact that Germans still suffer from the trauma of National Socialism and their responsibility for the Second World War and the Holocaust (Noelle-Neumann and Kocher, 1987; Buruma, 1994; Haller, 1997; Elwert, 1999; Westle, 1999). Finally, Hungarians stand out for an extremely high level of both national and European identity. This might also have to do with their particular historical experience as a very unique nation (in terms of language and culture) which gained its true independence only after the breakdown of the communist system in Central and East Europe. They might perceive European integration as the best safeguard for the preservation of their national independence.

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We can investigate the issue of the relationship between national and European attachment directly by looking at the findings of a multivariate analysis with the variable “feeling close to Europe” as the dependent variable. Among the independent variables, also the two dimensions of national identity—the state-nation and the ethno-cultural nation orientation—were included.

First, we carried out a multilevel analysis with the same micro and macro variables as in Table II. It turned out that none of the macro level variables was statistically significant. This is an interesting finding in itself. It indicates that the attachment to Europe is similar all over Europe, in the West as in the East, and among both members and non-members of the European Union. In our opinion, this finding also makes clear that we should not equate the concept of “Europe” with that of the European Union. This is done by political elites again and again when they try to win the consent of citizens for the process of integration and speak of “Europe”, “European values”, the maturity of a country “for Europe” and the like, when they in fact mean the European Union.

Also at the micro-level, only a few variables have statistically significant effects on the attachment to Europe: it may be seen as corresponding to the dominant theoretical approach, sketched out in our first part, that people inclined to the state-nation concept are attached more to Europe, as well as people with conservative and rightist political orientations. However, this
does not apply to Protestant and Orthodox people who are attached less to Europe. Furthermore, if both parents are citizens a person feels just as little close to Europe. So, the findings concerning European attachment again do not confirm the dominant approach which posits a contradiction between national and European identity and considers national identity as an outdated one and European orientation as a modern one.

Summary and discussion

Today, we live in the age of globalization. In Europe, this process has been accompanied by the breakdown of the division of Europe between East and West, and by a pervasive process of political integration. In this situation, it becomes a central theoretical and political issue how far nation states can still be considered as important and autonomous political units and national identity and affiliation as modern political orientations.

In the first part of this paper, we started from an influential school of thinking which posits that nation states more and more are loosing their autonomy and influence, and national identity becomes an outdated, conservative or even reactionary attitude which should be substituted by a European or cosmopolitan orientation. Following this line of thinking, we have deduced four concrete, testable hypotheses.

Our findings contradicted most of these hypotheses. First, they failed to show that there exists a distinction between a state-nation and an ethno-cultural nation concept; throughout Europe, people consider both the political and the ethno-cultural elements as central components of their national identity (see also Jones and Smith, 2001a, 2001b). Instead of this distinction, an alternative one was found: that between the ascribed and between the functional or action-related components of national identity. The first contains national ancestry, the birth in a country and citizenship; the second contains the respect of the institutions and laws of a country and the mastering of its language. Negative findings came out also concerning the second hypothesis: we could not find that the more traditional people and social groups were leaning toward the ethno-cultural, and the more modern ones (the younger, the better educated, etc.) toward the state-nation concept. Only weak indications were found regarding the prevalence of these different concepts in different macro-regions of Europe: rather, the state-nation concept is prevalent also in many East European countries. Finally, no distinction was found between local, regional and national orientations on the one side, and a true European orientation on the other side. On the contrary, a positive connection between these different affiliations exists in most of the countries.

Thus, all the findings suggest that the widely accepted distinction between a state-nation and an ethno-cultural concept of nation has to be qualified if we consider the attitudes of the general public. It may be that our negative finding in this regard has to do with the method used and data available. May be that in-depth interviews, as well as a more extended list of the characteris-
tics of a nation (including all the criteria mentioned in Smith 1991, for instance) in a standardized survey could give results more in line with the hypotheses tested. However, we think that the main reason for the disconfirmation of our hypotheses was a serious flaw in the underlying theoretical concept. The distinction between a "state-nation" and an "ethno-
nation" seems to confound an ideal type with reality. In reality, every state
must exhibit at least some degree of cultural integration as it must be based on
a politically conscious civil society (through active participation of the citi-
zens). The distinction between the ethno-cultural and state-nation has also
become so popular in the West because it is implicitly value-laden (the
"good" and modern state-nation, the traditionalistic ethnonation). However,
we know that also state-nations like France or the United States exerted
strong pressures toward creating cultural homogeneity among their citizens
and try to restrict immigration from countries very different in ethno-cultural
terms. Our findings have shown that the political and cultural, even ethnic,
aspects of national identity are considered as being important in all European
countries. If there is a distinction between different components of national
identity, it is, rather, between characteristics which have a more or less
ascribed character (these include even citizenship) on the one side, and char-
acteristics that are related to social and political involvement and behavior at
the level of the different political units, on the other side.

How can these findings be reconciled with the theoretical thinking about
local-regional, national and supra-national political affiliations? In our
opinion, there exists another tradition in this area which is much better able to
integrate our findings than the one sketched out in the first part of our paper.
Following sociologists like Simmel (1923), Mead (1983) and Elias (1987), we
would argue that the distinctive characteristic of modern social ties is not
their range or "universality" so that only those persons are truly modern who
identify themselves with overall humanity. Rather, modernity lies mainly in
the fact that one is able to develop and maintain multiple, complementary
identities once at a time. For instance, we can consider it as a sign of a
universal humanitarian ethos ("cosmopolitanism") if somebody is engaged in
a local social civic or political project in the same way as it is a sign of
modernity to engage in a world-wide movement such as Greenpeace or
Amnesty International. Ailon-Souday and Kunda (2003) have shown that
national identity can be used by the members of globalized organizations as a
resource in their social struggles. Edmunds and Turner (2001) found among
the generation of post-war British women a new type of "cosmopolitan
nationalism". If nationalism is a traditional attitude, it is at the same time a
modern one in the same way as family relations continue to persist but at the
same time have changed from traditional to modern forms. Moreover, there
exists not only one (the Western) model of nationalism, but several different
which all can contribute to modernization (Spohn, 2003).

From this point of view, it seems wrong to characterize rationalism as only
a negative, exclusionary and aggressive ideology. One cannot deny that these
facts are often associated with nationalism. Yet, they can be seen as exaggera-
tions of attitudes which –on their positive side– have important and indispensable societal functions. All fundamental and positive human attitudes, or even virtues and values, have a corresponding negative side; the positive attitudes and emotions are often associated with them in a subliminal way, or can even capsize abruptly into their opposite (examples include love and hate, pride and arrogance, thriftlessness and avarice). The concept of “patriotism” has since long been used to denote these positive aspects; as a patriot we may denote not only a person who feels attached strongly to his or her nation, but –may be in the first instance– a person who engages actively in the daily and public life of his/her political community (Anderson, 1991, p. 141 ff.; Miller, 2000).

In this perspective, also the cultural and ethnic components of national identity cannot be dismissed as being only of a traditional character. Some of them –such as language– are basic for a positive attitude toward an active participation in the political community. Therefore, they are also essential for national identity. People all over Europe seem to be conscious of this fact (see also Billig, 1995; Schöpflin, 2000, p. 16). From this point of view, the slight predominance of the ethno-cultural concept of national identity in East and South Europe has a very interesting concomitant. When we look at the items concerning immigration and ethnic minorities (which were also included in the module on “National Identity”) a significant difference between West and North Europe on one side, and East and South Europe on the other side turns out. People in most of the latter parts of Europe have much less negative attitudes toward immigration and they are more in favour that immigrants and ethnic minorities maintain their customs and traditions and that the state supports them in this endeavour. From the alternative viewpoint sketched above, we may say that the preservation of small languages and cultures, as well as the granting of political rights and autonomy to immigrants and minorities are not only basic human rights but involve also a progressive element (Bauböck, 1994; Guibernau, 1996; Miller, 2000; Schnapper, 2003). We may note here that the European Union is not a very positive model in this regard. The preservation of minority rights so far has not been among its overriding aims. The Union recognizes, for instance, all national languages the small the number of their speakers may be (in the case of the Maltese a few hundred thousands), but not minority languages within nation states even if they are spoken by millions of people (as in the case of Catalan, for instance).

From such a point of view, a different perspective follows also as far as the relationship between the attachment to different levels of political units is concerned. Instead of a contradictory or even antagonistic relation we must posit a complementary relationship between local-regional, national and European identity: people who are attached closely to their local town and areas, are also attached more strongly to their nation, people who are attached strongly to their nation, would also be attached more closely to Europe (Schöpflin, 2000, p. 30).
Two general conclusions seem to emerge from these findings. First, nationalism and the nation-state cannot be considered as becoming less and less important vis-à-vis larger political units; even in the age of globalization, nation states remain the most powerful actors on the international scene (Weiss and Reinprecht, 1998; Haller and Hadler, 2004/2005). The relevance of nationalism may even increase as a consequence of many recent developments, such as reluctance of states to give away sovereignty; new means of communication which can also be used by national subgroups; the return to tradition in a context of continuous change; the intensification of individual’s consciousness as a consequence of globalization (Guibernau, 1996, p. 146 ff.). The process of integration in West and Central Europe should not obscure this fact which is quite evident elsewhere in the world (e.g., North America, South or East Asia). Support for this thesis was also found in this paper which showed that attachment to the nation state is still much stronger than attachment to Europe as a whole. Such a finding is also fully in accord with the result that a central component of national identity is active involvement and participation. The smaller a political unit, the more numerous and variegated are the opportunities for such forms of participation (Kohr, 1962). From this point of view, also the builders of the European Union are well advised not to aim toward the creation of a new huge and centralized super-state. Rather, the Union should only aim to remain a new kind of federal union of states which preserves far-reaching autonomy to its constituting units, the nations and provinces (Haller, 1994a, 1994b, 1996; Keating, 2004). Such a framework is also advised in view of the fact that in different countries and regions of Europe, quite different aspirations and aims seem to be attached with European unification.

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APPENDIX

**TABLE IV. – Macro indicators for 19 members of the European Union, Switzerland and Russia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP per capita in PPS a</th>
<th>Ethnic homogeneity b</th>
<th>Dominant religion (ISSP 2003 in %)</th>
<th>Rate of foreigners c</th>
<th>Residence for citizenship d, e, f</th>
<th>Type of citizenship law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>cath.</td>
<td>prot.</td>
<td>orth.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>119.9</td>
<td>91.1% Austrian</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>110.2</td>
<td>93.6% French</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany-East</td>
<td>107.6</td>
<td>91.5% German</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany-West</td>
<td>107.6</td>
<td>91.5% German</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>65% German</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>97% Portuguese</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>72.3% Castilian Spaniards</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>92.1% English, Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>133.9</td>
<td>95% Irish</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>120.6</td>
<td>95.5% Danish</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>111.7</td>
<td>93.4% Finnish</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>145.9</td>
<td>95.9% Norwegian</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>113.8</td>
<td>90.8% Swede</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>90.4% Czech</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>92.3% Hungarian</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>96.7% Polish</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>79.8% Russian</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>85.8% Slovak</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>83.1% Slovene</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:


d www.migration-online.de

e www.migration-info.de

f www.gruene.at

g http://www.castelligasse.at/Politik/Staatsbuerger/staatsbuerger.htm

(10) *Ius sanguinis* (since 2005).
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